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Reconciling Liberal Democratic Citizenship Values with Traditional Arab Societies: the case of Jordan

Kamal Iskandar Abdel-Nour

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Education

University of Bath


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


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Abstract

The word 'democracy' today generally signifies a liberal form of democracy, which provides citizens with both a public sphere in which they have their say in running their affairs, and a private sphere where basic negative freedoms are enshrined.

Globalization and the knowledge economy have served to accent diversity as characteristic of late modern democratic societies, and ground belief in individual and social construction and consumption of knowledge. Given the liberal understanding of democracy, this research argues that diversity, which is extending its reach into Arab societies, especially in Arab states that have established democratic institutions, puts demands on citizenship education programmes in these states not only to help students develop a capacity to respect other ways of life, but also to help students develop a capacity for reasoning and critical thinking that allows them to make their own choices and decisions, which would lead to their development as autonomous individuals.

Individual autonomy as a liberal ideal could be argued to encourage students to reflect on their own 'inherited' ways of life, which may come into conflict with traditional sources of authority such as religion, tradition and the state. This research argues that a reasonable approach for citizenship education in democratizing Arab states could be grounded in John Rawls' political liberalism which, while providing a framework for liberal democratic citizenship education, also provides room for reasonable traditional ways of life to preserve their place in society.

To illustrate some of the tensions between democratic citizenship values and traditional sources of authority, chapter three sets to analyze some aspects of the citizenship education programme in Jordan in which reconciling the traditional with the modern is among the overarching objectives. Analysis is based on Norman Fairclough's three dimensional critical discourse analysis model.

List of Abbreviations

AHDR	Arab Human Development Report
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
ERfKE	Educational Reform for Knowledge Economy
JCE	Jordanian citizenship education
MoE	Ministry of Education
PL	Political liberalism
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

Overview

The main question of this research enquiry is how to reconcile liberal democratic citizenship values with traditional representations of the social world dominant in Arab societies.

Arab societies, for different historical, cultural, political and economic reasons, could be described as traditional. They are traditional in the sense that they have a tendency for emphasising the authority of religion, tradition and the state in the aim of maintaining political stability and enhancing social cohesion. At the same time, there are increasing internal demands in these societies for liberating political, economic and social systems. Furthermore, globalization, the knowledge economy and the opening-up of Arab societies to the more liberal West, in particular, have significant influences on the dynamics within Arab societies, particularly those that present themselves to the world as democracies, including Jordan.

This same struggle between the forces of tradition and the forces of democratisation is transferred to national educational systems in these countries. While traditional representations of the social world are powerful and present themselves forcefully in different aspects of the curricula, developments in the direction of liberal democracy that some Arab societies have made (and are still making) place increasing demands on educational programmes to pay more attention to helping students develop liberal democratic citizenship values including reasoning, deliberation, rational decision making and tolerance of individual as well as group diversity.

With this in mind, this study argues that attempts to reconcile liberal democratic citizenship values with traditional representations of the social world (dominant in Arab societies) are bound to create tensions. Liberal democratic citizenship values that this study is concerned with are those that could be argued to help students develop a capacity for tolerating group and individual diversity, and, at the same time, those needed for helping students develop a capacity for rational autonomy.

The citizenship education programme in Jordan is taken as an example to

highlight some of the tensions that may result from introducing liberal democratic citizenship values into a citizenship education programme that emphasizes a traditional outlook. The interest of this study in the Jordanian citizenship education programme arises from the fact that one of its main objectives is to help students develop a capacity for reconciling traditional orientations of society with liberal democratic citizenship values including tolerance of diversity, openness to other cultures, reasoning and critical thinking (Ministry of Education 2005a).

The Jordanian citizenship education (henceforth JCE) approach to addressing these tensions emphasises the role of traditional sources of authority which is one way for naturalising one form of discourse and suppressing others, which, this research argues, highlights the problem of 'individual freedoms' as a discourse related problem that has social implications. Norman Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) three-level analytical model is used as a framework for analysing aspects of the JCE programme in relation to this problem. The aim of the analysis is to highlight reasons for presenting an image of the social world in which the issue of individual freedoms is not a main concern. Analysis shows that a reconciliatory solution to citizenship education that presents liberal democratic citizenship values as a subset of traditional cultural and religious values, while it has some virtue in presenting Jordan as a 'decent' 'well-ordered' society, in Rawlsian terms, seems ordained to be less successful in helping students develop liberal democratic citizenship values of either diversity or autonomy.

Views, within the wider liberal democratic theory, regarding teaching democratic citizenship values are divided. Those in favour of teaching democratic citizenship could be seen to lie between two opposite ends of a spectrum. On one side are those who give utmost importance to tolerating cultural and religious diversity and, on the other side, are those who place rationality and autonomy at the core of liberal education.

Advocates of tolerance of cultural and traditional diversity argue that a rational autonomy-dedicated approach to citizenship education would undermine traditional ways of life that do not have the same appreciation for the value of rational autonomy. Religious and cultural norms and values in traditional societies represent a holistic way of life, it is argued, and adherence to these ways is a general expectation from members of these societies. On this account, one of the main aims of education is to transmit from one generation to another the

necessary basis for reproducing cultural and religious heritage, which is threatened by a form of citizenship education that advances the development of rational autonomy over all other values (Stolzenberg 1993, Galston 1995, Wahlstrom 2005).

At the opposite end of the spectrum, advocates of rational autonomy argue that while diversity is one of the characteristics of modern democratic societies, liberal societies cannot accept all different forms of diversity. On this account, there is an ever greater need for individuals to be equipped with the skills and dispositions that allow them to look critically at the different conceptions of the good present in liberal democratic societies and be able to make rational judgments between these conceptions. On this view, a core objective of political education is aiding students in developing a capacity for rational autonomy that helps them make better informed decisions (Gutmann 1995, Levinson 1999, Jewell 2005).

Developments in the age of globalization and the knowledge economy suggest that understandings of citizenship education that side completely either with the rational autonomy argument or the tolerance of diversity argument are not sufficient for preparing students for living in modern democratic societies. Post-modern theory provides a convincing account in favour of diversity. The wide spread of knowledge and the easier access to its different types has led to undermining claims to absolute truth that modernity's big theories, such as Marxism and Hegelianism, make. These developments, as Lyotard (1984) argues, have further facilitated the transformation of these theories into 'little narratives' that exist among other little narratives, which are more or less of equal status. At the same time, as Giddens (1998) argues, plurality and choice that are becoming more dominant features of modern societies, are paving the way for the emergence of a new form of individuality. Youngsters are becoming more than ever before in charge of making their own decisions in relation to many aspects of social life. As youngsters are becoming more independent, traditional sources of authority, including the family, school, religion and state, are pushed to the side even further.

John Rawls (1993a, 2001) argues that modern democratic societies comprise different ways of life. These different ways of life, while they could be reasonable, are often incompatible. The incompatibility of the different reasonable ways of life that these societies are bound to accommodate highlights the need for a broader

understanding of citizenship education that brings together the demands of tolerating traditional diversity and those of rational autonomy. Rawls, this research argues, provides a view of liberalism that can accommodate such opposite viewpoints and creates educational opportunities in Arab countries. Based on this, this study presents a citizenship education model that is grounded in Rawls' political liberalism. This model, it argues, is more capable than the traditional Jordanian model, the tolerance of diversity dedicated approach and the autonomy-dedicated approach in addressing the demands and needs of Jordan and other democratizing Arab countries that share some common features with Jordan (as the first Chapter explains).

Chapter One

Democratic citizenship and the Arab world

The aim of the account below is to give an idea about the roots of the liberal/traditional divide in contemporary Arab thinking and how political developments in the region favoured political systems in which authority was vested in one party. Two main reasons are identified in literature in relation to the slow progress of democracy in Arab countries: political systems that have authoritarian tendencies is one (and this, to varying degrees, is common in different Arab states) and Islam is identified as another (Abu Khalil 1993). These two obstacles are explored in sections 1.4 and 1.5 below.

Despite differences between (and within) Arab societies, emphasis on traditional sources of authority, namely, religion, tradition and the state, is one characteristic that they, to varying degrees, share and is dominant over liberal representations of the social world. Such a dominant representation has its influence on current understandings of education in Arab states and is reflected in their educational programmes.

This study takes Jordan as an example of one Arab country that started, in the nineteen eighties, introducing democratic reform to its political system. Political reform was followed by several processes of educational reform, the first comprehensive one started in 1987 and the most recent in 2003. Citizenship education is one discipline that received special attention in these reforms. A citizenship education programme was introduced by the 1987 educational reform and continued to be one of the focal points of the 2003 reform.

One of the main aims of the 1987 citizenship education programme, which was maintained in the 2003 reform, was to help young Jordanians develop as balanced individuals who have a strong sense of belonging to their cultural and religious roots, and at the same time, be open to accepting and engaging with other points of view (Ministry of Education 1991, 2005a).

While analysis of the Jordanian citizenship education programme will be introduced in Chapter Three (in illustration of tensions that may be encountered as a result of reconciling traditional inclinations with liberal democratic values), the current chapter introduces the rationale for the 2003 educational reform in general

and the citizenship education element in particular.

This chapter also introduces the concept of 'liberal democracy' as an amalgamation of two different ideals: democracy and liberalism, taking into account that within the liberal tradition, there are different understandings of both ideals. In order to identify common features of liberal democratic systems, section 1.3 identifies similarities and differences between modern and ancient understandings of democracy and introduces a general understanding of the concept of liberal democracy.

1.1 The Arab world, a shared classical culture

Politically, the 'Arab world' comprises twenty-two countries that currently form the Arab League of Nations. These countries are: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco¹, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

Despite differences between Arab countries, it could be argued that they share characteristics (and interests) that bring them together as a league of nations. These characteristics are mainly a religion that is shared by most Arabs, a common official language and, to some extent, a shared history. While none of these characteristics is uncontested, their influence in creating a culture that different Arabs share should not be underestimated.

An example of how these unifying characteristics could be challenged can be found in the work of Egyptian writers such as Ahmed Lutfi el-Sayed, Salamah Moussa and Taha Hussein, whose writings became popular in the first half of the Twentieth Century. These intellectuals, among others, did not see Egypt, on cultural, geographic, and historical bases, to form a natural extension of an Arab world. They argued that the Arab civilization was imposed on Egypt, and Egyptians had to seek their distinct Egyptian identity that roots back to the old pharaonic civilization (Matloub, 1994). Some Maronites in Lebanon, Kurds in Iraq and Berbers in North Africa are among others who present similar arguments. Another example could be realized in Arab states such as Djibouti, Comoros and

¹ Western Sahara is administered by Morocco and hence is not listed separately. However, this area is also claimed by the Polisario Front, which declares a government in exile.

Somalia, where Arabic language, while it is used for religious purposes, is not a main spoken language by the majority of population, who speak Somali instead.

Out of the twenty-two Arab states that form the Arab League, this study only concerns those among them in which the Arabic language is spoken by the majority of their population. This condition is necessary, as explained in this section below, as language is a main vehicle for the spread of cultural norms and practices. Among these Arabic language-speaking countries, this study only concerns these states that have already done some work towards establishing some of the fundamental features of a democracy. These fundamental features include a *“government based on majority rule and the consent of its governed, the existence of free and fair elections, the protection of minorities and respect for human rights”* (Kekic 2007 p1). Based on this, Arabic language-speaking countries that have taken steps towards establishing democratic systems will be referred to as ‘democratizing Arab countries’.

The geographic spread of the Islamic Empire, since it started in the Seventh Century, brought different nations under its jurisdiction. Many of these nations continued, under successive rules, to form a political unit until World War One, when, as a result of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (that ruled over much of the Arab states that currently belong to the Arab League), Arab land started to break down into modern nation states.

The ‘Arab civilization’ that grew during the high period of Islam was not brought by the invaders who came from the Arabian Peninsula, nor it was purely Islamic. Rather, it grew in collaboration between different peoples who belonged to different civilizations. The two main contributions that Arabs brought to this new civilization were their language and their faith (Hitte 1946, Lewis 1993). Over time, the Arabic language became the language of a multicultural society as well as its means for communicating and transmitting its civilization. As for the other contribution, Islam became the official religion of the empire, and law and order were maintained through the application of Islamic religious law, the *Shari’a*.

The spread of Islam throughout the Islamic empire, while it had (and still has) a major influence in creating a common culture among Muslims around the Arab world, also made the spread of the Arabic language easier. Classical Arabic being the language of the holy Qur’an kept its status over the years as the official

language of the Islamic Empire. The use of classical Arabic as the main means of communication, including education, jurisdiction, science, intellectual activities, official trade transactions, and its projections on the way people think and behave, aided the spread of a 'classical culture' that Arab societies share (al-Jabri 1994a).

Currently, while different societies within the larger Arab world have their own 'vernacular cultures', they share a classical culture that is encoded in classical Arabic and which is transmitted from one generation to the next through family upbringing, public education, television, radio programmes, newspapers and magazines, among other means. This is not to say, though, that such means do not participate in transmitting private vernacular cultures, but vernacular cultures were mostly not preserved in writings. They were mainly transferred, as al-Jabri (1994a) writes, from one person to another and from one generation to another through tales, food recipes, traditional dances and songs, etc. This part of culture, while it kept on developing and adapting under daily living experiences and interactions between different people, was kept local. The classical part of culture, on the other hand, is the one that is preserved in literature and is transmitted as the recorded memory of the Arab world.

1.2 The development of modern Arab thought

Until the advent of the Nineteenth Century, Arabs, living under Ottoman rule, regarded their cultural and religious heritage as their main reference (Bulkzeez 2001). The encounter with the West, which happened through different means, starting from the invasion of Egypt by Napoleon in 1798 and then by sending and inviting official delegates to and from Europe to benefit from the experiences that turned Europe into an imperial power, had a shock effect on Arab societies that had been living a long period of stagnation and isolation (Hitte et al 1949, Lewis 1993, Tamimi 2000).

The exposure to Nineteenth Century Europe challenged traditional Arab Islamic epistemologies and general ways of life. It initiated a project that aimed to modernize state institutions and different aspects of public life, including the military and the introduction of modern schooling systems similar to those found in Europe during that period of time (Hitte et al 1949). This marked the start of a lively intellectual period in the Arab world, known in literature as the awakening (*al-*

Nahdah) period. Writings during this period were influenced by an atmosphere of openness and freedom that Europe started to experience earlier (Bulkzeez 2001, Adonese 2002).

In the Nineteenth Century, two constitutional changes were introduced by the Ottoman government of that time that are of relevance to this study. Firstly, equal rights were granted to all Ottoman citizens regardless of their race or religion. This included equal opportunities for enrolment in state schools and state employment. The second was the introduction of new civil coded laws in place of the *Shari'a* law. The new civil laws were based on the French law, but were adapted to suit Muslim culture, and the administration of these laws was made the role of a newly created Ministry of Justice instead of Muslim judges, *qadies* (Mansfield 1991, Cleveland 2000)

The progress of life in the Arab world along liberal lines prompted the revival of a form of literature that was ancestral in its reference (Bulkzeez 2001, Adonese 2002, Gelvin 2005). Despite variations within this line of thinking, its advocates generally interpreted the political, military and economic lagging behind of the Arab civilization to be a result of abandoning the means of their ancestors who made the Arab civilization a central one (Esposito 1988, Gelvin 2005).

This liberal-ancestral divide, while it developed early in the Nineteenth Century, is still a main constituent of contemporary political dialogue in the Arab world. At the present time, al-Jabri (1994b) writes, Islamists and liberals are two groups in the Arab world who present competing visions concerning the type of reform that ought to be pursued in Arab societies, and the struggle between them, at least at the level of values, is affecting different aspects of life, including education. In between these two groups, as Filali-Ansari (1998) writes, lie the majority of Arabs who are "*alternately attracted to one or the other of these two currents of thought*" (p157).

Currently, Saudi Arabia is the only modern Arab country that was established based on the *Shari'a* Law. As for the rest of Arab countries, while some of them have judicial systems that build on the *Shari'a*, most countries in the Middle East and North Africa maintain a dual judicial system: a religious system and a modern civic one which in Jordan, as an example, is still modelled on the French law. The religious judicial system regulates marriage, divorce and inheritance issues, while

the civic system regulates all other aspects (Esposito 2000).

The sustaining of dual judicial systems in most of the Arab world suggests that the separation between the religious and the public is not an alien concept at least for those who live under such dual judicial systems. This point, however, will be further taken up in section 4.4 below.

Intellectual life that started to progress during the Nineteenth Century was disrupted by a major event that cast its shadow over different parts of the Arab world. With the end of the First World War, the Arab region was divided, under the Sykes-Picot Agreement², into states that were placed under European colonial rule until they claimed their independence at different times around the middle of the Twentieth Century. During the colonial period, the lively and diversified 'awakening' literature started to narrow down in its scope (al-Jabri 1994a). Literature during this period mainly revolved around military struggle and the political situation in the region, and other aspects of intellectual life, as Bulkzeez (2001) writes, were brought to a halt.

Arab states that emerged from colonial rule, while they enjoyed high morale, were economically exhausted. The struggle for independence and the urgent need for development in the post independence era favoured, as Macpherson (1966) writes, the emergence of one-party political systems (or in some cases a multiparty political systems in which overwhelming dominance is claimed by one single party). The priority was to focus efforts on achieving desired economic and social developments in the most efficient way possible, and therefore a strong disciplined leadership seemed to be, at that time, a reasonable option.

However, in the aftermath of the defeat of the combined Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian forces³ in the six-day Arab-Israeli War (in June 1967) and particularly during the 1970s, Arab citizens started to realize that, owing to factors including inefficient centralized economic policies, authoritarian tendencies of Arab régimes

² In May 1916 the Governments of Britain and France (with the assent of the Russian Government) signed a secret agreement to divide the Ottoman Empire after its anticipated defeat in World War One. This agreement led to partitioning the Middle East by establishing nation states (Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan) that were placed under the mandate and control of either Britain or France. Some argue that the agreement betrayed promises that were already given by the British Government to the Hashemite leader, Hussein ibn Ali for his role in the war against the Ottomans. These promises, that were made official by the so-called 'the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence', supported an Arab independence and their receiving an important share in the won territory (Milton-Edwards 2000).

³ These forces were backed by troops contributed by Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

and external pressures, Arab governments were unable to bring about the economic and social reform they had promised (Gelvin 2005). It was during this period, the nineteen seventies, when Islamists started to build their wide popular base (Tamimi 2001, Gelvin 2005).

As far as education is concerned, the need for human capital to push the process of development in the post-colonial era placed pressures on Arab governments to invest in different educational projects all at the same time. Among these projects were literacy campaigns, the expansion of formal schooling systems and investments in higher education institutions⁴. These projects, according to Mazawi (2006), placed strains on *“planning priorities, the allocation of natural resources, the quality of training programmes and the economic viability of many schools and higher education systems”* (p982).

It was not until the nineteen eighties that different Arab states started to take steps towards liberating their political systems (Arab Human Development Report⁵ [henceforth AHDR] 2002). Democratic reform that Arab governments started to implement was mainly a response to economic crises that prompted, in some cases, violent public protests, as in the case of the events in Tunisia in 1984, Algeria in 1988 and Jordan in 1989 (Brand 1999, Tessler 1999, Milton-Edwards 2000). Protests were generally against increasing consumption-oriented behaviours of middle and upper social classes at a time when the economic situation of the masses was deteriorating (Tessler 1999). But more importantly, as Tessler explains, they were directed against political leaders whose actions were largely perceived to be responsible for declining economic and social standards, and against government systems in which patronage and personal, family and tribal contacts were becoming characteristics of these systems.⁶

⁴ Three quarters of Arab universities were established in the last quarter of the Twentieth Century and 57% of them were established in the last fifteen years (AHDR 2003)

⁵ The Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) is published by the United Nations Development Programme, and is prepared by an independent group of Arab scholars, policymakers and practitioners. The report is annual and the first one was published in 2002.

⁶ In the case of Jordan, the riots followed the deterioration in the value of the Jordanian currency, the Dinar, and the increase in the price of bread and other basic goods following austerity measures demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A document of the demands of a group of demonstrators in the city of Karak included demands for the resignation of the government and the formation of a new one that could be responsive to the needs of the people; would hold accountable those responsible for corruption and embezzlement of public funds irrespective of their status; would reverse the rise in prices; would conduct free and fair parliamentary elections; would replace the current election law with a modern democratic one, and would declare full solidarity with the Palestinian struggle until all their national rights were seen to be fully restored. A delegation from the city of Salt presented similar demands to the King (Mahafthah 2001).

In addition to these internal demands for democracy, recent years have also witnessed increasing external demands that were mainly initiated by the tragic attacks on the United States of America on eleventh of September 2001. These attacks invited attention to national educational programmes of different Arab states, which to varying extents were accused of nourishing dogma and producing young men and women who were incapable of seeing the other point of view. Salama (2002), in a report on education in the Gulf states, writes that these accusations urged some Arab states, including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, to start a review process for some aspects of their national curricula in an attempt to pay more attention to values and attitudes that would encourage cultural openness and conflict resolution. Other countries (Yemen, as an example) closed some religious institutions that were seen to broadcast radical religious views (Salama 2002).

1.3 What does the term 'liberal democracy' entail?

In reading democracy, we do not all refer to the same textbook. Historically, the liberal democratic model developed and experienced widely in capitalist western societies is not the only political system that claims the title 'democratic'. Back in 1966, Macpherson, who is an advocate of a more participatory public-based democratic model, wrote

"[w]e in the West have achieved a unique political system, a combination of liberal state and democratic franchise. But we should not appropriate for it a title –democracy- which not only used to have a very different meaning, but which also now has a different meaning in the whole non-Western world. When we mean liberal-democracy we should say liberal democracy" (Macpherson, 1966 p12).

Liberal democracy, as already mentioned in the introductory paragraph to this chapter, and as will be further argued in this section, is an amalgamation of two different ideals: liberalism and democracy, and the relation between these two ideals is not a direct one in the sense that one leads to the other; in fact, they can come into conflict with each other.

Macpherson (1966) identifies two models, other than the Western liberal democratic model, that claim the title 'democratic'. The first one is the communist model, which not long ago was one of the main rivals for the liberal democratic model, and until now it is still dominating in some parts of the world. Despite the

huge retreat of communism that occurred during the nineteen eighties, some of its elements are still echoing within some societies. The second model encompasses nationalist political systems like those developed in Arab countries in the post-independence period around the middle of the Twentieth Century.

However, since this research is mainly concerned with the implications of introducing liberal democratic citizenship values into citizenship education programmes of traditional Arab societies, the discussion below will be limited to liberal democratic models. This is justified by the fact that relatively recent developments in world politics, including the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of a new world order, coupled with big strides made in the field of technology, particularly the communications industry, globalization and the knowledge economy, have given liberal values an advantage over other ideologies and paved the way for the acceptance of liberal democracy as the standard form of governance.

Historically, our understanding of the term 'democracy' and its practices goes all the way back to Athens more than twenty-five centuries ago. The word '*demokratia*', which is thought to be invented by Athenians of that time to define their system of governance, meant 'rule by the people' (Dahl 1989). Despite differences between today's understandings of democracy and the classical Athenian one, some aspects of the Athenian definition of democracy still hold today. The word 'democracy', modern and classical, implies that any system of governance that does not provide its citizens with a venue to have their say (and influence), whether directly or indirectly, in the way their affairs are governed, cannot be described as democratic.

The issue, however, of how much authority should be given to 'the people' to intervene in running public life is still an issue today as it was twenty-five centuries ago. Plato, in 'The Republic' (1955), showed that he had no faith in the masses (who were referred to as democrats), accusing them of acting upon immoral beliefs. He also did not have faith in democratic systems of government, and predicted that a democracy would inevitably collapse into a tyranny (Popper [1945] 2003). Plato highlighted two concerns about democratic systems of governance: the first one is the fact that minorities could be oppressed by the 'majority', an issue later addressed with the advent of liberalism in Seventeenth Century Europe; and secondly, the fact that the masses may not be qualified to rule so

they could end up making political choices that are to their disadvantage, an issue taken up by élite theorists, early in the Twentieth Century, and then developed by Schumpeter into an élitist competitive democratic model (Holden 1974, Schumpeter 1987, Etzioni-Halevy 1993).

Aristotle, on the other hand, did not have the same bleak image of democracy, yet he did not consider it, as it is accepted today, as the best form of governance. In 'Politics', Aristotle (1981) identified three systems of governance that he recognized as capable of serving the 'common good': kingship, aristocracy and polity. Each of these systems could transform into a corrupt system of governance that serves the interests of the rulers instead. Kingship (the rule of the one) could diverge into tyranny, aristocracy (the rule of the few) into oligarchy when power shifts from the educated to the wealthy, and polity (the rule of the many) into democracy when power shifts from the educated medium wealth middle class to the poor. Polity was Aristotle's preferred system of government, in which men who were knowledgeable and able to rule, while at the same time possessing the qualities of prudence, justice and moderation, would be able to rule for the 'common good'. Out of the three divergent systems of governments, Aristotle chose democracy as the least unjustifiable system, as he saw that the rule by the poor majority is better than rule by the wealthy minority who would not be able to recognize the needs of the poor. He also saw another advantage in democracy in that a large group of ruling people are not easily corrupted and their vision would be superior to that of a man committed to excellence (Aristotle 1981).

Despite the resemblance between certain aspects of the classical Athenian concept of democracy and contemporary understandings of the term, the twenty-five century period of development introduced significant changes to the classical concept of democracy to the extent that some theoreticians and observers, such as Dahl (1989) and Sartori (1987), argue that the Athenian concept of democracy and the modern one are two different things. Greece, as Dahl (2000) explains, was not a nation state in the same way as the concept is understood today. Greece was made up of city-states that were more or less autonomous and had their own independent systems of governance. The relatively small number of citizens in a city-state, in comparison to a modern nation-state, made it possible for citizens to decide directly through general assemblies on the city's policies. In most modern democracies, however, citizens delegate decisions to

representatives chosen through elections instead of directly taking part in the decision making process.

Historically, Holden (1988) notes that while electoral representation emerged as a result of liberal ideas that started to gain momentum in Seventeenth Century Europe, the merger between liberal thought and electoral representation led to the emergence of a new form of liberal representative democracy, which nowadays the term 'democracy', more or less, signifies. It was not, however, until the Nineteenth Century, as Etzioni-Halevy (1993) writes, when the idea of representative government started to take over the older view of direct democracy in different modern nation states. This move towards electoral representation marked the first difference between modern understandings of democracy and the classical Athenian one.

The second major difference between modern understandings of democracy and the classical direct one is that in the latter only a small proportion of the city's population held citizenship rights and could participate in general assemblies. In Athens, for example, participation in general assemblies was limited to male, adult, non-slave, native born Athenians, excluding a majority of the city's population. Contemporary democracies, by contrast, assume universal suffrage of adult citizens. It was during the second half of the Nineteenth Century and the start of the Twentieth Century that different nation states started accepting, though at different times, universal suffrage as a basis for their democratic systems (Etzioni-Halevy 1993).

The third departure from the classical Athenian conception of democracy, which emerged as a result of the merger between liberalism and democracy, could be found in Friedrich Hayek's writings. In describing democracy, Hayek (1960, p117) writes, it

"is not the fountainhead of justice ... it needs to acknowledge a conception of justice which does not necessarily manifest itself in the popular view on every particular issue".

Majority vote may be regarded as a method for legitimizing a law but this does not necessarily make it a good law. Democracy in Hayek's view is not an end in itself; it is rather a means for reaching a certain end. Liberalism, Hayek argues, is the ultimate end that the state and its apparatus must seek to maintain through the rule of law. Since democracy is just a tool that serves a higher goal, its limits must

be determined in light of serving that goal, and therefore it must be judged by the ends it achieves.

Hayek's argument reflects a view of democracy as the best form of 'limited' government, which is a significant departure from the view that regards majority vote as the only limitation to democratic rule as in the classical understanding of democracy. While a classical direct form of democracy emphasized, as Sartori (1987) writes, vesting power in the hands of citizens (narrowly defined), modern liberal understandings of democracy place emphasis on limiting the array of issues that people can decide on. This eventually means restricting the government itself that draws its powers from the consent of its subjects, and in particular the majority that puts the government in power.

Liberalism and democracy, while they may come into conflict with each other, may also support one another, according to Rawls (1999). To achieve political justice, Rawls proposes the principle of equal participation which gives every citizen an equal right to participate in and influence political decision making. This principle can be satisfied through safeguards such as having one vote for each citizen, free and fair elections that are regularly held, a constitution that protects individual freedoms such as freedom of speech, assembly and political association, tolerance of opposition and difference in political opinion, and citizens having equal access to public office (Rawls 1999). This suggests that there is a positive relationship between liberalism and democracy; as for citizens to exercise self-rule effectively in a democracy, individual freedoms such as freedom of speech and political association must be guaranteed.

Hayek's definition of democracy is in line with Isaiah Berlin's concept of negative liberty. Berlin (2006) defines 'oppression' as the prevention of one's wishes by others, which could be exercised intentionally or unintentionally and/or directly or indirectly. On Berlin's negative liberty account, being free means not to be oppressed, which in turn means that one should be able to pursue his/her wishes without interference by others (and without harming others). According to this account of liberty, being free implies that one's actions are motivated by one's own ends, which may or may not be governed by self-interest.

Under Berlin's definition of negative liberty, a political system could be liberal but not necessarily democratic. A non-democratic liberal political system provides

(and protects) certain personal (civic) liberties, but it does not take its consent from its subjects and it does not involve them in the decision making process. Subjects, while they have certain personal rights, do not necessarily have full political rights.

Berlin (2006) distinguishes between an understanding of liberty that he identifies with the negative notion of liberty and another one that he terms 'positive liberty'. While negative liberty concerns the question "*what am I free to do or be?*" (p373), *positive liberty, Berlin writes, concerns the question of "by whom am I ruled?"* (p373). He identifies the positive notion of liberty with self rule or the 'freedom to', as opposed to 'freedom from' that is associated with the concept of negative liberty.

Berlin's positive concept of liberty assumes the individual to have a 'real self' that is identified with reason. Individuals, however, according to this understanding of liberty need to be educated to be free, and only then they become self-directed, deciding, conscious of themselves and responsible for their choices, as well as free of control by other people and their own uncontrolled desires.

According to Berlin (2006), those in favour of positive liberty assume that truth exists and that individuals (after they discover their real self) are able to find that truth. According to this understanding of liberty, the "*real self may be conceived as something wider than the individual... as a social 'whole' of which the individual is an element*" (Berlin 2006 pp373-374). This social whole imposes its collective will upon its members, and self-rule is achieved through collective decisions.

This dedication of the positive notion of liberty to set free those who are unable to recognize their own good by themselves or those, as Burtonwood (2006) puts it, who are "*unable to control their weaker selves so that a better self can emerge*" (p7), could twist the meaning of self rule into the opposite. While the negative notion of liberty could be interpreted to lead to an understanding of government that is liberal but undemocratic, the positive notion of liberty, as Berlin writes, runs the risk of providing reasons for despotism and tyranny.

Berlin's illustration of self-rule under the understanding of positive liberty is criticized by communitarians, such as Taylor (2006), who argue that while the struggle between the two notions of liberty is a struggle over what is more important, individual liberty or self-rule, self-rule does not have to be associated

with extreme collectivism. Against the concept of negative liberty, Taylor (2006) argues that being 'free from' is not a sufficient understanding of liberty. One's liberties are restrained if he/she, for any reason, cannot make use of the negative liberties made available to him/her. Taylor writes of a concept of freedom that leads to fulfilling one's purposes. To be free, according to Taylor, one needs to have the capacities of self-understanding, self-awareness, self-control and moral discrimination that would help him/her overcome problems such as false consciousness and fear.

In his 'Capabilities Approach', Sen (1999b) highlights another limitation of focusing on negative liberty. He argues that while none of the negative freedoms a person is entitled to may be directly repressed by a state, a citizen, as a result of being deprived of necessary capabilities, might not be able to make use of (or even recognize) these freedoms. Such deprivation could result from extreme poverty that may lead to malnourishment, limited (or no) access to clean drinking water and health and education services, or a form of education that does not help children to develop the capabilities that would allow them to realize future opportunities. There is a direct connection, Sen writes, between human development and the enhancement of people's capabilities to live more freely (Sen 1999b p36).

Between the two notions of liberty extends a spectrum from anarchism to extreme collectivism. However, whether a political system is a dictatorship, takes majority rule as its means for legislation, or adopts a minimal state approach, political power, as Rawls (1993a) describes it, is always coercive. In a democracy, however, this power is the collective power of the people. The extent of how much power a democratic state allows for its people and the admissible grounds for the exercise of this power are, as Nagel (2003) writes, among the most important features that distinguish a liberal form of democracy from democracy understood as majority rule.

Political equality, which is one of the main pillars of liberal democracy, is criticized by Gould (1988) who argues that economic inequalities created in a society as a result of protecting individual liberties result in an unequal distribution of power. This renders some societal structures, such as big economic and industrial organizations, more influential than others, or as argued by Marxists, divides the society into two classes, exploiters and exploited, which in turn puts a question

mark on the validity of political equality that liberal democracies are based on.

In summary, this section emphasizes that a liberal understanding of democracy comprises a private sphere that is maintained and protected by the state. In this private sphere, an individual is entitled to pursue all activities that are considered to lie within it without external interference as long as one's actions do not violate the rule of law. This sphere is distinguished from a public sphere where the state is obliged to interfere under the name of the collective will of its people to stop something from happening, make something happen or even to inflict punishment on those who violate the law.

The absence of a public sphere denies the right of citizens to participate in the running of their affairs and therefore such a political system cannot be described as democratic. On the other hand, in the absence of a private sphere, a political system, while it could be described as democratic, cannot be liberal democratic. While this private/public divide is well established in modern liberal thought, where to draw the line between the private and the public will always prove to be a subject for debate and change (Berlin 2006).

1.4 Political systems and the development of an understanding of liberal democracy in the Arab world

Political régimes in the Arab World are identified as one reason for the slow progress of democracy (Khuri 1993). This concern is highlighted by the 2002 Arab Human Development Report (AHDR 2002) and is reiterated in the more recent 2004 AHDR (AHDR 2004). The 2002 AHDR describes the situation in different Arab states thus:

“[w]hile de jure acceptance of democracy and human rights is enshrined in constitutions, legal codes and government pronouncements, de facto implementation is often neglected and, in some cases, deliberately disregarded” (p2).

Arab political régimes are also accused of using their authority to place restrictions on the development of a wider cross-section of opposition political parties that citizens could choose from. According to the AHDR (2002) report, Arab states are characterized by having

“a powerful executive branch that exerts significant control over all other branches of the state, being in some cases free from institutional checks and balances. Representative democracy is not always genuine ... Freedoms of expression and association are frequently curtailed. Obsolete norms of legitimacy prevail” (p2).

Given these characteristics, the model citizen, as Arab political systems would like him/her to be, is one who is politically inactive, unquestioning and does not hold ruling authorities accountable (AHDR 2004).

Among the issues that the observations made by the two AHDRs raise is the relation between democracy and liberalism. Concerning this relation, two opposite views can be found in the literature. The first view argues that while constitutional liberalism may lead to democracy (as a system of electoral representation), democracy does not lead to incorporating liberties in the constitution. The second view maintains that democracy and constitutional liberalism are intrinsically linked and one facilitates the other.

Concerning the first view, Zakaria (1997) argues that the development of the political aspect of democracy, i.e. the introduction of general or parliamentary elections to a nation state, does not lead to endorsing individual liberties as a value enshrined by the state. In Western Europe and North America, Zakaria argues, constitutional liberalism preceded and led to the establishment of electoral democracy that had to adjust and adapt to already existing established liberal constitutions in these societies, which made the two ideals that comprise the term ‘liberal democracy’ in these societies inseparable. In parts of the world where liberal constitutions are not properly established, Zakaria writes, while electoral democracy *“is flourishing; constitutional liberalism is not”* (p23). According to Zakaria, pushing elections on countries where régimes do not have much respect for individual liberties will not make these régimes more liberal and less domineering over the lives of their citizens, but rather would provide for an illiberal form of democracy which is *“dangerous, bringing with it the erosion of liberty, the abuse of power, ethnic divisions and even war”* (pp42-43).

The progress of electoral representation in the Arab world has led to strengthening the position of religious fundamentalism in both the political and social arenas (the victory of the religious fundamentalist group, Hamas, in the last parliamentary elections in Palestine is a current example). However, the popularity of Islamists among citizens of Arab countries is mainly motivated, as Tessler (1999) and

Gause (2005) argue, by rejecting existing political régimes rather than by a commitment to Islamists' political agendas. This is evidenced, as Gause (2005) writes, by the fact that Islamists do not have as much influence on voters' opinions in countries where non-Islamic parties are well established, such as Lebanon and Morocco, as they do have in other Arab countries.

Opposite to Zakaria's view, Plattner (1998) argues that while electoral democracy may not eventually develop into liberal democracy, it is a step in the right direction. Self-governance, he continues, entails many problems especially for new democracies, but abolishing elections can never be the solution. Plattner also argues, and the same point is argued by Sen (1999a), that even if democracy fails in one country, historical evidence shows that it is more likely that this country will have more chances in the future to democratize than other non-democratic countries that have never been through the democratization experience before.

Sen (1999b) argues that allowing one type of freedom to develop will pave the way for the development of other types. Political freedom, he writes, is most valued for the opportunities it makes available for citizens *"to discuss and debate -and to participate in the selection of- values in the choice of priorities"* (p30). Sen (1999a) challenges what he refers to as a Nineteenth Century concept of a country or society being *"fit for democracy"* (p2) or not, and argues that this concept is by its nature hostile to liberal democratic values. This very notion of 'being fit for democracy or not' does not only divide the world into those who culturally have the necessary credentials and those who do not, but also assumes some sort of cultural fixity, which makes claims and generalizations that are hard to defend, and at the same time ignores any educative effect for democracy. Once democracy starts, its sustainable and educative powers will keep it going and its influences permeate over the course of time reaching different aspects of life. States and societies, as Sen (1999a p2) writes, are to become *"fit through democracy"* not the other way around.

On this account and contrary to Zakaria's argument, the introduction of electoral elections (as part of the political aspect of democracy) is indeed a step in the right direction. While a more talk-centric form of democracy could be argued to be more favourable over a vote-centric one (Enslin et al 2001, Kymlicka 2002, Kymlicka and Norman 2002, Sen 1999a), electoral elections are one of the freedoms that help develop other forms of freedom, and hence, encourage the

spread of democratic culture. Education, and in particular citizenship education, is one of the means for developing skills, attitudes and values that are necessary for the development of such a culture. However, realizing the effects of democracy is not instantaneous. Helping youngsters develop democratic values, attitudes and skills is an ongoing process that requires, *inter alia*, time and dedication, and this is one of the reasons that makes formal education a suitable venue, though not the only one, for this purpose.

This section places emphasis on the importance of introducing electoral representation as a step in the right direction towards helping traditional societies develop a democratic culture. It also highlights authoritarian tendencies of political systems in Arab countries. In 'The Law of Peoples', Rawls (1993b) argues that liberal societies are obliged to respect "*other societies organized by comprehensive doctrines, provided that their political and social institutions meet certain conditions that lead the society to adhere to a reasonable law of peoples*"⁷ (p37). Arab societies are, to varying degrees, hierarchical in structure, and to that effect they could be described, in Rawlsian terms, as illiberal. This, however, does not make them essentially not 'decent'⁸. A Rawlsian (1993b) view of a well ordered hierarchical illiberal (decent) state is one that is peaceful, non-expansionist, has a legitimate legal system that protects basic human rights "*and its basic structure contains a decent consultation hierarchy*" (Rawls 1999 p5) and to this effect it could be described as decent. States that are not well ordered, on the other hand, "*cannot be accepted as members in good standing in a reasonable society of peoples*" (Rawls 1993b p37). Taking a Rawlsian stance, while not all states are expected to be liberal, not all illiberal states are not decent. Well ordered⁹ liberal states are preferable, but well ordered illiberal states are also possible.

Political systems in democratizing Arab states, while they are hierarchical in structure, are also drawn to some aspects of liberalism. To take Jordan as an example, democratic reform started in 1989, and by the start of the nineteen

⁷ By the law of peoples, Rawls (1993b p36) refers to "*a political conception of right and justice that applies to the principles and norms of international law and practice*".

⁸ In 'The Law of Peoples', Rawls (1999 p4) considers "five types of domestic societies". The first two are: "*reasonable liberal people*" and "*decent people*" that he refers to as "*well-ordered*" (p4). The other three are: "*outlaw states*", "*societies burdened by unfavourable conditions*" and "*finally societies that are benevolent absolutisms: they honor most human rights, but because they deny their members a meaningful role in making political decisions, they are not well-ordered*" (p63).

⁹ The characteristic features of a well-ordered liberal society are, according to Rawls, different from these of a well-ordered hierarchical illiberal society, and will be introduced in Section 4.3.

nineties, Jordan was often cited “as the most encouraging example of democratization in the region” (Milton-Edwards 2000 p165). According to the National Charter, Jordan is a “state for all citizens regardless of any differences of opinion or any pluralism of approach”. Jordan “derives its legitimacy ... from the free will of the people, and all authorities within it are committed to providing legal, judicial and administrative guarantees to protect the rights, integrity and basic freedoms of the individual”. The National Charter also emphasizes Jordan’s commitment to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Jordanian National Charter 1990).

Regarding parliamentary life in Jordan, the parliamentary elections of 1989 marked the return to parliamentary life after more than twenty years of disruption. The 1989 elections allowed Jordanians from different political and social orientations to run for parliamentary seats. They also marked the first experience for women to actually run for elections¹⁰. Unlike previous elected councils, the 1989 council comprised three main blocs instead of one group (that used to dominate the council and that was known for its support for the government). While the latter group still managed to present itself in the 1989 council with 35 seats, it was counterbalanced by two other major groups: Islamists won 32 seats and leftists, who mainly included Arab nationalists and communists, won 13 seats (Mahaftha 2001). With power distributed amongst the three blocs, no one group was able to claim absolute control over power. The three blocs checked and balanced each other and delegations between them as well as with the government became a necessity.

The importance of the 1989 parliamentary council is that deliberations among its members led to introducing many changes that helped revive democratic life in Jordan. Examples of these changes included putting an end to the state of emergency and martial laws, cancelling the law of anti-communism, amending the law of political parties, amending the law for print and publishing, and indeed introducing the National Charter (introduced briefly above). The National Charter was meant to act as a contract, whereby the different political and social groups agreed to be regulated by its principles (Mahaftha 2001, Hadrami and Idwan 2003).

¹⁰ It is worth mentioning here that the elections law was amended in 1974 to allow women to join the council.

1.5 Islam and the progress of democracy: the revealed versus the intellectual

Democratic experience in the Arab world, Abu Khalil (1993) writes, is argued to have been challenged by the presence of a sacred text that represents a supreme point of view that cannot be subject to reasoning. As Brand (1999), Tessler (2003, 1999) and Sen (1999b) point out, there are some who believe that Islam and democracy call for two contradictory sets of values: while democracy requires openness, plurality and tolerance of diversity, Islam demands intellectual conformity and uncritical acceptance of authority. Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' is an example of such views. Huntington (2002 p209) writes that contrary to the belief that prevails among some Westerners that *"the West does not have problems with Islam but with violent Islamist extremists"*; the problem, he continues (ibid p217), *"is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power"*.

However, it can be argued that there is no one interpretation of Islam. Sen (1999b), for instance, argues that a quick review of the history of Islam since its birth in the Arabian Peninsula in the Seventh Century shows that while there are instances in Arab Islamic history when freedoms were suppressed, there are also other instances in which freedoms were protected. The real issue, he writes, *"is not whether these nonfreedom perspectives are present ... but whether the freedom-oriented perspectives are absent"* (p234).

Commentators, such as Zraiq (1994) and Tessler (1999) argue that the spread of the Islamic Empire over a wide geographic area and its inclusion of peoples from a wide variety of backgrounds indicate that Muslims of that time were not inward-looking. Contrary to that, early Muslims must have been proactive, adaptive and accommodating to diversity, as otherwise it would be difficult to imagine how they managed to survive over the centuries. What is perceived as traditional in today's measures, Zraiq (1994, p298) argues, is a result of the progressive spirit that characterized early Arabs, as it is this progressiveness and openness to other cultures that provided the steam that pushed their success forward in the many fields of science, medicine and philosophy.

The encounter with Nineteenth century Europe, introduced in Section 1.2, while it

provided the first cultural challenge for Arab ways of life in modern history, is the second challenge that Arabs faced since the rise of Islam in the Seventh Century. The encounter of Arabs with the Greek civilization, which was most active in the Ninth Century, was the first cultural challenge that Arabs had to face in the early days of Islam (Adonese 2002, AHDR 2003). The exposure to logic and rational thinking brought about by Greek philosophy resulted in the development of different intellectual movements and different schools of thought, and the struggle between these different movements had a significant influence on the route that the Arab civilization took in later years, the impact of which is still felt until this day.

One of the main debates of that time revolved around the relationship between 'intellectual knowledge' that could be acquired through the activity of human reason and intellect, and 'revealed knowledge' which could only be obtained through divine revelation. Responses to this debate, as Adonese (2002) argues, ranged from taking a secular stance, as in the case of Ibn al-Rawandi of the Ninth Century, to the extreme of rejecting the whole notion of Greek philosophy¹¹. In between these two views, different movements emerged in medieval Islam that tried in one way or another to come up with a reconciliatory solution that brought together intellectual and revealed knowledge. The Mu'tazilites and the Asharites were two of the most influential rival theological schools in Islamic history who took two opposite views. The debate between these two schools, as this section will show, still resonates in current understandings of education and in the relationship between knowledge and the individual.

Al-Mu'tazilites, who adopted a Greek inspired rational theology approach, regarded religion and rational thinking to be inherently compatible. They argued that while religion is inspired by revelation and philosophy is inspired by the mind, their ultimate goal is the same, which is to reach the truth. Since the ultimate goal is the same, they argued, knowledge, whether it is scientific or religious must be approached with skepticism and open-mindedness. The Mu'tazilites' rational approach to theology did cause tensions within Muslim communities as some of their teachings challenged basic dominant understandings of religion that were

¹¹ One of the advocates of the latter position was Ibn Taymiya, born in 1263, who believed that the guide to a flawless virtuous life must be sought from the Qur'an and the practices of the first three generations of Muslims, and that deviations from this route must be forbidden. Later on, this school of thought formed the basis of the more conservative Wahabi movement that emerged in the Eighteenth Century in Arabia, and the Muslim Brotherhood that was established in Egypt 1928, which are both active today.

assumed to be undisputed facts (Hitte et al 1949, Esposito 1988)¹².

It was under al-Ma'moun, in the Ninth Century, who was deeply influenced by the Mu'tazilite school of thought, that the translation process of foreign texts into Arabic, particularly from the Greek, took an organized form. This period of translation and assimilation, as Esposito (1988) writes, "*was followed by one of Muslim intellectual and artistic creativity as Muslims ceased to be merely disciples and became masters, in the process of producing Islamic civilization, dominated by Arabic language and Islam's view of life*" (p59). However, al-Ma'moun's attempt to impose Mu'tazilite rational theology as orthodoxy, as Hitte et al (1949) write, turned his rule into a period of political oppression. According to Adonese (2002), it was not the challenging philosophical ideas that the Mu'tazilites were trying to sell, as much as it was the oppression that al-Ma'moun inflicted on people in the aim of enforcing Mu'tazilite rational dialectic, that provoked Islamic jurists and ended up in the Mu'tazilite thinking becoming marginalized and being taken over by the more conservative Asharite theology.

The Asharite School of theology was named after Abu al-Hasan Ali al-Ashari who died in 935. Al-Ashari, who himself, before changing allegiance, was a Mu'tazili intellectual, set on a journey, as Esposito (1988) writes, to respond to "*the Mu'tazilites tendency to rationalize God and theology*" (p73). Unlike the Mu'tazilites, the Asharites believed that God's characteristics were beyond human reasoning. By the Eleventh Century, Asharite theology became one of the dominant schools in the Sunni world. Among the advocates of Asharite theology was al-Ghazali, who was (and still is) one of the most influential Muslim intellectuals. Born in Persia in 1058, al-Ghazali argued that Muslims should make use of reason and logical argumentation as utilized by Greek philosophy; however, he argued that Muslims must know where to apply these skills. Al-Ghazali classified knowledge into good and bad. Good knowledge should ultimately assist individuals to identify with God and become more aware of their relation with him. Bad knowledge, on the other hand, may lead believers to doubt their basic convictions and therefore must be avoided. Human rational capabilities, he argued, were limited, and certain facts could only be revealed by God himself.

¹² As an example of some of these provocative teachings was the rejection of the idea of pre-determined destiny. They argued in favour of man's free will on the basis that God the Merciful would not choose to differentiate amongst His subjects. They also argued that the Qur'an was created rather than being present and preserved since the dawn of time. Their justification for this point was that if the Qur'an was omnipresent, then, pre-determined destiny would become a fact of life, and that would contradict their rightful and merciful image of God (Esposito 1988, Hitte 1946).

While al-Ghazali did not reject rational reasoning, he confined it within the limits of justifying the religious. He gave the status to revelation and argued that intellectual knowledge is only justified because it stems from revealed knowledge (Hewer 2001, Adonese 2002, Halstead 2004, Dangor 2005).

At this point it should be made clear that in the Sunni Muslim world, unlike, for instance, the Catholic Church, there is no religious authority or church that speaks for Muslims. The absence of such a unifying authority allowed for Muslim scholars who presented different views and understandings concerning many issues, including the relation between intellectual and revealed knowledge, to emerge in different parts of the Islamic world. While these different understandings could be argued to be equally relevant, after al-Ghazali, Asharite theology became accepted in most of the Sunni Muslim world as a standard way of thinking (Hitte et al 1949, Esposito 1988).

The importance of this debate is that, while it started in medieval Islam, it still resonates in current understandings of education. Halstead (2004), for instance, writes that viewing Islam through an Asharite lens was one major factor that restrained the pursuit of knowledge in the Arab World, and had its significant influence on educational thinking in the years to come. Along the same line, Hewer (2001) argues that the way Asharites viewed knowledge placed religion at the heart of all aspects of education in which it acted as the unifying factor and the guiding principle. In this regard, he writes that the different subjects in the curriculum became

"permeated by Islamic values and the divinely ordained harmony should be brought out by the educational process. Underlying this is a distinctive epistemology: ultimate truth, the relation between all created beings and things, is not personally synthetic but is given and immutable. Thus knowledge is something existent and defined, which is transmitted in the educational process" (Hewer 2001 p522).

Before devising any curricula, Hewer (2001) writes, teachers must ask themselves *"what has the Qur'an to say on this subject?"* (p523). Consequently, Halstead (2004) argues that the different subjects would lose their autonomy if they were to comply fully with this view of Islam.

The perceived view of the righteous nature of knowledge has its influence on the way young Muslims view the authority of those who transmit this knowledge. By the Tenth Century, a consensus among *Sunni* religious jurists was reached that

the thus far developed Islamic body of law was comprehensive enough and sufficient to regulate legal life in Muslim lands¹³. Muslim jurists, according to this consensus, were no longer allowed to seek new solutions and regulations based on their independent interpretation, *ijtihad*, of the Holy text. Their new role became limited to studying and applying what early Muslim jurists had legislated based on the principle of imitation, *taqlid* (Esposito 1988). This consensus, known as 'closing the door of *ijtihad*', directed Muslims, as Esposito writes, to follow *"the past, God's law as elaborated by the early jurists ... [and] ... Islamic law, the product of an essentially dynamic and creative process, now tended to become fixed and institutionalized"* (p85).

Closing the door of *ijtihad* (in the Sunni world) suggested that after the early jurists, no one was considered to be qualified enough for this responsibility, and the teachings of the early jurists were to be trusted, and their knowledge was to be uncritically accepted. While this uncritical acceptance of the authority of jurists has its spill-over effect on fields other than the religious, the dominating Asharite view of placing revealed knowledge as a source that inspires intellectual knowledge puts the two types of knowledge in one basket. It ruled out the distinction between religious knowledge and secular knowledge and rendered the development of each type as a separate entity more difficult.

This stance towards knowledge suggests that students are to be brought up in an environment that does not provide reasons for them to question faith matters. This may be achieved, as Halstead (2004) writes, through aiding students to accept the authority of those who have the knowledge, including their teachers. Teachers' neutrality, according to this view, is not seen to encourage students to cultivate the teachings of their belief in their daily life experiences. It may also be seen to encourage students to question their own beliefs. Teachers, according to this view, have a religious obligation to help students to develop spiritually and morally along certain lines dictated by religious hierarchy.

This section, while it argued that there is no such thing as 'the' Islamic way of life, presents the uncritical acceptance of the authority of religion and tradition as a dominant representation of the social world. This representation of the social

¹³ Islamic jurisdiction draws mainly from the Holy Qur'an and the traditions of Prophet Mohammed as two direct sources. The process of interpreting these two sources to apply to specific cases is referred to as *Ijtihad*, and is usually done by scholars of Islamic law, *ulama*.

world became part of the common classical culture that is encoded in the Arabic language and consumed in Arabic-language speaking countries. The following section shows how such dominant representation has its influence on current understandings of education in Arab countries.

1.6 Views about current educational systems in Arab countries

The English word 'education' has more than one equivalent in the Arabic language. The most commonly used are *ta'leem* and *tarbiya*. Despite the fact that these two terms are often used interchangeably, each one of them could be seen to deal with one dimension of education, and the two terms together provide an overarching understanding of what the term 'education' implies in the Arab world. The first term, *ta'leem*, is used to refer to the process of acquisition of knowledge, skills and competencies, which is taken as a separate entity from the second term, *tarbiya*, which refers to character building and helping learners develop morally, spiritually as well as socially¹⁴. In addition to these two terms, Cook (1999) and Halstead (2004) add the term *ta'deeb* (refinement), which they argue refers to the development of the social dimension of the learners' characters.

These two dimensions of education, *ta'leem* and *tarbiya*, are not unique to educational programmes in the Arab world; however, dividing education into such two realms could be argued to have its significance in emphasizing the demands of each and, at the same time, stressing their separateness. *Tarbiya* mainly concerns helping students to develop a higher level of abidance by traditional sources of authority (religion, tradition and the state) in which reasoning, critical thinking and questioning are not considered favourable. On the other hand, the other dimension of education, *ta'leem*, demands these very same thought processes that help students become competent learners. This has to effect of juxtaposing the two dimensions of education.

Having said this, *ta'leem* is not necessarily presented in this way in the Arab world. Developments in education that started in the post-independence era have focused more, as the 2002 AHDR writes, on making education available for more

¹⁴ It is worth mentioning here that ministries of education in many Arab countries, including Jordan, the country from which aspects of the citizenship education programme will be analyzed in Chapter Three, are referred to as Ministries of *Tarbiya* and *Ta'leem*, and many schools of education in many Arab universities are referred to as schools/departments of *Tarbiya*, which reflects emphasis on the importance of the character-building side of education.

students than on enhancing the quality of education itself. The report argues that the few available studies that address the development of education in Arab countries present the *“low level of knowledge attainment and poor and deteriorating analytical and innovative capacity”* (AHDR 2002 p54) as common outcomes of national educational programmes all around the Arab world. The same observations are re-emphasized by the 2003 and 2004 AHDRs.

Different factors contribute to the declining quality of education in Arab countries. Chief among these factors, as identified by the 2003 AHDR, is the absence of a clear vision concerning what is needed out of education. This leads to formulating education policies that lack *“an integrated vision of the education process and its objectives”* (AHDR 2003 p54). Teachers' working conditions comprise another main factor identified by the report. Concerning teachers, the report explains that low salaries forced many of them to take on other jobs, including private tutoring, which consume their time and energy. Poorly designed curricula and low quality teachers' training programmes are also identified to add to the problem. In addition to this, most teachers are graduates from institutions where rote learning is the norm. This last point, in particular, is not very conducive for helping students develop their critical thinking faculties (AHDR 2003).

Arab intellectuals present similar observations concerning the low quality of education in Arab countries. Fakhro (2002), for instance, who is a former Minister of Education in Bahrain, writes that educational programmes offered in Arab countries are influenced by a frame of mind that digs in the past to find ready-made solutions for current problems. Adonese (2002), a contemporary Lebanese intellectual, argues that the influence schools have on students is not so much in the subject matter that they teach, which students may or may not remember after they move on to another stage in life. What matters, according to Adonese, is to help students think for themselves, something which he notes that Arab educational systems fail to do. Contrary to this, Arab educational systems, Adonese maintains, have a tendency to mould students' thinking into fixed casts of thought that are borrowed from the past.

Along the same line, Biblawi (2002), an Egyptian academic and educator, summarizes some of the characteristics that he argues to be common to different national educational programmes in the Arab world. He writes that teaching takes a form of indoctrination in which information is transmitted by teachers to their

students who have to learn the taught material by heart. Textbooks are viewed to present immutable facts. Examinations are designed to test the extent to which students are able to memorize the material as it appears in their textbooks. The message conveyed through education, Biblawi argues, is that there is true knowledge that exists somewhere; this knowledge is packed into textbooks and teachers are to transmit this knowledge to their students. The effect this has on students is that they come to develop tendencies to accept the authority of the written word without much scepticism, and also emphasizes in their minds the authority of those who have the knowledge. Biblawi argues that the uncritical acceptance of knowledge provides reasons for students to grow as consumers of knowledge rather than participants in creating it. Students develop dependency on external sources to tell them what to do and when to do it, which puts limits on their development as creative, rational, and self reliant individuals. Redha (1992), an Iraqi academic, raises similar points, but he addresses university education in the Arabian Gulf in particular.

The same observations are also noted by the AHDR (2003). In line with Biblawi, Adonese, Fakhro and Redha above, the AHDR (2003) describes current understandings of education in Arab countries as a production process: students' fresh minds are to be moulded into curricula that contain incontestable facts. Curricula taught in Arab countries, as the AHDR describes them, are inclined to encourage¹⁵

"submission, obedience, subordination and compliance, rather than free critical thinking. In many cases, the contents of these curricula do not stimulate students to criticize political or social axioms. Instead, they smother their independent tendencies and creativity" (AHDR 2003 p53).

Concerning the concept of 'freedom' and how it figures in textbooks, a study conducted in three North African Arab countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) shows a deficiency in the way this concept is introduced. The study analysed the Arabic language and civic education textbooks taught at the preparatory level¹⁶. The textbooks mainly identified the concept of 'freedom' with the freedom of one's own homeland and the freedom to practise one's own religion (not the freedom of the individual to exit his/her religion or the freedom not to believe in any religion). The choice of texts in the textbooks under study for the most part was either from

¹⁵ These observations are based on a background study conducted for the purposes of the AHDR (2003). The AHDR 2003 only makes reference to this background study without illustrating any data collected or explaining how the above conclusions were reached.

¹⁶ Corresponding to years 8, 9 and 10 in the UK in terms of student ages.

the near past colonial/post-colonial era and/or from the distant past of the glorious days of Islam. This approach, as the researchers concluded, invited students to live in the past, created a disjunction between the textbooks and reality and created the illusion in the minds of youngsters that 'we' are a glorious nation, if only because we were glorious in the past (Lemrini and Marwazi cited in AHDR 2004 p149).

In all Arab states, centralized state systems regulate the provision of public education, which is either offered free or subsidized by the state (Mezawi 2006). This section suggests that educational systems in Arab countries are more inclined towards glorifying the past and encouraging submissiveness rather than helping students to develop a capacity for independence and critical thinking. Mezawi (2006) comments that the uncritical unquestioning citizen that current representations of education endorse serves the authoritarian tendencies of Arab political systems (introduced in section 1.4). Arab educational systems view the knowledge that textbooks comprise to represent an ultimate form of the truth that students are expected to internalise, which is in line with the Asharite view of knowledge presented in section 1.5. Both the Asharite view and current representations of education in Arab countries emphasise the authority of the written text. They both assume the presence of an ultimate truth, and learners are to be directed to reach that truth. Critical thinking and questioning are faculties that both views are not keen to help learners to develop.

1.7 Demands for democratic educational reform in Jordan

Section 1.4 introduced Jordan as an example of an Arab country that started, in the nineteen eighties, introducing democratic reform to its political system. Democratic reform in Jordan was followed by several educational reform programmes, the first comprehensive one starting in 1987 and the most recent in 2003. The 2003 educational reform programme introduced a compulsory national and civic education programme for all grade levels as part of the national curriculum. Among the aims of the programme is to provide students with a venue that is intended to help them develop as open-minded tolerant individuals; develop a capacity for rational and critical thinking skills; employ democratic values in the different aspects of life; and at the same time help them maintain their Arab, Islamic and national traditions and values (Ministry of Education [henceforth MoE]

2005a).

This study takes the Jordanian citizenship education programme as an example of an attempt to strike a balance between helping students develop liberal democratic citizenship values and maintaining the role of traditional sources of authority, namely tradition, religion and the state. While the analysis of some aspects of the Jordanian citizenship education programme will be presented in Chapter Three, this section provides the immediate background for the 2003 educational reform.

The development of education in Jordan, as in other Arab countries, cannot be simply reduced to the struggle between tradition and modernity or to building national identity in a post-colonial era. Its development is rather embedded, as Mezawi (2006 p987) writes, in "*a society's socio-economic structures and political conflicts*" in which different factors, including tradition, modernization and national development and identity, are main constituents. At the same time, education generates interpretations of these very concepts of tradition, modernization, national identity, culture, etc., and by doing so it constitutes a certain picture of the social world.

In light of the scarcity of natural resources, including water, and economic challenges that face Jordan, including high rate of population growth, the Government of Jordan recognizes the need for investing in a high quality labour force that gives Jordan and Jordanian labour an advantage in the global knowledge economy. At the same time, the Government recognises that the educational system in Jordan is, in many ways, traditional. The Jordanian Ministry of Education (MoE) describes it as teacher oriented, reliant on rote-learning where learners are at the receiving end, and to have contributed to widening the gap between the needs of the labour market and the outcomes of education (World Bank 2002, MoE 2004).

In October 2002, King Abdulla II of Jordan issued a document, "*Jordan First*"¹⁷, which aimed, among other things, at enforcing national identity and enhancing unity and belonging among Jordanians in a framework of liberty, democracy, pluralism, tolerance and social justice. The royal directive came at a time when Jordan, as other neighbouring countries, was suffering from unstable political,

¹⁷ The "Jordan First" document can be found in Appendix One.

economic and social circumstances. It called on Jordanians of the different origins, backgrounds and political and religious orientations, to reconsider their priorities, placing the interest of their country prior to any other external interests, and to channel their energies in ways that allow them to focus on their home-grown problems, disregarding any agendas that may be imposed by external elements (King Abdullah II 2002). The directive effectively invited Jordanians to have a common citizenship code, irrespective of their political or religious orientations, that informs their behaviour within the public domain. The document could be read as being in line with Rawls' political liberalism which maintains a common political sphere that all citizens share, in addition to multiple private spheres in which different reasonable conceptions of the good exist and are practised (Rawls 1993a). The interest of the country is part of the shared political sphere and must form the inspiration that informs the citizenship code and organizes public life. Apart from this, citizens are at liberty to exercise their private values as long as the rule of law is maintained.

The importance of the issue of identity for Jordan can be illustrated in the results of the May 2004 public opinion poll conducted jointly by the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and development at the University of Maryland and Zogby International. Respondents in six Arab countries were asked about their primary identity and where they saw their belonging. In Jordan the most common answer was 'a Muslim' (33%) followed by 'an Arab' (29%), with only 26% identifying their primary identity as Jordanian¹⁸. When asked to identify a secondary identity, 'an Arab' came first among respondents in Jordan (Zogby 2004)¹⁹. With the turbulent political situation in the region, it is not hard to see how affiliations to the greater Arab or Muslim worlds can have an unsettling effect on Jordanian politics.

One of the challenges that face the 'Jordan First' document arises from the fact that people who belong to different political, religious and social affiliations will see the best interest of the country differently²⁰, and discussions within the public

¹⁸ 6% identified themselves as 'citizens of the world' and 3% were not sure where they belonged. The percentages do not add-up to 100, and the remaining 3% percent is not accounted for in the report. It could be the case that respondents within this category see themselves to belong to another identity that is not specified in the set of choices presented to them.

¹⁹ The responses in the rest of the countries included in the poll indicate that generalizations about the Arab world are not possible. The order of primary identities varied from one country to another, and people's belonging, as indicated by their responses, did not show one dominant identity even in the one country.

²⁰ For some, the country's best interest lies in applying the *Shari'a* law, while for others, it is best served by preparing Jordan to join the global market, and different views on where the best interest of the country lies never run short.

domain may not lead to a societal consensus. Here comes the importance of helping students to develop readiness, as Rawls (1993a) explains (though he was not writing with students in particular in mind), for proposing principles of cooperation consistent with the ideal that all society members are free and equal, and, at the same time, to help them develop willingness to abide by these principles. Rawls (1993a) reminds us that while we hope that political decisions that employ arguments, common sense knowledge, weighted evidence and are fair to others are acceptable to people who uphold different sets of values, this, however, may not always be the case.

Despite ups and downs in the progress of democracy in Jordan, national, regional and global challenges continue to exert increasing pressure on the Jordanian MoE, which is the party in charge of devising Jordanian educational curricula, to develop its educational programmes in ways that will provide students with necessary knowledge, skills and competencies that prepare them to compete in the knowledge economy and, at the same time, help them develop citizenship values in line with the royal directive (MoE 2004).

Given this brief preview, in 2001, preparations for reforming the educational system in Jordan started, with economic and social modernization as one of the main objectives. These preparations led to introducing an educational reform project, Educational Reform for Knowledge Economy (ERfKE), which in collaboration between the Jordanian MoE and the World Bank, was launched in 2003. ERfKE is planned to be a comprehensive educational reform project that deals with different aspects of the educational process. It is planned to be undertaken over two phases, each lasting for five years (World Bank 2002, MoE 2004).

This chapter argued that despite the wide variety present within Arab societies, it is possible to make the assumption that they share common features. Among these features is an emphasis on traditional sources of authority as means for maintaining political stability and social cohesion. This traditional outlook of society, this chapter argued, is transferred, to varying degrees, to educational programmes offered in these countries. Yet, demands for democratization, globalization and the knowledge economy present a direct challenge to the traditional representations of the social world dominant in these societies and indeed to educational programmes that reflect this traditional outlook. While

Chapter One investigated reasons and circumstances that paved the way for the prevalence of such traditional understandings of education, in the absence of a modern theory of education (whether Arabic, Islamic or Jordanian), traditional understandings continue to inform educational planning, policy and practice. There is a need, this study argues, to look outside such narrow traditional understandings of education that different studies and educational literature show to be insufficient for preparing youngsters for democratic citizenship. Based on this insufficiency of national educational programmes in Arab countries, Chapter Two moves on to explore different understandings of education, and in particular citizenship education, within the wider liberal democratic theory. The aim is to reach an understanding of citizenship education that could address the needs of traditional ways of life present in Arab societies and, at the same time, prepare youngsters for democratic citizenship.

Chapter Two

Towards reaching a suitable conception of citizenship

The nineteen seventies witnessed a revival of political philosophy (Kymlicka 2002, Enslin and white 2003). One of the landmarks of this revival is John Rawls' 'A Theory of Justice', which, since its publication in 1971, invited much debate along both sides of the right/left political spectrum. The 1970s political debate focused on issues such as justice, rights and liberties (Kymlicka 2002). By the 1980s, Kymlicka adds, terms such as 'community' and 'community membership' started to become trendy among political theorists. This period witnessed the rise of an entire school in political philosophy known as 'communitarianism'.

Communitarians, despite differences between them, argue that the "*value of community is not sufficiently recognized in liberal theories of justice, or in the public culture of liberal societies*" (Kymlicka 2002 p208)

Along the same line, but from a different angle, Enslin and White (2003) write that the revived interest in political philosophy focused its attention on the world of adults, and children did not form a central part of political debate. By the eighties, Enslin and White note that citizenship education started to figure as one single chapter in modern political philosophy books. Among these books are Ackermann's 'Social Justice and the Liberal State', which was published in 1980 and Walzer's 'Spheres of Justice', which was published in 1983. A few years later, full books were published, such as Gutmann's 'Democratic Education' in 1987 that were entitled to the subject of political education.

The revival of citizenship and citizenship education theories did not start all of a sudden, but rather, it was a corollary of the development of various events that affected different parts of the world. Among these factors are the end of the Cold War era and the breakdown of the Eastern European communist bloc (Haste 2001); the resurgence of nationalism, particularly in Eastern Europe; issues of assimilation versus distinctiveness of more traditional religious and cultural ways of life in pluralist societies particularly in Western Europe (Kymlicka 2002); declining levels of political participation detected in some of the already established democracies including the USA, Britain and France (Osler 2005); interest in consolidating democratic ideals in nation states that accepted democracy as the system of governance; regional economic and political

alliances, such as the European Union (Enslin and White 2003); ecological concerns; and more recently, global terrorism. Societies and nation states were trying to adjust to these developments, and already existing understandings of liberal democracy, as Haste (2001) writes, were not readily taken as direct replacements for old régimes. Instead, the *“task was to re-invent not only ‘democracy’, but national identity and citizenship”* (p375).

The development of citizenship theories owes much in the way they are shaped today to the debate amongst liberal theorists and between liberalism and communitarianism. Kymlicka (2002), for instance, writes that the attractiveness of modern citizenship theories came partly from their general orientation to integrate the two conflicting theories of liberal individualism and community membership.

In education, and particularly in citizenship education, there is a parallel issue of rationality and autonomy arising from the liberal perspective versus tolerance of tradition and safeguarding cultural diversity arising from the communitarian perspective. Within liberalism, different understandings are possible of the importance of autonomy and rationality, and these differences also have implications for what it is that different sorts of liberals might like to ‘foster’ through education.

2.1 The liberalism debate

This section introduces three liberal political theorists: John Rawls’s egalitarian argument is introduced first and is contrasted to both Friedrich Hayek and Robert Nozick, taken as two representatives from the Right.

Published in 1971, Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’ aimed at defining a coherent liberal theory that replaces utilitarianism. According to Rawls (1979), equality and liberty are two ideals that are hard to reconcile. Democratic models that developed over the course of history focused on one or the other of these two ideals. Rawls in his theory set out to find a way to protect basic individual liberties without undermining the value of equality (Rawls 1979, 1993a, 1993b, 2001). He argues that the freedom of the individual cannot be sacrificed for any material benefits (which could be justified on utilitarian terms) (Rawls 1999). According to Rawls, all individuals have equal liberties. This ideal, as Ripstein (1997) writes, prohibits democratic states from adopting slavery, for example, even if slavery would lead to

economic welfare that maximizes happiness for the maximum number of society members.

With his roots in the social contract tradition, Rawls (1993a, 1993b, 1999 and 2001) argues that the most reasonable principles of justice are those that persons, under fair conditions, would agree to. In Rawls' theory justice is regarded as the cornerstone for democracy. The first of two principles of justice that Rawls' theory affirms is the Principle of Equal Liberty, which states that *"each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberties compatible with a similar liberty of others"* (Rawls 1999 p24). The second principle has two parts; the first one asserts that offices and positions must be open to all members of society under the condition of fair equality of opportunity, and the second part emphasizes that social and economic inequalities in wealth and income are only permitted if they result in the greatest benefit for the least advantaged members of society (known as the Difference Principle). These two principles of justice are to act as guidelines that regulate the working of basic society institutions in democratic societies, with the first principle taking precedence (Rawls 1999).

Rawls' egalitarian view of liberalism could be contrasted to neo-liberal views, which oppose any state interference in redistributing wealth. In 'The Constitution of Liberty', which was published in 1960, Friedrich Hayek argued that large scale economic and social planning is counterproductive and is bound to failure (Hayek 1960). Hayek defended market freedoms and argued that the expanding role of the state as a welfare provider and its control over market operations allowed resources to be used to support inefficient public enterprises and state bureaucracies rather than being productively used.

Hayek argued that a free society, more than any other type of society, demands individuals to be *"guided in their action by a sense of responsibility which extends beyond the duties exacted by the law"* (p76). More than any other agency, individuals, he argues, *"know the circumstances surrounding their actions"* (p76) and therefore, individuals should be left free to decide for themselves. While Hayek was aware that the individual is not always the best judge of his/her interests, limiting his/her liberties would result in not knowing whether he/she has something creative to offer or not.

Hayek's argument, as Kukathas and Pettit (1990) argue, builds on a pragmatic assumption that for markets to run in the most efficient manner (and therefore to give people the most satisfaction for their wants), markets must run freely with minimal state intervention. Among the main objections to Hayek's free market philosophy, some argue, is that it undermines the demands of those who do not have enough material capital to satisfy their basic needs. Bobbio (1987), for instance, notes that the less fortunate within a society are more likely to demand that elected governments provide services such as health care and public education. Politicians, Bobbio argues, hoping for re-election cannot ignore the electorate's demands. They have to provide at least some of the requested services, and therefore, deviate from Hayek's *laissez-faire* approach, which, according to Bobbio, renders the paternalism of the welfare state as inevitable.

In Hayek's argument, however, short term economic inequalities will turn in the long term to the benefit of all members of society (Hayek 1960). Rawls (1979), on the other hand, argues that any inequalities must not be allowed unless the least well-off within a society would benefit from them. Contrary to Hayek's free market philosophy, Rawls, through the Difference Principle, advocates state interference in redistributing wealth for the benefit of the least well-off, but in a way that is different than the welfare state system. For Rawls (1979), the reactive (rather than proactive) role of the welfare state would allow for disparities in wealth to occur. After such disparities become realities on the ground, Rawls argues, the welfare state intervenes to alleviate any hardships caused by these disparities. In contrast to the welfare state, the aim of Rawls' theory of justice is to fight injustices and inequalities in wealth before they start.

One of the main criticisms to Rawls' theory of justice came from the same liberal camp that Rawls belongs. Three years after the publication of Rawls' 'A Theory of Justice', Robert Nozick's 'Anarchy, State, and Utopia' was published, in which he responded to some of the arguments presented by Rawls.

Nozick's libertarian view could be argued to be located to the right of Rawls. Along the same line as Hayek, Nozick (1974) argues for a minimal state, but as Kukathas and Pettit (1990) write, for different reasons to Hayek. Nozick (1974) considers individuals' rights as fundamental and beyond compromise. Society, for Nozick, is an aggregation of "*individual people...with their own individual lives*" (p33) and the sole role of the state is to prevent oppression that hinders the

autonomy of the individual. He sees no justification for a state to infringe on one's entitlements for the satisfaction of others who have less, e.g. "[t]axation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor" (Nozick 1974 p169).

'Entitlement' for Nozick, is acquired through inheritance, voluntary exchange of goods and gifts, or as a compensation for wrongs suffered. Individuals should be free to spend what they are entitled to in the way they deem appropriate, and any interference by the state that involves the redistribution of what one is entitled to is a violation of property rights (Nozick 1974).

Nozick's view of society extends Berlin's concept of negative liberty to one extreme. On Nozick's argument, the less the state interferes, the more liberties individuals have. However, for a state to be able to prevent oppression that may be inflicted on individuals, it must put rules and laws that aim to protect individual liberties from the interference by others including the state itself. These rules, while their aim is to protect individuals' negative liberty, lead to state interference and inevitably limit these liberties.

Despite its appeal among liberals on the right side of the political spectrum (libertarians), Ripstein (1997) and Graham (2007) write that Nozick's argument is not as philosophically grounded as Rawls' theory. Using Ripstein's (1997) words,

"Nozick's dependence on intuitive examples [leads] many to doubt whether much depth lay beneath... [these examples] ... The difficulty is that the book's theoretical apparatus is so thin that it is very difficult to know what to make of these examples" (p293).

Rawls and Nozick, despite presenting two opposite views of liberalism, both emphasize the private/public distinction introduced in section 1.3. Nozick's aim is to subordinate the public sphere for the service of a maximized private sphere. Rawls, on the other hand, justifies expanding the public sphere for what he considers to be a more just distribution of wealth.

This debate within liberalism has implications for educational policy. Gutmann (1995) writes that liberals are traditionally dedicated to "*cultivating individuality in citizens*" (p562). However, a divide exists within liberal thinking on the best method to cultivate this individuality. Some liberals argue that beyond helping students to develop a capacity for autonomy through formal general education, there should be no citizenship values imposed by the state. This liberal camp (which could be argued to be in line with Hayek's and Nozick's minimal public

sphere), writes Gutmann, regards state-enforced citizenship education as a tool for moulding people to think like one another, which works in favour of promoting conformity rather than individuality. Brighouse (1998), for instance, argues that

"[c]ivic education is problematic because legitimacy deprives (liberal) governments of the authority to condition the consent of future citizens. Such conditioning is... problematic when it involves teaching any virtues" (p734).

Brighouse (1998) calls for a capacity for autonomy to be developed through schooling. He reasons that the state has an obligation to provide each prospective adult a significant opportunity to *"live well"* (p730). He explains that living well involves two criteria: that the person's way of life is good and that he/she endorses it *"from the inside"* (p730). To live well the person needs to have some sense of what constitutes good living, which can to an extent be realized by applying critical reflection to different ways of life. Citizenship education is permissible, Brighouse argues, only if it encourages critical reflection on the very values it was promoting.

Another camp of liberals, which could be argued to take a more Rawlsian view, assumes less confidence in the role of family (and indeed in the market place in relation to Hayek's open market philosophy) in promoting democratic values. Advocates of this view regard a state-controlled citizenship education as a better option than not having one. Enslin et al (2001 p115), as one example, write that *"since the family and the market place are held together by private interests or respect for authority, we cannot rely on them to promote a democratic culture and nourish the values dependent upon it"*. Along the same lines, Gutmann (1995) writes that *"the realm of public schooling is a democratic government's single most powerful and legitimate means of teaching respect for reasonable political disagreement"*.

2.2 The communitarian critique to liberalism

Nozick's objections to Rawls are contrasted to objections from the left side of the political spectrum. While Nozick accused Rawls' theory of not doing enough to protect the individual, objections from the left side of the political spectrum accused Rawls of not doing enough to protect the community.

Emphasis on the community, while it started to surface during the 1980s in the writings of modern communitarians, can also be found in Marxist literature as well. Marxists argue that governments in modern capitalist societies are agencies that look after the affairs of bourgeois minorities who become dominant not only economically but also politically. As a result of this domination, the proletariat majority suffers from class oppression and market exploitation and they need to be set free. Recognizing the value of community in the Marxist sense can only be achieved by revolutionary means. The revolution or “battle for democracy” as described by Marx (1954 p518), starts by taking over power from capitalists and abolishing all private property. Communitarians, on the other hand, do not believe that the community has to be built anew. They argue that communities already exist but they need to be protected.

Communitarian thinking, while some dismiss it as being a developed form of collectivism that has its roots in Rousseau's general will as well as elements from the Marxist theory, Etzioni (1995) argues that modern communitarian thinking belongs to the liberal Western tradition. It aims, according to Etzioni, to correct liberalism's excessive emphasis on individual's negative liberties.

Etzioni (1995) argues that excessive individualism has led individuals to become increasingly demanding of the state and less aware of their responsibilities towards it. For individuals to act rationally and morally, Etzioni writes, they need to feel part of a stable community that helps them do so, and on this basis, liberal ways of life must presume a communitarian foundation. Haste (1996) explains that communitarianism is based on the social constructionist view that emphasizes the role of language and social interaction in the formation of identity. This is in contrast with the liberal rationalist understanding of the individual as an autonomous and sovereign entity who is in control of his/her environment. In stressing individual autonomy, Haste argues that an ‘individual’ is not seen as essentially a social being, but rather is asked to step outside his/her culture and time and make impartial decisions.

Communitarians generally agree with Rawlsian liberals on the importance of justice. However, they argue that imposing a universal conception of justice, which liberal theories tend to do, is unjust. A universal conception of justice undermines the particularities of different ways of life. Communitarians, such as Walzer (1983), argue that requirements of justice can only be identified within the

community itself. Justice within a community begs the shared understandings of its members. These understandings are reflected in the practices specific to every community and in the institutions that enforce these practices, which renders the requirements of justice as cultural rather than philosophical.

Mulhall and Swift (1992) review the work of four communitarian thinkers: Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer. Despite the different approaches and arguments presented in their work, Mulhall and Swift come to a conclusion that what binds the four thinkers together and earns them the communitarian label is that they are *“united around a conception of human beings as integrally related to the communities of culture and language that they create, maintain and inhabit”* (p162). However, Mulhall and Swift note that these communitarian thinkers do not reject autonomy, but rather they do acknowledge it as a human good and only aim to set limits to the priority it is given by liberalism.

In defence of liberal ideals, Brighouse and Swift (2003), reflecting a Rawlsian liberal background, argue that liberalism is a rich theory (in educational policy making and evaluation), which is often misunderstood. On individual autonomy, they explain that defending the right of the individual to make his/her own choices in life and not having to conform to society's norms, is not the same as assuming that individuals are detached from their social background. As for excessive individualism, Rawls' (1993a) liberalism is an example of a trend in the liberal tradition that concerns itself with justifying principles of justice that guide the workings of basic societal institutions. Rawls' view of liberalism builds on the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation between persons who are free and equal. The liberal 'private' life, according to Brighouse and Swift (2003), is not atomistic, but rather it is a life within the civil society, in which individuals use their liberties to work with others in the pursuit of shared ends. The idea of private life does not aim to free the individual from society, but to free society from political interference.

In response to the issue that liberalism emphasizes individual rights without emphasizing responsibilities, Hayek (1960) argues that liberty and responsibility go hand in hand and that a free society cannot function in the absence of responsibility. He explains that freedom gives a person the choice of what action to take in a particular situation, and the act of choosing therefore leads the person to bear the responsibility of his/her actions. Hayek writes *“[l]iberty is an*

opportunity for doing good, but this is so only when it is also an opportunity for doing wrong" (p79). Brighthouse and Swift (2003) give an example in support of the complementary relationship between rights and responsibilities: if individuals have a right to a trial by jury, then they also have the duty to do jury service in order to provide that right to other individuals.

2.3 The implications of the debate on citizenship values

Burtonwood (2002) writes that since the publication of Rawls' earlier work, 'A Theory of Justice', much of the political philosophy debate has been focusing on reconciling liberalism and its communitarian rival. A main criticism to trends of liberal thinking that promote individual autonomy as a way of good general life comes from advocates of religious and cultural diversity. Individual autonomy dedicated ways of life are described, as Burtonwood writes, as "*monistic*" (p243) in the sense that they are not welcoming to traditional ways of life. In education, those involved in the debate have been trying to find a balance between the demands of fostering rationality and autonomy and the demands for tolerating traditional cultural and religious ways of life.

One of the democratic values that different liberals (along the liberal spectrum) endorse is tolerance of diversity (Galston 1995, Gutmann 1995, Macedo 1995, Levinson 1999, Enslin et al 2001). Having the value of tolerance aids individuals in acknowledging reasonable points of view that oppose theirs, which leads to peaceful coexistence and stability in liberal democratic societies. Gutmann (1995) explains that if individuals strongly believe that their own points of view (and values) are the only acceptable ones, they will consequently have less faith in the democratic process. Besides this practical justification of tolerance, Stolzenberg (1993) argues that knowledge claims inevitably have a level of uncertainty and establishing their truth beyond doubt is not possible, therefore different conceptions of the good that are reasonable must be tolerated.

Given the centrality of tolerance in liberal democratic thinking and the pluralistic nature of modern democratic societies, conflict arises between demands of tolerating traditional and religious ways of life and demands of rationality and autonomy. Views within the liberal tradition concerning this paradox vary from those who, in the name of tolerance, give utmost importance to protecting and

maintaining group diversity (such as William Galston), to those who place rationality and autonomy at the heart of liberal education (such as Amy Gutmann and Meira Levinson).

Galston (1995) argues that autonomy and group diversity are not coherent as the standard liberal view presents them. He writes that the standard liberal view of the relation between these two values could be summarized as follows: while diversity demands toleration, critical reflection on the different ways of life, including one's own, is needed to sustain this toleration. Adopting this standpoint, Galston continues, means that ways of life that do not welcome critical reflection on one's own commitments do not exemplify good citizenship, and therefore are not worthy of support.

Helping children of traditional parents to develop a capacity for individual autonomy paradoxically undermines the liberal ideals of tolerance and free choice for parents. A common liberal response would register that moral and legal responsibility of parents over their children does not imply that parents are to enforce their own conception of the good on their children. Walzer (2003 in Burtonwood 2006) argues that while parents have the right to maintain their way of life and therefore have the right to raise their children the way they see appropriate, the state also has a right to educate children who are the future citizens. When it comes to traditional communities, these two rights will come into conflict as parents and the liberal state have different conceptions of what constitutes an appropriate education. Walzer recognizes that compromises need to be made on both sides in order for traditional religious communities and the liberal state to be able to live together.

Historically, Galston (1995) explains, autonomy is linked to the 'Enlightenment Project' in which reason, not faith or tradition, provides the justification of knowledge. Valorising the Enlightenment Project, he argues, through placing the ideal of rational autonomy at the heart "*of liberalism is in fact to narrow the range of possibilities available within liberal societies*" (p523). In the pretence of defending diversity, he continues, "*the autonomy principle in fact represents a kind of uniformity that exerts pressure on ways of life that do not embrace autonomy*" (p523).

The point that Galston (1995) raises is that autonomy as a way of life must be

respected, but its enthusiasts must not assume its triumph over other ways of life. Autonomy enthusiasts must accept the fact that it is only a way of life that exists alongside other ways, and that they need to learn to coexist among others who do not look at it through the same lens. For Galston, the protection and preservation of cultural and religious diversity, not autonomy, should be the hallmark of liberalism. He argues that, while students must be exposed to a minimum level of awareness about other ways of life, political education must not *“require or strongly invite students to become skeptical or critical of their own ways of life”* (p529). He recommends *“a pedagogy that is far more rhetorical than rational”* (Galston 1998 p 471) to help students accept the commitments of liberal societies, basically a commitment for tolerating diversity. Although Galston’s conception of tolerance does not demand critical reflection on ways of life, he does stress the importance of the ability of individuals, safeguarded by the state, to freely associate with any group they wish to join, and likewise individuals having the right to exit a group they belong to.

Gutmann (1995) argues that mere exposure to other ways of life, as suggested by Galston, is not sufficient for good citizenship for two main reasons. Firstly, while diversity is one of the characteristics of modern democratic societies, liberal societies cannot accept all different forms of diversity. Political conceptions of justice are often associated with certain ways of life. Hence, to recognize reasonable from unreasonable ways of life, democratic citizenship education must help students develop a capacity for rationality and autonomy that would allow them to understand and evaluate these different ways, something that mere exposure to other ways of life does not do. Secondly, mere tolerance that is not tainted with mutual respect cannot solve discrimination problems within society. As an example of this form of discrimination, she argues that in privately owned businesses, while business owners may be tolerant towards other ways of life, this tolerance may not necessarily rise to the level that allows them to hire ‘outsiders’ who belong to ‘other’ systems of belief. Gutmann (1995) recommends that democratic citizenship education must be *“constitutionally constrained not to indoctrinate or discriminate against minorities”* (p563) if it is to succeed over the demands of parents who are opposed to teaching their children to respect other ways of life. She also argues that while citizenship values, including rationality, mutual respect and autonomy, encourage children to reflect critically and criticize their parents’ ways of life, they also encourage them to understand the virtues of these ways. This, according to her, renders the assumption that mutual respect

and autonomy would necessarily reduce diversity as unjustified.

Along the same line as Gutmann, Levinson (1999) argues that liberal political education cannot but promote the development of students as autonomous individuals; as otherwise, liberalism would lose its coherence. For Levinson, *“liberal political education is in fact Liberal extra-political education: education for autonomy”* (p46). For a student to develop a capacity for respecting other ways of life, he/she needs to develop a certain level of detachment, both intellectually and emotionally, from his/her own commitments, culture, group and religious affiliations and his/her conceptions of the good. Individuals, Levinson writes, *“can accept other people’s conceptions of the good as reasonable-and therefore as worthy of toleration and respect-only if they are able to see their own background and commitments as in some way contingent”* (p45). The development of such an outlook, Levinson stresses, is conditional upon the development of students as autonomous individuals. However, once students develop as autonomous individuals they start to reflect not only on political issues, but also on socio-cultural and personal ones. Students who learn that values and beliefs are not absolute, i.e. can legitimately be questioned, turn to evaluate their own, and, as a result, may choose to revise them. Levinson, though, departs from Gutmann’s analysis by arguing that pre-existing social and cultural diversity will inevitably be reduced by the development of students as autonomous individuals. It is inevitable, she writes, that students will look back at their own systems of beliefs and some of them may decide to revise them.

Macedo (1995) shares Gutmann’s view that the *“indiscriminate embrace of difference and diversity should be resisted”* (p469). Some groups and individuals will unavoidably feel discriminated against by liberal public policies and the wider culture such policies are trying to promote. Such feelings, Macedo argues, highlight the need for such groups to adjust to these policies and not the other way around. However, unlike Gutmann, Macedo objects to promoting rationality and autonomy as a way for good general life, and instead he argues for the need for helping persons to develop a capacity for rationality and autonomy as a requirement for good political life. Macedo, in line with Rawls’ political liberalism, argues for a form of liberalism that aims to satisfy the demands of rationality and autonomy and at the same time provides protection for religious and cultural diversity. Macedo’s position will be explored further in section 2.5 below as part of Rawls’ political liberalism.

Singh (2000), who like Galston objects to imposing a form of liberalism that pushes aside non-liberal conceptions of the good, argues that culture plays a crucial role in determining one's identity, and a liberal state that takes a strict stance towards enforcing liberal ideals will cause anxiety and ill feeling among those who do not belong to the liberal camp. To make cultural understanding possible, democratic citizenship education must help future citizens drop the view that there is only one way for good life, and this approach, Singh writes, does demand the values of tolerance and mutual respect for other individuals and for their right to pursue their own views of the good life. He argues that all members of society, majority and minorities, need to develop and adapt to their living together. When values come into conflict with one another, Singh points out that there *"is no overarching standard or principle ... whereby such conflicts can be arbitrated or resolved"* (p227). Unlike Gutmann's liberal response that employs reason alone as a basis for deliberation, Singh argues that a liberal state cannot rely on reasoning alone to settle moral conflicts, as pure reasoning is not suitable for addressing cultural and religious practices and beliefs. At the same time, Singh rejects extreme versions of cultural relativism on the basis that if what could be considered moral or immoral is a matter of a particular culture, then it becomes difficult to challenge any form of discrimination perpetrated by one cultural group over another, or even by some members of a group over other members. He points out that practices that offend basic liberal values, like for instance the practice of female circumcision or polygamy, cannot be allowed in a liberal society, as they offend in this case the fundamental principle of equality among sexes. The solution that Singh anticipates lies in engaging the different groups in a deliberative open-minded dialogue, which resorts to both reasoning as well as to traditional cultural systems of beliefs with the aim to explore *"where and why they disagree and where some agreement can be reached"* (p215).

Burtonwood (2006) identifies two goods that can be threatened by accepting non-liberal communities in liberal societies, and allowing them to raise their children in faith schools that transmit their way of life in a holistic manner. The first is the autonomy of children in these groups and endangering their right of exit from these groups when they become adults. The second is social cohesion as groups can isolate themselves. At the same time, Burtonwood recognizes a wide variety of traditional groups who have widely varying degrees of tolerance toward rational autonomy and tolerance toward other ways of life. Similarly, he acknowledges a wide variety of practices in the faith schools. While Burtonwood recognizes that

minority groups seek status and recognition by the liberal state, he suggests that these groups need to be judged by the way they treat individuals and on whether they allow practices that harm individuals. After presenting a wide variety of views from liberals about the ways of reconciling faith schools that cater for the needs of traditional communities with an education that meets the needs of the liberal state, Burtonwood (2006) comes to the conclusion that these needs cannot be reconciled, and that difficult choices need to be made between the competing goods of community belonging and security versus individual autonomy and social cohesion.

2.4 Globalization

Development, as described by the 2002 Arab Human Development Report,

“is being reinvented by new markets (e.g., foreign exchange and capital markets), new tools (e.g., the Internet and cellular phones), new actors (e.g., non-governmental organizations, the European Union and the World Trade Organization) and new rules (e.g., multilateral agreements on trade, services and intellectual property)” (AHDR 2002 p1).

Such developments that are brought about by globalization²¹ and the knowledge economy left the door wide open for new opportunities and at the same time created new challenges that nation states, societies and individuals had to deal with. A cause and a consequence of these developments is that knowledge is becoming increasingly shared, which has undermined the distinction between the domestic and the foreign and made events that happen in distant geographic locations not faraway any more.

While knowledge is becoming increasingly shared, which could lead to the argument that the world is heading towards some sort of unified culture, Lyotard (1984) argues that diversity, individual and group, traditional and secular, is presenting itself as an inescapable consequence of the spread of knowledge. At the same time, Giddens (1991) writes of a new form of individuality that puts demands on individuals to make decisions concerning their own lifestyles from an early stage of life. Lyotard's diversity and Giddens's new individualisation are two developments in the post-industrial era, this section argues, that have important implications for education. While the effects of these changes can be readily

²¹ For a brief account of what the term 'globalization' could mean from a Middle Eastern perspective, see Appendix Six.

noticed in pluralist democratic societies, they are also influencing more traditional societies, including these in the Arab world²². In light of these two developments, this study argues for a broader conception of citizenship that, while it fosters rationality and autonomy, accommodates reasonable diversity in a way closer to Macedo than to Galston or Gutmann.

2.4.1 The post-modern condition and the challenge of diversity

One of the challenges posed by the wide spread of knowledge is well articulated by post-modern thinking. In 'The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge', Lyotard (1984)²³ argued that as the status of knowledge in post-industrial societies was profoundly changing²⁴, the means of legitimization of the claims of truth of the different types of knowledge were becoming more diversified as well. This, according to his argument, rendered grand theories, that claim their legitimization through making reference to universal narratives, dysfunctional on the basis that there is no one universal doctrine that could encompass human diversity (Lyotard 1984).

Lyotard distinguishes between 'scientific knowledge' which he argues not to represent *"the totality of knowledge ... [but rather] ... it has always existed in addition to, and in competition and conflict with"* 'narrative knowledge' (1984 p7). What is classed as 'scientific knowledge' is composed of denotative statements that demand true or false responses based on dialectical scrutiny by experts who are not less qualified than the sender him/herself, while 'narrative knowledge' comprises different types of statements e.g. denotative, prescriptive, evaluative etc. Narrative knowledge is not restricted to the true/false criterion that scientific knowledge is confined to; it extends to taking into account different criteria like efficiency, beauty, justice, happiness, etc. In light of this, legitimizing narrative knowledge is done in reference to *"the relevant criteria (of justice, beauty, truth and efficiency respectively) accepted in the social circle of the 'knower's' interlocutors"* (Lyotard 1984 p19).

²² The discussion concerning demands of citizenship education in Arab societies is dealt with in Chapter Four after introducing some challenges that face democratic citizenship in traditional Arab societies in chapters three and four below.

²³ Lyotard's 'The Postmodern Condition' was originally published in French in 1979. English translation of the book was first published in 1984.

²⁴ Writing back in 1979, according to Lyotard, the changing status of knowledge is mainly due to developments in computer technology and cybernetics. Surely, by now, technology has moved much further and Lyotard's argument remains profoundly valid.

The pragmatic nature of scientific knowledge, however, cannot be used to claim that scientific knowledge is superior to narrative knowledge. Using Wittgenstein's terminology, these two different types of knowledge use different types of language games that have different rules. Reality, Lyotard (1984) argues, cannot be captured through the use of one type of language game (that is of science), and therefore there is a need for narrative knowledge that captures other aspects of life that scientific knowledge fails to do. Therefore it is not possible to verify the claims of truth of one type of knowledge by referring to the rules of the other type.

Lyotard (1984) argues that as modern societies move from modernity into post-modernity, meta-narratives or grand theories that make universal claims to absolute truth, whether they are scientific or narrative, have lost their convincing power as a source for legitimizing their truth-claims. Post-modern societies, Lyotard argues, are characterized by pluralism and fragmentation, which make it impossible for any meta-narrative to encompass such diversity, including that of scientific knowledge, which in modernity, claims its legitimacy by resorting to one among many meta-narratives that have claims to absolute truth²⁵. On this basis, Lyotard rejects any kind of grand theory or meta-narrative that presumes uniformity in opinion and argues that “[a]ll we can do is gaze in wonderment at the diversity of discursive species, just as we do at the diversity of plants or animal species” (p26). In advanced societies, post-modernity is exemplified by the rise of different little narratives that reflect this wide ‘diversity of discursive species’.

The fragmentation that the post-modern condition suggests places emphasis on cultural and value diversity and relativism, and at the same time, provides more solid grounds for the belief in the individual and social construction of knowledge and the way this knowledge is understood. Using Lyotard's argument, it could be claimed that a significant number of struggles between groups (and individuals) are struggles between competing meta-narrative mind sets that resist accepting that others are entitled to their own views of the world. The least to be said about individuals who are brought-up in sheltered societies -that do not recognize the diversity that this new era exposed (and created) - is that they will be traumatized by the fact that their allegedly true ways of life are questionable and that there are other ways of life that offer a direct challenge to theirs. One of the demands of such a challenge is to educate students about how to deal with the new reality that

²⁵ Lyotard (1984) mentions two principal meta-narratives, one is Hegelian in nature and the other is Marxist.

what they have always accepted as facts of life are only facts of their own lives which are not shared by many others. This approach might undermine affiliations of citizenship discourse with meta-narratives, whether these narratives are religious, nationalistic or even scientific.

2.4.2 Choice and the ‘new individuality’ challenge

In addition to Lyotard’s political and social fragmentation, globalization, Giddens (1998) argues, has left the doors wide open for the rise of a new form of individuality or *“life politics”* (p33). This development, according to Giddens, presents a challenge for collectivism as an ideology behind social democracy that has always relied on the role of the nation state to emphasize its two main themes of solidarity and equality. At the same time, it has increasingly challenged conservatism that looks for traditional means, like the family, customs, cultural norms, and/or religion, to justify authority. Social and political coherence, Giddens writes, that is traditionally *“guaranteed by top-down action of the state or by appeal to tradition”* (p37) is more and more challenged by a lifestyle that demands individuals to make their own decisions from an early stage of life. Along the same line, Stables (2003) writes, children *“have become less and less the unquestioning recipients of a role allotted to them by society, and more and more the conscious agents of their own career and lifestyle choices”* (p4).

Lyotard’s post-modern condition and Giddens’ life politics suggest that a form of education that seeks to eliminate differences between different people is unrealistic as differences, as Stables (2005) writes, are inevitable. Contrary to that, such developments highlight the need for an understanding of citizenship education that helps students to develop a capacity for accepting group and individual diversity. It is difference, Stables writes, *“that draws people to seek solace from each other”* (p194). In this regard, it could be argued that a multicultural form of citizenship education could be useful. However, a multicultural form of education that makes a clear distinction between the two notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ runs the danger *“of treating others as abstractions, or examples, rather than fully human individuals, and of promoting the easy adoption of assumptions”* (Stables 2005 p188). Instead, what is needed is a moral understanding of citizenship education that, as Stables writes, allows all to *“flourish in their diversity”* (p195).

Furthermore, some of the choices that an individual makes have effects on the

society at large. Some of these impacts are social, economic and ecological. The progress of societies toward pluralism and diversity, while it puts demands on citizenship education to help students to develop a capacity for accepting individual and group diversity, also highlights the need for core democratic values that people of different backgrounds would agree to accept as basic principles for organizing their living together. In this regard, it could be argued that helping future citizens to develop a capacity for reasoning and deliberation is a useful tool for political bargaining in pluralist democratic societies.

Deliberation among society members, as Kymlicka and Norman (2000) write, gives citizens, minorities in particular, an opportunity to articulate their opinions and try to persuade others of their points of view. Kymlicka (2002) notes that minorities are likely to accept the legitimacy of political decisions made after they have had a fair hearing, even if the final decision achieved through voting opposed their view. As well as giving legitimacy to democratic decision-making, deliberation has the advantage of producing more solidarity and understanding among citizens, by helping to expose misunderstandings and judgments that are based on incomplete information.

Deliberation among society members also gives citizens the opportunity to learn from one another and helps society to form its values and priorities, which Sen (1999a) refers to as the 'constructive' role of democracy. An active public sphere in a democracy provides opportunities for citizens to understand their rights and duties and determine their needs, which is something that requires public discussion and exchange of information, views, and analyses. On the effectiveness of deliberation in addressing social and political problems, Sen (1999a) gives the example of fertility rate in the state of Kerala in India, which he notes to have fallen to a similar level to that of Britain and France, and well below that of China, without employing state coercion. This drop is attributed to political and social dialogue that led to a change in the values of the community, which was aided by a high literacy rate in the state especially among women, higher than that in any province in China.

The importance of deliberation in democratic citizenship education is also identified by Enslin et al (2001), who argue that students should be helped to develop their abilities *"to make a reasoned argument, written or oral, as well as the abilities to cooperate with others, to appreciate their perspectives and experiences*

and to tolerate other points of view" (p116). Along the same line, Kymlicka (2002) writes that students need to develop willingness to listen to others' points of view, even if they are alien or obnoxious to them, and try to understand what is being said and respond politely, in order to engage others in political dialogue. However, it is important to note that it is not always possible to reach consensus on issues of public concern. There are always sources of disagreement between persons, which Rawls (1993a) refers to as the 'burdens of judgment'²⁶. This, however, begs the virtues of accommodation and compromise (Kymlicka 2002), which could be argued to be part of helping students develop as responsible citizens.

Given the centrality of rational autonomy in liberal thinking, the progress of societies toward Giddens' 'life politics', assumes a more autonomous role of the individual. However, given the fact of pluralism that characterises modern democratic societies, adopting an understanding of citizenship education that is solely dedicated to rational autonomy, would, more than ever before, run the danger of coming in conflict with traditional ways of life. In light of these conflicting demands, the following section introduces the main features of Rawls' political liberalism and argues that a Rawlsian based citizenship education programme (which emphasizes the need for public reason and deliberation) is better tailored to address the needs of diversity and autonomy at the same time.

2.5 Rawls' political liberalism: main definitions

After briefly introducing Rawls' theory of justice in section 2.1, this section presents Rawls' political liberalism, which introduces the concept of 'justice as fairness' as a political conception rather than a comprehensive way of life.

During the 1980s, Rawls started revising his previous account of justice which he had presented in his earlier work (the most substantial of which is 'A Theory of Justice', which was first published in 1971). While the revision process did not have much impact on the two principles of justice (as introduced in section 2.1), changes were introduced, as Graham (2007) writes, to the *"justificatory basis of the theory"* (p124). Rawls' revised work appeared in a set of articles followed by a book, 'Political Liberalism', which was published in 1993, in which he articulated

²⁶ Rawls' notion of the 'burdens of judgment' will be further introduced in the following section, 2.5.

his later ideas.

In 'Political Liberalism' (hereafter PL), Rawls (1993a, also Rawls 2001) criticizes his previous account of 'Justice as Fairness' on the basis that it was presented as a fully encompassing (comprehensive) way of life that *"is not distinguished from a strictly political conception of justice"* (Rawls 1993a p xv). 'A Theory of Justice', Rawls clarifies, presumes that citizens living in liberal well-ordered societies accept the conception of justice as fairness as a comprehensive moral or philosophical doctrine that aims to replace 'utilitarianism' as another comprehensive doctrine. The problem with this account (as well as with utilitarianism) is that it is incompatible with reasonable plurality that characterizes modern democratic societies. In his revised work, Rawls (1993a) argues that modern democratic societies are characterized by encompassing different reasonable ways of social life that are often incompatible. In such circumstances, the maintenance of justice as fairness in democratic societies (in which citizens who endorse different ways of life are free and equals) becomes a challenge for any democratic society.

Rawls (1993a p19) writes that individuals have two moral powers, *"a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good"*. In addition to these two moral powers, he continues, individuals also have a capacity for reason. A just person who knows what is good for him/her and can pursue that good through reason is, according to Rawls, a free individual. As for equality, citizens who have opportunities to develop these capacities could act as fully cooperating society members and to that effect they are, on Rawlsian terms, equal²⁷.

Rawls (1993a, 2001) presents PL as a solution that has potential to address the demands of reasonable diversity. PL, Rawls argues, assumes that a shared reasonable political conception of justice offers common grounds for reasonable persons that enable them to decide on fundamental political issues. The aim of PL is not to replace comprehensive doctrines, but rather it aims to reach a political conception of justice that could be accepted by those who uphold different reasonable comprehensive doctrines within a society.

²⁷ As already introduced in Section 2.1, Rawls' theory of justice was proposed as a moral solution to problems that are bound to arise as a result of adopting comprehensive doctrines to inform political theory, particularly Utilitarianism, which, according to Rawls, placed liberty and equality at two opposite ends.

Before going any further, there are few terms in Rawls' PL that need clarification.

According to Rawls' PL, a person, while he/she may uphold a private comprehensive doctrine, shares with other members of society values that inform the working of basic societal institutions. These shared values do not necessarily belong to one's own comprehensive doctrine. Such values that different members of society share are, in Rawlsian terms, 'political'. They support a political conception of justice (as opposed to a comprehensive one).

Comprehensive conceptions of justice could be fully or partially comprehensive. A 'fully' comprehensive conception of justice *"covers all recognized values and virtues within one rather precisely articulated system"* (Rawls 1993a p13). While a 'partially' comprehensive one *"comprises a number of, but by no means all, non political values and virtues and is rather loosely articulated"* (Rawls 1993a p13). Many religions and philosophical doctrines, Rawls writes, seek a comprehensive status.

A 'political' conception of justice, on the other hand, concerns *"certain fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture of a democratic society"* (Rawls 1993a p13). It draws its values from different religious, moral or philosophical reasonable doctrines, but at the same time, it does not advance any doctrine over others.

According to Rawls (1993a), comprehensive doctrines are part of *"the culture of the social, not the political"* (p14). They inform daily life activities from supporting a football club to joining a scientific, social or religious society, etc. A Rawlsian political conception justice, however, is a moral conception that applies to a society's main social, economic and political institutions (its 'basic structure', in Rawls' terms). It concerns *"fundamental ideas ... in the public political culture"* that all citizens share. This includes *"constitutional essentials and basic questions of justice"* (p10).

Moving on to the word 'reasonable' in Rawls' long list of vocabulary, Rawls writes of 'reasonable persons' and 'reasonable doctrines'. Persons are reasonable when

"among equals say, they are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so" (Rawls 1993a p49, 2001).

'Reasonable persons' are also willing

"to recognize the burdens of judgment and to accept their consequences for the use of public reason in directing the exercise of political power in a constitutional regime" (Rawls 1993a p54, 2001).

'Burdens of judgment' are

"the sources, or causes, of disagreement between reasonable persons so defined" (Rawls 1993b p55). "[T]he burdens of judgment set limits on what can be reasonably justified to others" (Rawls 1993a p61, 2001).

Rawls assumes that *"reasonable persons affirm reasonable comprehensive doctrines"* (1993a p59). A reasonable comprehensive doctrine recognizes the burdens of judgment and allows for freedom of conscience (Rawls 2001 p191).

The existence of different reasonable comprehensive, yet incompatible, doctrines highlights the need to present basic political values as freestanding (Rawls 1993a, 2001). These values *"should be justified in terms of reasons and arguments that can be shared with reasonable peoples whose religious and other ultimate commitments differ"* (Macedo 1995 p475).

This characteristic property of Rawls' PL could be argued to render it more accommodating for cultural diversity than other liberal models. In this regard, Macedo (1995) writes that it is only reasonable for people of different comprehensive doctrines to disagree about their basic beliefs or about attempts that aim to come up with *"a comprehensive set of moral values governing all of our lives"* (p474). Instead of highlighting people's basic disagreements, PL embraces these fundamental 'political' values *"such as peace, prosperity and equal liberty"* (p474) that most reasonable people, despite of their differences, would agree to.

In order to affirm fundamental political values, while Rawls' PL refrains from making reference to any particular doctrine, citizens are encouraged to consult their private comprehensive doctrines. Since different reasonable comprehensive doctrines inform Rawls' PL, citizens, as a result of their consultation, as Rawls (1993b) writes, may find that their private beliefs are not conflicting with, or they may even be in agreement with, fundamental political conceptions of justice. While it is totally up to citizens to find their own ways to affirm political values, the above could be seen as one way to help citizens come to terms with Rawls' PL.

Rawls' theory of justice, whether it is the older version or the revised one, provides

two main elements: firstly, a method for deriving principles of justice, and secondly, an account of what would the application of this method lead to, namely, the two principles of justice (Graham 2007). Therefore, while Rawls' PL does not allow any comprehensive doctrine, be it religious, philosophical or moral, to present itself as the only possible one, it also provides a general framework for how free and equal citizens, who uphold different reasonable doctrines, could live and cooperate together on a fair and just basis. While it is true that Rawls' PL concerns liberal societies, his account, as argued in Chapter Four, could be adapted to serve growing reasonable plurality in 'traditional' Arab societies that are keen to consolidate democratic ideals.

Rawls (1993a) writes that Kantian and Millian forms of liberalism are comprehensive in nature. They foster individual autonomy as a way for good general life, and therefore a liberal form of education that builds on this form of liberalism would also embrace individual autonomy in the same way. Various religious and cultural ways of life, he adds, would oppose their children being exposed to this sort of autonomy-dedicated education that comes in conflict with some of their basic beliefs. PL, as will be argued in Chapter Four, invites members of reasonable religious and traditional ways of life, along with members of other reasonable comprehensive doctrines, to practise their role within society as equal, free and fully cooperating members. Children's education, Rawls (1993a) writes, should

“prepare them to be fully cooperating members of society and enable them to be self-supporting; it should also encourage the political virtue so that they want to honor the fair terms of social cooperation in their relation with the rest of the society” (p199).

In addition to this role,

“children's education includes such things as knowledge of their constitutional and civic rights so that, for example, they know that liberty of conscience exists in their society and that apostasy is not a legal crime” (p199).

Despite Rawls' PL dedication to accommodating diversity, the above quotation reflects its liberal roots. There are basic rights that are beyond negotiation. However, the reason for emphasizing this liberal aspect of education is not to undermine traditional ways of life, but rather, to ensure that children's membership in a society

“when they come to age is not based simply on ignorance of their basic rights or fear of punishment for offenses that do not exist” (p199).

These demands that Rawls' PL places on education suggest two of its related characteristics. Firstly, while plurality is a main theme in Rawls' PL, embracing diversity does not necessarily mean to indiscriminately embrace groups or individuals who refuse to recognize other ways of life. Secondly, PL, while it does not ask people to abandon their private beliefs, demands putting aside some of these beliefs for the sake of laying the grounds for building public life and institutions that are based on shared public principles acceptable to reasonable people (Rawls 1993a, Macedo 1995).

Rawls' PL, Gutmann (1995) argues, is not more welcoming to traditional ways of life than a rational autonomy dedicated approach. Once students, she adds, develop a capacity for reasoning and critical thinking they may become skeptical of their own private beliefs and, as a result, may choose to revise them. Along the same line, Callan (2007) writes that Rawls' PL brings individual autonomy through its *“back door”* (p126). In response to this criticism, Macedo (1995) argues that while Rawls' PL aims to confine its scope within a shared political domain, a capacity for liberal democratic values will have a spill over effect on other aspects of life. Rawls (1993a) himself does not deny this effect and in this regard he writes that the *“unavoidable consequences of reasonable requirements for children's education may have to be accepted, often with regret”* (p200).

Another challenge that Rawls' PL faces is the difficulty of dividing social life into two domains, political and private. What could be considered to belong to the political, others would place within the private. Life is entangled in many ways and therefore many issues could prove to be difficult to put a label to. As an example of this conflict, Macedo (1995), refers to the Mozert versus Hawkins County Board of Education case in 1983 in which 'born again' Christian parents charged a primary school for offering a reading programme that they regarded as impeding to their desire to raise their children the way they wanted. The reading programme itself was not accused of advancing religious claims of one faith over others. The main concern of the parents of these children, whose demands were turned down by the court, was that exposing their children to a variety of ways of life would encourage the children to exit the faith communities that their parents belong to.

A typical comprehensive liberal would argue, in relation to the Mozert case above,

that children are not the property of their parents. Children have rights of their own and education, as one of these rights, has an obligation to help students develop a capacity for rational autonomy as a way for good general life, which is what the language programme is aiming to do. A political liberal, on the other hand, while he/she would agree with the comprehensive liberal on the outcome of the court's decision, would adopt a different justification. He/she would differentiate between two notions of tolerance: civil tolerance, which is a shared political value, and religious tolerance, which PL would not endorse. Civil tolerance, which is what the language programme was helping students to develop, is a value necessary for peaceful coexistence of the different groups within the same society. It is necessary to maintain social order in pluralist democratic societies, and on this basis public schools are obliged to expose their students to a variety of ways of life in order to help them develop this value. Religious tolerance (tolerance of other religions), on the other hand, may not be accepted by extreme fundamentalist religious groups, who place biblical (or Qur'anic) authority beyond any question. For such groups, their system of belief is not just one among others; it is rather the one and only true way.

Rawls' PL cannot claim that the different conceptions of the good are equal in the eyes of any particular religion. However, it maintains that all reasonable comprehensive doctrines are constitutionally equal: they are all equal and free from a constitutional point of view (Macedo 1995). In line with Rawls' PL, regarding parents who reject teaching their children that all conceptions of the good are morally equal, the reasonable amongst them would not object to expanding constitutional equality to include holders of different conceptions of the good.

For this reason Rawls' PL would not approve of formal education to teach any specific doctrine of religious toleration. At the same time, as Macedo (1995) writes, it rejects attempts to present science and experimentation as the only certain route to truth. By taking this stance, PL accepts as free and equal peoples coming from the different walks of life, including reasonable religious fundamentalism, as long as they do not seek political authority and are *"willing to acknowledge for political purposes the authority of public reasonableness"* (p476). PL, Macedo argues, asks of religious fundamentalists what it asks of others, including proponents of secular ideals.

This chapter has argued that as democratic societies are becoming more diverse, there is more reason for adopting an understanding of citizenship education that helps students develop a capacity for accepting diversity both at the individual and group levels, traditional and secular: an understanding that brings youngsters to appreciate that being different is not something wrong that warrants discrimination or deserves pity. After all, globalization, the wide spread of information, the weakening of the role that used to be played by traditional sources of authority and the availability of more choice in life, are emerging pieces of evidence that highlight the need to help students come to appreciate the benefits of 'reasonability' on Rawlsian terms, while at the same time maintaining the liberal demand for rationality. Based on these demands, this chapter suggested Rawls' PL as a framework that resorts to the value of reasonability for reconciling the demands of diversity and rationality. While this chapter introduced the main features of Rawls' PL, the issue of how Rawls' PL can be translated into educational policies and practices will be the subject of Chapter Four.

Chapter Three

Analysis of the Jordanian citizenship education programme

This chapter analyses some aspects of the citizenship education programme in Jordan in which reconciling the traditional with the modern is among the overarching objectives of the programme. The general aim of the analysis is to highlight some of the tensions between liberal democratic citizenship values and traditional representations of social life that place emphasis on tradition, religion and the state as sources of authority. The analysis is based on Norman Fairclough's three-level critical discourse analysis model, and focuses particularly on the problem of emphasizing traditional sources of authority at the expense of individual freedoms as a discourse related problem that has social implications.

3.1 Introduction: discourse analysis and Fairclough's three-level critical discourse analysis model

The realization of the importance of discourse emerged as a result of social constructionist thought which views discourse as the source of knowledge. In categorising objects and phenomena, social constructionism sees that we actually create reality, rather than describe a reality that already exists (Phillips and Jorgenson 2002). Social interaction is seen to lead to establishing common truths, as representations of the world are formed through discourse and as we argue the truth and falsity of propositions. The significance of this view of knowledge, as Phillips and Jorgenson write, is that it is contingent on our worldviews and identities, and it is therefore changeable over time and culture. This means that struggles about definitions and identity can change social phenomena and social structure. This does not mean that constructionist thought denies the existence of physical objects or reality, but it stresses the role of discourse in giving them meaning (Phillips and Jorgenson 2002). According to this view, language ceases to be regarded as a mere communicative tool and instead, it is a tool that shapes reality, and therefore, is worthy of study in its own right.

Discourse theorists, in general, agree that discourse is a social practice that shapes our social world. They, however, disagree on the relationship between discourse and reality (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002). On the one hand, there is the Laclau and Mouffe model, which considers all social practices as discursive.

Reality, from their perspective, is what is represented in discourse, and there is no reality that exists outside the boundaries of discourse. They do not regard the economy, for instance, as an entity on its own that should be studied outside the domain of discourse. The economy, as other fields, is part of discourse that is itself fully constitutive of the world (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). On the other hand, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) theorists limit the concept of discourse to recognised semiotic activities, whether these are *“language, body language, visual images or any other way of signifying”* (Fairclough 2001b p229). In contrast to Laclau and Mouffe, Norman Fairclough distinguishes between discursive and non-discursive elements of any social practice, and assumes a dialectical relation between these elements. According to Fairclough (2001b p234),

“social relations, social identities, cultural values and consciousness are in part semiotic, but this does not mean that we theorize and research social relations, for example, in the same way that we theorize and research language – they have distinct properties, and researching them gives rise to distinct disciplines”.

While the different social elements shape discourse, discourse also has a role in defining and shaping other social elements, and both discourse and other social elements constitute our world.

The starting point of any CDA research is a social issue or problem (Fairclough 2001b). It aims to expose unequal power relations, manipulation, domination and hegemony applied through discourse. Power can be regarded in different ways. Foucault (1980) considers power *“as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repressive”* (p119). This productive nature of power, according to Foucault, *“traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge [and] produces discourse”* (p119). Power is also considered in a negative way as exclusively oppressive. It justifies domination and control of one group\individual over other groups and\or individuals (van Dijk 2003). Control extends over acts and minds and can be achieved through having access to scarce social resources such as money, force, information, status, and forms of communication (van Dijk 2003). When control is pervasive in laws, habits and norms, and is not challenged by the majority but enjoys a general consensus, then ‘hegemony’ in Gramscian terms is achieved, Van Dijk writes. Hegemonies, according to Forgacs (quoted in Fairclough 2001b p232),

"are sustained ideologically, in the 'common sense' assumptions of everyday life, and hegemonic struggle penetrates all domains of social life, cultural as well as economic and political".

CDA maintains that economic, social, cultural and other realities inform discourse and inform a certain biased image of the social world. CDA relies on the Marxist concept of ideology as an important aspect that establishes and maintains unequal power relations between different social groups. CDA, argues Wodak (2001 p10), seeks

"not only to describe and explain, but also to root out a particular kind of delusion. Even with differing concepts of ideology, critical theory intends to create awareness in agents of how they are deceived about their own needs and interests".

This Marxist outlook of CDA, Fairclough (2001b) explains, has its root, not in classical Marxism, but in Western Marxism that *"highlights cultural aspects of social life, seeing domination and exploitation as established and maintained culturally and ideologically"* (p232). The reason for bringing this point up is that while this research studies how liberal democratic values figure in the curriculum, it uses a CDA framework that has its basis in cultural Marxism in order to carry out the needed analysis. The difference in emphasis that these two traditions have, suggests that trying to recruit Fairclough's CDA framework (or any other CDA framework) in order to tackle a problem that is at the heart of the liberal democratic theory is not free, as the following paragraph argues, from philosophical contradictions.

It could be argued that the self-acclaimed enlightening and emancipatory role of CDA (as regarded by CDA theorists) has an underlying assumption that underestimates the capacity of the individual to pick up hidden ideological messages (hence the need for a means for helping individuals to identify the truth, which could be argued to be in line with Berlin's illustration of the concept of positive liberty introduced in section 1.3). By defining itself as 'critical', CDA seeks to expose latent ideological effects in dominant discourses. This aspect of CDA is at odds with the liberal tradition, which is more inclined towards presenting the individual as a rational and autonomous agent who is in charge of his/her actions. However, despite this difference in emphasis, the absence of an analytical framework that builds on such a liberal view of the individual, and at the same time combines linguistic textual analysis with social and cultural analysis, makes CDA, as the following paragraph explains, suitable for the purposes of this study.

Social practices, according to the social constructionist theory, while shaped by social structures and power struggles, are encoded in discourse. Taking this view as a premise that underlies the analysis of the text that will follow, it could be argued that linguistic text analysis, while it provides an insight on how semiotic practices operate in specific texts, does not shed enough light on the relation between the text under study and the bigger societal and cultural picture that shapes the realities that the text is representing through the use of discourse. Hence, the interdisciplinary nature of CDA, which is by no means restricted to Fairclough's CDA, allows researchers, as Van Dijk (2001 p98) writes, to draw on a range of theories that "*account for the complexities of the relationships between discourse structures and social structures*". In CDA, Van Dijk continues, "*theory formation, description, problem formation and applications are closely intertwined and mutually inspiring*" (p98).

While there are different approaches to CDA that share common aspects, it could be argued that Fairclough's approach is one of the most developed, theoretically and methodologically, for researching socio-cultural discourse related problems. Although Fairclough's approach is under constant development, this study draws mainly on Fairclough's three level analysis model introduced in more than one of his books, including Fairclough 1995, 1992a, 1992b and 1989. This study also utilizes some other details that are introduced in other publications, mainly Fairclough 2001(a) and 2001(b).

Fairclough's model is an interdisciplinary model that contains a range of different concepts that are interconnected at three levels (diagram 3.1 below). This makes it not only a tool for data analysis, but also a general framework for studying discourse related social issues.

The three levels of the analytical model are:

Level A. The wider social practice to which the communicative event belongs.

Level B. Process relating to the production and consumption of the text (Discursive Practice).

Level C. The linguistic features of the text.




Diagram 3.1: Fairclough's three-level critical discourse analysis model

3.2 The Problem

This study argues that attempts to reconcile liberal democratic citizenship values with traditional orientations dominant in Arab societies are bound to create tensions. The Jordanian citizenship education (henceforth JCE) approach to addressing these tensions emphasises the role of traditional sources of authority which is one way for naturalising one form of discourse and suppressing others. The use of power in this way is both productive as well as constraining. While power is responsible for creating a certain image of the social world, it is also responsible for suppressing other representations of it.

The struggle, within the JCE discourse, between demands placed on students by traditional sources of authority and demands placed by liberal democratic citizenship values, highlights the issue of 'individual freedoms' as a discourse related problem that has social implications. Such potentially conflicting demands that the JCE programme asks from students makes the individual freedoms issue a "needs-based" (Fairclough 2001b p236) problem. The three-level analysis below aims to show how the JCE discourse contributes to the individual freedoms problem.

3.3 Applying Fairclough's three-level model

Each of the subsections below deals with one of the three levels of Fairclough's model (diagram 3.1). It starts with the wider social practice to which the individual freedoms problem belongs (level A) and finishes with linguistic features of the text (level C).

3.3.1 Level A: the wider social practice to which the communicative event belongs

According to Fairclough (1989, 1992a, 1992b, 1995, 2001a and 2001b), discourse is both constituted by and constitutive of social life. This section focuses on the 'constituted by' aspect of discourse. The analysis below aims to show how the JCE discourse is constituted by dominant socio-cultural, political and economic representations of social life. It also aims to show how such dominant representations stand as obstacles to the problem being tackled in the sense that they "*become hegemonic and so become part of legitimizing common sense*" (Fairclough 2001b p235), which serves as an agent for sustaining the status quo rather than embracing desired changes. The struggle between such dominant representations and (some) of the aims of the JCE programme -namely helping students develop democratic values including tolerance, respect for others, reasoning and critical thinking skills, and respect for human rights (MoE 2005a)- contributes to making the individual freedoms problem a needs-based one.

Part of the practices of a government is to produce social and economic changes (Fairclough 2001b), and in this case the reformation of the Jordanian educational system is one of the means of the government to achieve desired changes. According to 'The Development of Education National Report of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan' for the year 2004, educational programmes aim, among other things, to empower young Jordanians as

"change agents for future national growth... to...become the human resource wealth and resource to face internal and external economic and social challenges in a rapidly changing region and world...[A sound education leads to the rewards of] young citizens who will be well-qualified and trained, multitalented, capable of self-learning and lifelong learning, flexible and open to other cultures, and entirely comfortable in coexisting and integrating within their environment" (MoE 2004 Foreword).

The quotation stresses 'change' as one of the characteristics of the current age. The message that the quotation conveys could be read along the following line: 'in order not to be left behind in this 'changing' world, we must reconsider our economic and social priorities in light of internal and external challenges'. An implication here is that citizens have to adapt socially in order to develop economically. Adaptation to change is justified via pragmatic reasons, as without

it, both citizens and the government (that works for the benefit of citizens) would suffer the consequences, and these consequences are mainly economic. An example of this kind of social adaptation that may lead to economic development comes as a result of normalizing the relations between Jordan and the State of Israel in 1994. Cheap labour in Jordan is an attraction for foreign capital, and investments by Israeli businessmen can have economic benefits for local citizens as well as the government. But this very idea of accepting Israeli investments on Jordanian land, not to mention Jordanians accepting job offers in these investments, is one thing that demands social change.

The quotation also stresses the fact that 'change' requires preparation, and one way for preparing for it is through good education that focuses on empowering young Jordanians as 'change agents'. In a country that has limited natural resources, good education is a form of investment for future 'national growth'.

It is instructive to consider the main educational outcomes of the newly reformed JCE programme, as stipulated by its ten overarching objectives (MoE 2005a²⁸ p10), of which the following four are directly relevant to this analysis:

"To expose learners to a variety of sources of knowledge ... [aiming] ... to help them develop a capacity for interacting positively with other cultures (thaqafat) in ways that allow them to have their influence on and be influenced by these cultures" (Objective 2).

"To help learners maintain authentic and positive Arab cultural practices, traditions and values, in the new world order, and to help them develop a capacity for reconciling the traditional with the modern" (Objective 5).

"To help learners to reject imitation (taqleed) and blind fanaticism, employ rational thinking skills and to deepen their critical thinking skills" (Objective 6).

"To emphasise the role played by the Hashemites in the modern Arab rise, and in the practising and applying of democracy, both verbally and practically, in the different arenas of life" (Objective 10).

One of the obstacles that contribute to the individual freedoms problem could be realised in the way these objectives are worded.

In the fifth objective, for instance, the use of the word 'authentic' is problematic. It could be seen to imply an invitation by those who come under the category 'Arab'

²⁸ Quotations from this source (MoE 2005a) are translated from the original Arabic text by the Author.

to accept these 'Arab cultural practices, traditions and values' without any reflection and as matters of truth. This implies an image of conformity and underplays the view of students as 'agents of change'. It could even imply that these 'Arab cultural practices, traditions and values' are omnipresent realities that draw their meaning from a superior authority and keep their value despite the fact that everything else around them may be changing. This may lead youngsters to believe that they are, by default, better than others who belong to other cultures. While the objective calls for reconciling the traditional with the modern, this approach of describing and presenting 'Arab values and traditions' has the effect of suppressing and marginalizing ways of life that do not valorise these values in the same way as the textbook does. More specific examples of how the language of citizenship education textbooks itself contributes to this problem (suppressing other ways of life) are delayed to the next section that aims to have a closer look at the language of these textbooks.

In line with the image of conformity presented in the JCE programme objectives, it could be argued that an emphasis on shared interests and values is more helpful to social cohesion than highlighting diversity, which would lead to fragmentation and incomprehension among the different groups within a society. However, as Putnam and Putnam (1993) argue, when values are imposed from the outside, individuals do not make these values their own, as exemplified by the alienation among non-Anglo-American US citizens. If the dominant group, such as the Anglo-Americans in USA, or religious Sunni Arab Jordanians, fails to interact cooperatively with other groups, the society fails to have shared values developed through democratic inquiry.

Putnam and Putnam (1993) highlight the importance of seeing values as socially constructed rather than fixed. They argue that if students feel that values cannot be subject to rational analysis, then they will see each other's norms as absolute and hence the chance for these groups to develop respect for each other diminishes. This puts limitations on positive interaction that leads to having an influence on and being influenced by other cultures as described in Objective two above.

In the foreword to The Development of Education National Report above (MoE 2004), 'change' is one major theme. However, in the overarching objectives of the citizenship education programme (MoE 2005a p10), four of which are quoted

above, the emphasis on change is played down. In fact, the word 'change' (*taghieer*) does not appear in any of the ten objectives. The second objective (quoted above) emphasises the importance of "... *interacting positively with other cultures in ways that allow [students] to have their influence on and be influenced by these cultures*", which has an aspect of change to it. The sixth objective also emphasises the importance of critical thinking, which is necessary for producing change, but there is no mention of the word 'change' itself.

The tenth objective (quoted above) introduces the word 'democracy' for the first time and presents it as a way of life. This, however, is not done, at least in the objective above, by referring to democracy itself, but rather by referring and emphasising the role the Royal family in Jordan "*in the practising and applying of democracy in the different arenas of life*" (MoE 2005a p10). Democracy, according to this objective, is in collocation with the conduct of the Royal family, which suggests that students learn by referring to a role model(s) as far as democracy is concerned. This is not to make any judgements concerning the royal family in Jordan and to what extent they are democratic role models, but the issue at stake is that the message conveyed defies liberal understandings of democracy. In order to develop as democratically oriented citizens, students have to watch, observe and follow, rather than reflect and reason. It follows that a non-democratically oriented individual is one who thinks or behaves in a different way than the role model does. The message conveyed is that citizens are to follow the lead of their leaders, which is another dimension where the citizenship education overarching objectives prove to take a non-democratic turn. This way of presenting democracy stands in sharp contradiction with Amy Gutmann's (1987) view about deliberative democratic citizenship, which states that children at school

"must learn not just to behave in accordance with authority but to think critically about authority if they are to live up to the democratic ideal of sharing political sovereignty as citizens ... [P]eople who possess sturdy moral character without a developed capacity for reasoning are ruled only by habit and authority, and are incapable of constituting a society of sovereign citizens" (p51).

While this approach to teaching about democracy (definitely not teaching for democracy), asserts in the minds of youngsters the authority of traditional sources of authority, it is also not conducive to the development of critical thinking, and therefore it adds to the individual freedoms problem within this study.

The unsettled political and economic situation in the region has its say in constituting the JCE discourse. Jordan is reliant on tourism, foreign investments and aid, which are negatively influenced by an anti-Western image of Islam, particularly portrayed by the incidents of 9/11 in the United States of America. In November 2004, according to the Jordanian Embassy in Washington website, Jordan issued *“a message on Islam to Muslims and the world”* (Embassy of Jordan 2004). Known as ‘Amman Message’²⁹, its aim, according to the embassy’s website, is to *“reveal a message of tolerance and humanity; rejecting extremism as a deviation from Islamic belief; thus stressing the true value of Islam”*. The Amman message was delivered by the Kingdom’s Chief Justice, in a religious ceremony, in the Presence of King Abdulla II.

In line with this message, JCE discourse aims to present a moderate middle (*wasati*) image of Islam that excludes interpretations which take a radical stance. For example, this moderate image of Islam is emphasised in the grade ten *“National and Civic Education”* textbook on more than one occasion and is enforced by quoting the Qur’anic verse *“thus We have appointed you a middle nation”* (verse 143 from Surah al Baqara) on page 27 and then again on page 71 of the textbook (MoE 2005b). The Amman message is also introduced in a grade ten lesson entitled *“Coexistence and Tolerance”*, describing its purpose as to show *“the real tolerant image of Islam, to protect it from external attacks and to stop false accusations against it”* (MoE 2005b³⁰ p72). At a time when acts of terrorism are done in the name of Islam, using traditional sources of authority to defend a moderate image of Islam that rejects associating it with such actions has value in itself (allowing students to feel proud as Muslims) and, at the same time, militates against the radicalization of young men and women by radical Islamist groups that are active in the region.

Another reason that justifies the reference to traditional sources of authority is constitutional in nature. According to the constitution of Jordan (the second item of the first chapter), Islam is the religion of the state. While the constitution is informed by many factors, including the social, the political, the economic and the historical, the constitution itself has a major role in constituting the government discourse and the citizenship education programme is part of that discourse. While this constitutional obstacle could be argued to contradict the ethos of

²⁹ A copy of ‘Amman Message’ can be found in Appendix Two.

³⁰ Quotations from this source (MoE 2005b) are translated from the original Arabic text by the Author.

pluralistic modern democratic societies, it could be justified by the fact that the majority of Jordanians are Muslims (92%), which makes it natural to turn to Islam as a major constituent of JCE discourse. This could be seen as a 'majority' obstacle that forces itself on citizenship discourse as the dominant form of social life.

In the same way as many other religions and philosophical ways of life, Islam seeks a comprehensive status. This comprehensive nature of Islam could act as an obstacle to realizing certain individual freedoms that liberal democratic citizenship would enforce. This 'comprehensiveness' obstacle, when taken with the 'majority' and 'constitutional' obstacles above makes it more difficult for the citizenship discourse to avoid being constituted by representations of social life in which the heavenly transcends the social. This could be seen as another turn from the ethos of modern liberal democratic societies in which individuality and diversity are two main features.

The perceived 'glorious' image of the Arab Islamic civilization and history is another obstacle to the individual freedom problem of this study. As introduced earlier in the section 1.2, Arab societies, until the start of the Nineteenth Century, were culturally and intellectually self sufficient in the sense that their main references were their own. In medieval times, the Arab Islamic civilization was one of the influential civilizations at the global level both intellectually and indeed imperially (Bulkzeer 2001). Despite the retreat that the Arab Islamic civilization has suffered since³¹, the image of a 'glorious' past that once assumed a universal status is still persistent and is reflected in today's literature, songs, as well as textbooks. For example, in the grade ten citizenship education textbook, in a lesson about the values of citizenship, the book presents a list of six traits that, according to the textbook, make Jordan a very special place *"and emphasise the pride and sanctity of belonging to it"* (MoE 2005b p33). Among these traits is the following:

"Jordan is land blessed by God, and it is a patron (aknaf) of Jerusalem (beit al-Maqdes)... its civilization is Arab and Islamic, and is the cradle of human civilizations... its leadership is Hashemite that goes back in its root to Prophet Mohammed." (MoE 2005b p33).

³¹ As discussed in section 1.2, since the Renaissance started in Europe as early as the fourteenth century, the centre of gravity started to shift from the Arab Islamic world towards the West. From that time, while the Arab world was suffering a period of stagnation and isolation unaware of what was going on outside the walls of the Ottoman Empire, Europe started to emerge as a political, intellectual, industrial and also as an imperial power.

The perceived view of the 'glorious' past of the Arab Islamic nation started to regain momentum through the rising power of Islamist movements, which started to become socially and politically more influential on the Arab scene during the 1970s³². Furthermore, some Western policies in the region provide reasons for some to play-up the West-East divide and to encourage others to look with suspicion on what could be perceived as Western values altogether. These developments provide reason for some to turn to the past as a grand theory hoping to find solace there.

By mixing the past with the present and the future, this approach to citizenship education has the effect of imprinting in the minds of youngsters a false and unrealistic image of the current state of affairs. While it is true that the past is a springboard for moving forward, the move forward demands evaluating the past on the basis of the demands of the present and the future. This puts demands on democratic citizenship education to help learners look critically at the past rather than presenting it as the normal and expected way of life.

As already discussed in section 2.4, one of the main characteristics of modern democratic societies is that they are becoming more and more diverse and individuals are exposed to other ways of life more than ever before. In 1979, Lyotard defined post-modernity "as *incredulity toward metanarratives*" (Lyotard 1984 pxxiv), and since then, globalization and technological breakthroughs in ways of storing, transmitting and accessing knowledge never slowed down, but quite far from that, they continued to challenge modernity's meta-narratives. Individuals in this era are becoming more in charge of their own lifestyles, which Giddens (1991) describes as the emergence of "*life politics [that] presumes emancipation from fixities of tradition and from conditions of hierarchical domination*" (p214). Whether it is defined as post-modernity (c.f. Lyotard) or high (or late) modernity (c.f. Giddens), globalization has deep influences on the way individuals perceive themselves. Individuals can compare and contrast their ways of life with others', and are more free to mix and match between these different ways of life. This, however, is not suggesting that a society can tolerate all different ways of life. While meta-narratives that claim universal status could be

³² The resurgence of these groups is exacerbated by occupation or invasion of some parts of Arab and/or Islamic land (Palestine, and lately Iraq and Afghanistan) and is justified partly by lack of ability of secularly oriented Arab régimes to obtain independence in Arab land (mainly Palestine) or to achieve desired social and economic changes (democratic reform is among them) that were hoped to be achieved in the post-independence period (Section 1.2 deals with this issue at more length).

argued to be losing their appeal, there are limits to tolerating other ways of life. These limits, however, are not fixed and one does not run short of examples of how they are constantly changing in different areas.

In conclusion, while claiming the title 'democratic' places emphasis on the demands of individuality and diversity, powerful social, economic, political and historical networks, of which the JCE discourse is part, act as obstacles in the face of realizing such values. These conflicting demands make societal consensus concerning individual freedoms related issues harder to achieve. Analysis at the second level (the following section) will highlight how these tensions feature in the JCE programme.

3.3.2 Level B: process relating to the production and consumption of the text (Discursive Practice)

This section moves from the social, economic, political and historical circumstances that inform the citizenship education programme and its general objectives to how these circumstances figure in the discursive practices of the text itself. The aim of this section is to show how the author of the citizenship education textbooks draws on existing discourses (and genres), which are introduced in level A above, to create the text, and therefore create a special version of social life. It also aims to show how the text interacts with its 'implied' readers: how readers of the text rely on available discourses (and genres) to interact with, and interpret, the text (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002).

The analysis will focus on paragraphs from lessons chosen from the grade ten "*National and Civic Education*" textbook, which is part of the JCE programme. The choice of these lessons was not made randomly, but rather they were selected to illustrate the individual freedoms problem that this study focuses on. This does not mean that other lessons in the textbook cannot be used for the same purpose, but the selected lessons are better suited than others³³. Furthermore, given the space provided for this section, confining the analysis to few lessons is seen as sufficient since they contain enough material to illustrate the problem and allow for more detailed analysis.

³³ The selection of these lessons by its very nature could be described by some as a biased process, as CDA, as Van Dijk (2001 p96) writes, "*is biased-and it is proud of it*". The purpose of this bias is seen necessary to draw attention to instances in the use of language where power is used to establish certain representations of social life.

The choice of the grade ten textbook is made based on the lessons it includes. These lessons cover issues which are related to the individual freedoms problem and democratic citizenship values. An English translation of the table of contents of the textbook can be found in Appendix Three. This however, does not make "*National and Civic Education*" textbooks studied in grade levels other than year ten, unsuitable for analysis³⁴. The grade ten textbook, however, in addition to its suitability in terms of content, comes at the end of the compulsory stage of education in Jordan, and therefore, it could be regarded as the most advanced within that compulsory stage in terms of the level of complexity of the concepts it introduces.

The grade ten textbook presents Jordan as a democracy, which is evident in more than one instance in the book. The second paragraph of the fifth lesson, "*The Democratic Experience in Jordan*", of the third unit, "*The State of Jordan and its Democratic Institutions*", states that

"the 1952 constitution of Jordan is recognised by its emphasis on the rise of a democratic rule, thereupon, the state is democratic and the form of government is parliamentary, monarchical, hereditary where the people are the source of legislation" (MoE 2005b p52).

The second lesson, "*Democracy: its Domains and Applications*", of the same unit, states some requirements for democracy to succeed, which include:

"To ensure that individuals and groups have the freedom to express their opinions and beliefs... [and] ... a belief in human intelligence and creative abilities, that allow the individual to effectively participate in the affairs of his/her society" (MoE 2005b p41).

These requirements for the success of democracy, the textbook states, are guaranteed by the Jordanian constitution that was issued in 1952 (MoE 2005b p61).

However, despite this emphasis on the importance of liberal democratic citizenship values, the following paragraphs argue that this emphasis is not well served by the language of the textbook. The way the social world is talked about in the textbook could be seen as a manifestation of the use of power by the dominant culture that sets the agenda for painting one form of the social world and suppressing other discourses and therefore suppressing alternative ways for creating the social

³⁴ Citizenship education is presented in schools in Jordan as a separate subject for grade levels five to ten, and incorporated within the social studies textbooks for the first four and the last two grade levels.

world. Furthermore, as argued below, this dominant voice that narrates the citizenship education story assumes to have access to true knowledge, and the justification for its claims is often made, not through argumentation and presenting and weighing evidence, but rather by making recourse to traditional sources of authority.

Fairclough (1992a) writes that modern democratic societies witnessed a shift in the way power and social control are exercised, which is illustrated in the replacement of force and physical coercion, as means for setting-up, producing and reproducing power relations, by “*the routine workings of particular social practices*” (p3). Power relations and hegemonies are practised more implicitly, Fairclough (1992a) argues, through the use of language whether it is a textbook, a TV commercial or a doctor’s consultation. While this has wide implications, as far as democratic citizenship education is concerned, it places demands that students develop a capacity for identifying patterns of domination and power that stand behind and inform mainstream language. Democratic citizenship education, on Fairclough’s account, has an obligation towards helping students learn to critically read between and behind clauses and paragraphs if they are to learn to make rational and independent decisions.

The domain of the grade ten textbook is Jordanian future citizens (Jordanian students of the different backgrounds) and other non-Jordanian minorities who attend schools in Jordan that follow the Jordanian National Curriculum. Out of all students who study this textbook, the language of the textbook effectively addresses only students committed to Islam. This is manifested by dedicating a relatively large space in the textbook for direct quotations from the Qur’an, sayings of Prophet Mohammed and/or one of the First Four Caliphs in the early days of Islam, while at the same time, failing to balance this by quoting, or at least making reference to, others who belong to other systems of belief, religious or secular. To illustrate this point in numbers, out of the 27 lessons that constitute the grade ten textbook, 14 have a minimum of one direct quotation, and the total number of direct quotations in these 14 lessons is 47. The lessons that do not include any direct quotations could be argued to be descriptive in their nature and therefore do not invite the use of direct quotations from any of the religious sources above. A summary of how these quotations are distributed per lesson can be found in Appendix Four.

Among the objectives of the fifth unit of the textbook (MoE 2005b p63) is to help students “*reject fanaticism and discrimination*”, “*to adopt an open-minded outlook towards other ways of life*” and “*to appreciate tolerance as a democratic value*”. These democratic citizenship values are not justified by argumentation and reasoning on most occasions but rather by making recourse to religion and revelation as a source of authority. This suggests that religious directives are the inspiration for ‘good’ citizenship and that accepting the ‘Other’ is a religious duty that a good citizen must comply with³⁵. As an illustration of this, under the subtitle “*Forms of Tolerance and its Means*” (MoE 2005b p73), the grade ten textbook lists four different forms of tolerance. The four listed forms are: “*religious tolerance, tolerance in dealings, racial tolerance and cultural tolerance*”. The first two forms of tolerance are followed by one verse from the Qur’an each, and the third one by one of the sayings of Prophet Mohammed. Apart from the religious quotations, nothing else is written in support of these three forms of tolerance. Under the fourth form of tolerance (cultural tolerance) there is one statement that reads “*every society has its own culture and has the right to be proud of it and to promote it*” (MoE 2005b p73).

The complete reliance on religious quotations to support the first three types of tolerance reflects an assumption that students who use this textbook are all the same; they are Muslim students bound by their religious commitments. This could be argued to be acceptable in light of the constitutional and majority obstacles discussed under level A (section 3.3.1). In fact, it is one of the objectives of the grade ten textbook, as stated in the “*General Guidelines for National and Civic Education*” and reiterated in the textbook itself, that it is an expectation from all students “*to make mention of verses from the Qur’an and sayings of Prophet Mohammed that instigate tolerance*” (MoE 2005a p76, MoE 2005b p63).

Nevertheless, addressing all students as being devout Muslims has profound implications on the individual freedoms problem which forms the subject of this analysis. Firstly, it blocks the exit way for any of these students who may wish to break free from this closed representation of social life or even to think differently. Secondly, by addressing Muslim students only, the textbook is effectively dividing the world into the two distinct realms of ‘us’ and ‘them’, and the ‘them’ voice,

³⁵ A distinction is to be made here between ‘toleration’, which implies a relationship between two parties that do not enjoy equal status in the way they are perceived socially, and ‘respect’, which could be seen as a more serious attempt to bring the two parties up to the same level and hence differences are celebrated rather than merely tolerated.

including the voice of non-Muslim students who study this textbook, is absent from the picture the textbook draws of the social world. By failing to incorporate but the voice of one form of social life, individuals who do not belong to that particular form, feel intimidated and even threatened by that dominant representation that excludes their voice.

In another chapter, the textbook states that one of the “*main characteristics of a good citizen... is to... believe in God, His books and Messengers*” (MoE 2005b p26). The God that the textbook refers to is the God of Abraham that the three monotheistic religions have in common, and this is again part of the constitutional obstacle (introduced in level A above). Stressing this characteristic of good citizenship provides reasons for learners to divide the world into believers and non-believers, and at best they would feel obliged to tolerate ‘non-believers’. It could also be understood as an encouragement to discriminate against all those who do not believe in the God of Abraham or in any God altogether. The textbook certainly denies non-believers the right to be good citizens, which contributes to the individual freedoms problem of this analysis. The message portrayed in the textbook is that ‘we are not prepared to accept social changes that may result in undermining our collective belief in God’.

It could be argued that the concept of tolerance that the textbook presents is, in certain ways, in line with the concept of ‘religious toleration’ as was understood by the Ottomans during their rule between the Fourteenth Century and the collapse of their empire in World War One. While understandings of religious tolerance in Europe (during the age of Reformation) started to conceptualize along the lines of individual freedom of conscience, in the Muslim world, religious toleration took a different route. The Ottomans adopted a millet system, in which Ottoman subjects were organized in religious communities that were given some sort of self-rule. The expansion of the Ottoman Empire, particularly during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (to include parts of the Middle East, East Asia, North Africa and East Europe) brought peoples of different religious backgrounds under their rule. Under the millet system, Christians and Jews, in particular, were recognized as self-governing units within the larger Muslim Ottoman Empire. They were not only allowed freedom to have their own worship places and schools, but also their own courts and legal codes. Despite restrictions imposed by ruling Muslim authorities on religious communities (non-Muslims for instance were not allowed to advocate their religious beliefs while Muslims did), Muslims were prohibited from interfering

in the internal affairs of these communities (Goldschmidt 2004, Kymlicka 2002).

In hindsight, the millet system could be regarded as a communitarian solution (or at least along one understanding of it) to incorporating religious diversity.

However, the division of the society along religious lines and the self-rule that Christian and Jewish communities were given made it possible for these communities -as means for protecting and maintaining their own religious and cultural ways of life- to impose orthodox religious restrictions on their own members. Within these communities, as well as within the larger Muslim community, individual freedom of conscience was a punishable crime. The way the Ottomans dealt with religious toleration emphasized the authority of religion, be it Islam, Christianity or Judaism, over individual freedom of conscience, and to that effect the Ottoman conception of religious toleration was illiberal (Kymlicka 2002).

The grade ten JCE textbook presents an image of social life that is based on Islam; it also advocates tolerance as one of the values that Islam calls for. Like the Ottoman millet system, it seems to advocate the right of collective worship and practising beliefs for non-Muslims, while excluding those who do not adhere to one of the three monotheistic religions.

Furthermore, the language of the textbook presents Islam as one collective voice that does not make mention of the different sects of Islam, including Shi'ism. This may be justified in terms of the majority obstacle (the majority of Jordanians are Sunni Muslims). However, in a country that is dominated by Sunni Muslims, such as Jordan, the citizenship education textbook is a reasonable venue to help Sunni students develop a capacity for respecting moderate non-Sunni Muslims (indeed as well as non-committed students of Muslim background in general and non-Muslim students altogether). Recognizing Shi'ite Muslims would help young Jordanian students, who often hear about struggles between Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims in the media, to build bridges of respect and trust with their fellow Shi'ites.

In addition to emphasising the authority of religion, the textbook also draws on and emphasises the role of the state as another source of authority. An example of this is found in the lesson "*Citizenship Values and its Demands*". Citizenship in this lesson is described as a "*coin that has two sides: one is belonging and the other is loyalty (wala'a)*" (MoE 2005b p31). The lesson proceeds to explain the

meaning of these two terms; it states that

“Belonging and loyalty are bound to obedience (ta’ah), devotion (ikhlas) and faithfulness (wafa’). These traits start to develop during childhood when a child learns (yata’allam) to be loyal to his/her parents, relatives and those who are in charge (oli al-amr) in his/her clan (asheera). He/she learns to belong to his/her house, school and town. Later on, belonging and loyalty develop to become more associated with one’s own home country (watan) and the authority that looks after it... Loyalty... is an internal feeling that pushes the human being (al-insan) to be devoted and faithful to those in charge of his country, to his culture and history, and to look after the good, interest and wellbeing of his country.” (MoE 2005b p31)

Loyalty, according to the textbook, progresses as if the individual is at the centre of concentric circles where in the outermost circle comes the state. Introducing loyalty in the hierarchical order of parents, relatives, clan, town and the state, establishes and legitimizes hierarchy within society. The inclusion of the term ‘obedience’ could be seen by students to suggest that authority must not be questioned, and that a level of conformity is desirable. In order to promote liberal democratic values more successfully, this lesson could have benefited from focusing on participation in the political debate as part of loyalty to one’s country. As Kymlicka (2002 p289) writes

“[T]he ability and willingness to question political authority, and to engage in public discourse about matters of public policy... are perhaps the most distinctive aspects of citizenship in a liberal democracy...”

Furthermore, the textbook presents loyalty in a rather simplistic manner, assuming it develops naturally without the need of an agent to promote it. According to this model, there is no conflict between different loyalties but rather one contains the other and loyalty to the state contains all. The lesson does not make any reference to the fact that loyalty for one’s own clan, for instance, might come into conflict with being loyal to government. In modern democratic societies, however, loyalties could be represented by scattered circles that may or may not have shared space and each individual could be loyal to different issues at the same time as individuals, as Sen (2006) argues, are not bound to one single identity. Belonging to a certain family, job, religious background, political party, environmental group, civil society organization, and even retail store and football club, present different demands on the individual who needs to make choices and decide on his/her priorities.

The textbook recognises some of the challenges that face the democratic process in Jordan. One of these challenges, as summarized on page 53 of the textbook, is “*the adoption of the Western model as basis for evaluating Jordanian democracy*” (MoE 2005b p53). It is true that every society has its own features, and for some Jordanians ‘individual liberty’ talk is seen as unwarranted Western interference that threatens their way of life. At the same time, to claim that one of the challenges for the democratic process in Jordan is evaluating Jordanian democracy by Western standards could be argued to emphasize the tension arising from trying to reconcile democratic citizenship values with traditional values, and could even be argued to undermine the liberal aspect of democracy.

To conclude this section, the grade ten “*National and Civic Education*” textbook mainly resorts to appealing to traditional sources of authority in supporting its claims, presenting a hierarchical view of Jordanian society. It paints a picture of conformity and does not acknowledge diversity within Jordanian society or Islam. While this may aim to enhance a common identity and solidarity among students, it is more likely to alienate students who come from backgrounds that do not share the same assumptions as the author, and does not suit a pluralistic democratic society.

Rawls’ political conception of justice emphasizes that citizens in democratic societies, who constitutionally share equal powers, are entitled to be different. Unity and stability in well ordered democratic societies, Rawls (1993a) continues, should be established along the lines of reasonable pluralism. Based on this account, the use of the citizenship education textbook as a stage within the public domain to advocate for a comprehensive dominant doctrine has the effect of marginalizing other reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Therefore, on Rawls’ account, such an approach to citizenship education is unreasonable, on the grounds that comprehensive doctrines, even reasonable ones, cannot always provide answers for political questions based on public reason and therefore are not suitable as a basis for social unity (Rawls 1993a).

The reliance on religious quotations, in particular, addresses devout Muslim Jordanian students who would identify with the text. It encourages tolerance toward others, but at the same time it rejects citizens who do not belong to one of the three monotheistic religions, placing limits on the freedom of such groups and individuals, and limiting Muslim students’ ability to develop respect for them and

deal with them as citizens who enjoy equal rights.

By repeatedly presenting knowledge in an assertive non-argumentative manner and resorting to traditional sources of authority for justifying claims of truth, the textbook does not help students to develop the values of public reason, which according to Rawls (1993a) are necessary for helping individuals develop an appreciation for reasonable plurality.

3.3.3 Level C: the linguistic features of the text

This section provides a closer look at some of the linguistic features of the grade ten "*National and Civic Education*" textbook (which is part of the JCE programme). The analysis will focus on certain linguistic features identified mainly in one single lesson, with support, where necessary, from examples from other lessons from the same textbook. The title of the lesson under study is "*Coexistence and Tolerance*" (which is part of a unit entitled "*Reason, Logic and Dialogue*") for which an English translation may be found in Appendix Five. This lesson is chosen as a sample of how linguistic features of the textbook contribute to the individual freedoms problem in Jordan, and the linguistic features chosen to be analysed are those considered to contribute the most to this problem. There may be other linguistic features that other lessons in the textbook (or other textbooks offered as part of the JCE education programme) make use of, but confined within the space provided for this section, identifying certain linguistic features of one single lesson is an example of how a single teaching unit, a lesson, is organized within the larger picture that the textbook provides for the social world. Four linguistic features of the lesson will be analysed (whole-text language organization, clause combinations, clauses and words), and analysis is intended to illustrate how these features contribute, collectively, to the complexity of the individual freedoms problem. The choice of this particular lesson is made based on the assumption that coexistence and tolerance, that constitute the title of the lesson, are both liberal democratic citizenship values.

The lesson under study is made-up of five brief sections and each section is made up of short paragraphs. Most of the clauses in these paragraphs are linked with an 'and', which makes the structure of the sentences that make up the lesson

mainly compound rather than complex³⁶. The declarative nature of the compound sentences used in the lesson disregards the need for legitimizing the information declared in any one clause. The lesson is not written as a set of arguments, but as a set of assertions that aim to inform students of the 'right' way of behaving.

As argued in section 3.3.2 above, the declarative language of the textbook is obvious in the excessive use of religious quotations as justification for statements, and this particular lesson is no exception. The lesson starts with a Qur'anic verse that is placed inside a text-box positioned right under the title of the lesson. The lesson also quotes two other Qur'anic verses and one saying for Prophet Mohammed, as well as three more Qur'anic verses that appear in the evaluative set of questions at the end of the lesson.

The declarative nature of the lesson is also reflected in the use of listing syntax and illustrative diagrams that contribute to its paratactic syntax. Sections four and five of the lesson are mainly constituted of numbered points, and each of these points conveys a certain message without going through the process of justifying it. The lesson also contains two illustrative coloured diagrams: the first one is comprised of eight boxes each instructing the student to refer to a Qur'anic verse (or verses) that emphasises an Islamic principle (found in the Amman message) that could be related to coexistence and tolerance. And the second diagram illustrates six means (*wasail*) through which tolerance, as the textbook points out, could be achieved. These two diagrams stand in the lesson without a discussion of the messages they convey.

The lesson also includes six text-boxes that are distinguished from the rest of the text by having a different colour in the background. Five of these text-boxes, coloured blue, contain the word 'think!' (*fakker!*), followed by one or two questions/problems. The sixth text-box, coloured pink, contains the word 'activity' and asks students to write a report about "*the values of tolerance that are encompassed in Amman Message*"³⁷. Two of the seven questions inside the blue text-boxes ask students 'to mention more examples of', which could be argued not

³⁶ In complex sentences, a subordinate clause follows and gives reason or purpose for a main clause, while in compound sentences each clause declares some sort of information that, while still serving the general theme of the whole sentence, could be regarded as independent of other clauses in that sentence.

³⁷ Amman message was introduced in Level A of the analysis, and a copy of the message is found in Appendix Two.

to invoke critical thinking. The other five questions are open-ended ones; they ask students: 'to explain', 'what do you think of?', and 'what is the role of?'. Students might find answers (or hints for answers) within the lesson, as in the case of the question in the second text-box for which a brief answer is provided in the fourth paragraph of section one. However, the open-ended nature of these questions demands more than just searching for an answer in the textbook. In order to address these questions, students should be able to present arguments (and possibly counterarguments) in support of their answers. Given the declarative nature of the lesson and in the absence of examples of complex sentences, as will be made clearer in the clause combinations analysis that will follow, students might not be able to properly address these questions.

Moving on to the second linguistic feature of the lesson, clause combinations, the following analysis aims to provide a closer look at how clauses are combined together in such a way that could contribute to the assertive non-dialogical nature of the language of the lesson. The fourth paragraph of the lesson (section one) can be used as a representation of this linguistic property. This paragraph states that

*The practising of tolerance does not come into conflict with human rights/ and it does not mean accepting social injustices/ or abandoning one's rights and beliefs/ or failing to take them seriously.
(MoE 2005b p71)*

The paragraph above is a compound one that could be divided into four separate clauses or assertions (the slant marks are introduced to show where the paragraph could be divided). Each of these clauses informs students, in an assertive manner, about a certain feature of tolerance, and therefore, suggests that students are to take what is written for granted without further investigation. The declarative approach of this paragraph is evident in the absence of a warrant or evidence that may be used to allow the student to move from a premise to a conclusion in order to confirm the validity of these clauses in a rational and convincing manner. The absence of the 'if ... then' structure or 'premise-conclusion' movement within the paragraph allows the four clauses to be rewritten in any order without changing the meaning of the paragraph.

Also in the absence of premise-conclusion movement, the paragraph under study could be understood in more than one way. One way of reading it could be along these lines: 'there is no contradiction in holding one's beliefs and being equally

tolerant of the existence of other beliefs', which could be interpreted as a way to assure and encourage believers to uphold the value of tolerance. One could also read it as a warning (or maybe as a threat): 'be warned not to abandon your beliefs if you are going to uphold the value of tolerance'. And a third way could be: 'being tolerant does not mean tolerating all positions such as injustices and violations of human rights'. The way to read this sentence could be along any of the three readings above, or it may be left open on purpose to address different people who view tolerance differently.

Another example of how clause combinations could add to the declarative non-dialogical language of the lesson is the first paragraph of section four: 'the Importance of Tolerance'. This paragraph (quoted below) is made up of four clauses that could be rewritten as four bullet points without disrupting the meaning and without the need for making any alterations to any of these clauses (the slant marks are introduced to show where the paragraph could be divided):

Tolerance is a key for solving disagreements,/ ¹ and a necessary condition for peace and social progress,/ ² and through tolerance we can overpower bigotry, discrimination and hatred./ ³ And the following represents the most prominent positive effects that could be achieved through tolerance: .../ ⁴ (MoE 2005b p72)

The first three clauses try to assert, in general terms, why tolerance is such an important value. These assertions are once again stated in a declarative manner. It may be argued, however, that the fourth clause and the seven numbered points that follow it³⁸ are an attempt to justify, in a listing syntax, the assertions made in the first three clauses that precede it. While this may (or may not) be the intention, the way the four clauses in this paragraph are combined together does not back-up this interpretation. There are 'commas' between the first three clauses and a 'period' at the end of the third one. The fourth clause also starts with an 'And' in the same way as the two clauses that precede it, which makes the quoted paragraph (as in the previous quotation) an example of another compound sentence that lacks the necessary requisites of an argument.

In addition to the declarative compound statements that dominate the lesson, the lesson contains two paragraphs that may be regarded as complex. The arguments presented in these complex paragraphs, however, are implicit rather

³⁸ The seven numbered points do not appear in the quotation above, but may be found in the translation of the lesson in Appendix Five.

than explicit. These paragraphs are the two paragraphs of section two³⁹. The first paragraph reads:

The human community (mujtama' insani) incorporates a great deal of variance and unity at the same time./¹ Variance is manifested in the big number of races, ethnicities, religions and nationalities that hold values and beliefs that lead to different civilizations (thaqafat),/² and unity is manifested in the sharing of all members of these groups their seeking to live in dignity, peace and to achieve their ambitions and interests/³ and based on this, what brings people together is more than what divides them,/⁴ but, why the violence, struggle, ill-will and hatred that the world witnesses today?/⁵ (MoE 2005b p71)

The quoted paragraph above lacks the presence of obvious connecting words such as 'therefore', 'nevertheless', 'if...then', which could be used to make an argument explicit. The clauses are, as in any simple compound statement, connected via the connecting word 'and'. However, it could be argued that the first three clauses are presented as a premise for a conclusion that comes in the fourth clause. The reason for making this assumption could be justified by the presence of the "... and based on this..." sentence at the start of clause four that could be seen as an implicit way for moving from a premise to a conclusion. Not being able, however, to clearly identify whether this sentence is intended to be an argument or not is mainly due to the fact that the premise does not exactly lead to the stated conclusion. The weak link between the conclusion and the premise that precedes it could be argued to justify the absence of explicit connecting words that may be used to direct the flow of a good argument. A paragraph like this one is closer to presenting knowledge through assertions than reasoning, and students are expected to accept its assertions without further investigation.

The argument in the second paragraph of section two is clearer:

"In the current age, the association between societies and the intertwining of interests between these societies, which resulted from the communication, information and transportation revolution, makes tolerance, coexistence, communication and open dialogue necessities that are crucial for achieving the interests of all societies." (MoE 2005(b) p71)

Students are given reasons in support of the claim that tolerance and open dialogue are necessities in the modern world, for example to allow for mutual economic benefit. Here tolerance is justified in a pragmatic manner that addresses all students regardless of religious belonging.

³⁹ The two paragraphs can be found in the translation of the lesson in Appendix Five.

Going back to the quotation before last (first paragraph of section two), the fifth interrogative clause that comes at the end of the quoted paragraph allows shifting the discussion from clause combinations to the clauses themselves that make up the paragraphs. As has already been argued, most of the clauses in the lesson are in the declarative mood in the sense that they make assertions rather than engage students in a dialogue. The fifth interrogative clause, however, is the only clause that comes within the lesson's main body and takes a different form. The interrogative mood of the clause under study could be seen as an invitation to students to join the dialogue. While this may be the case, given the declarative nature of the lesson, it could also be argued that this clause is rhetorical and does not actually demand an answer from students.

Another linguistic feature of clauses is modality. In the lesson under study, none of the clauses use modalizing expressions such as 'we believe', 'in our opinion' or 'it could be argued', that have the effect of showing the reader that there are other points of view 'but this is how we think it is'. Contrary to that, the language used claims a universal status, a totalizing story, where issues of right and wrong are judged based on this story. In this particular lesson, 'coexistence' and 'tolerance' are presented as unproblematic where controversial and shady issues are avoided.

Moving from clauses to the 'word' level, part of the non-dialogical language of the text could be realized in the vocabulary it uses. The textbook presents "*forgiveness, pardoning, charity, replacing bad deeds with good deeds and shunning the ignorant*" (MoE 2005b p72) as different meanings for the value of tolerance that are found in the Qur'an. While these values have some commonalities, they may also come into conflict with each other, something the text does not acknowledge. There is an underlying assumption that upholding the value of tolerance is the key to solving, at the very least, all problems mentioned under the section 'The Importance of Tolerance' on page 72 in the textbook, without any mention that the value of tolerance could sometimes be difficult to uphold. Difficult issues, like for instance 'honour killings' are avoided altogether, let alone taboos like apostasy and same sex relations that students learn about mainly through the Internet and some satellite TV channels. As discussed in section 3.3.2, the value of tolerance is presented in a rather simplistic manner that lacks the necessary complexity needed to help students develop their critical thinking.

In almost every society, there are certain behaviours, attitudes and values that are more difficult to tolerate than others. Tolerating such values that the society regards as foreign may not lead to social progress, according to a given set of criteria, but rather may initiate resistance that may lead to social struggle.

An example of such resistance could be illustrated in the debate within the Jordanian parliament and society at large concerning crimes of honour. According to a BBC report (broadcast in January 2002), 24 women are reportedly killed in Jordan each year in honour killings (Hawley 2002). In 2004, Amnesty International reported that at least 15 women are victims of honour killings every year (Amnesty International 2004). Warrick (2005) writes that reliable statistics concerning the right number of honour killings are hard to find as some of these crimes are either unreported or reported as accidents or suicides. Murders of this kind are conducted in the name of cleansing the 'family' honour from the shame brought about to the family by an unlawful act of one of its female members (Feldner 2000, Warrick 2005). Crimes of honour, as Feldner writes, could be argued to be supported by the Jordanian criminal law itself. Article 340 of the criminal law states that

"(a) He who discovers his wife, or one of his maharim (female relatives of such a degree of consanguinity as precludes marriage), while committing adultery with another man and kills, wounds, or injures one or both of them, is exempt from any penalty; (b) He who discovers his wife, or one of his sisters or female relatives, with another in an illegitimate bed, and kills, wounds, or injures (one or both of them) benefits from a reduction of penalty" (Feldner 2000).

In addition to this 'crimes of honour' specific Article, there is Article 98 which has a more general nature and is also referred to in cases of a male killing a female relative, even if the murdered female is not one of the murderer's *maharim*. Article 98 states that

"He who commits a crime due to extreme anger caused by an illegal, and to some extent dangerous act, committed by the victim benefits from reduced penalty" (Feldner 2000).

These two articles ensure the perpetrator a light sentence, which, according to Feldner (2002), ranges from three to twenty-four months in prison. Such light sentences encourage some to believe that these crimes are socially acceptable.

In response to pressures exerted by Jordanian human rights activists, the

Parliament went into session twice (the latest was in September 2003) with one of its agenda items being to amend Article 340. In both cases, these amendments were rejected by the House of Representatives.

The issue of honour killings, while it is not addressed in the textbook, is an example of how individual freedoms form a site of struggle between certain traditional understandings of certain values, such as family honour and pride, and liberal democratic citizenship values in which all citizens, men and women, are equal before the law.

Nevertheless, the textbook does address the important issue of women's rights. In a lesson entitled 'The basic rights of woman and child', reference is made to some of the main items of 1995 Beijing World Conference on Women (six basic rights presented as an illustrative diagram without making reference to them within the text) and some of the basic rights granted to women under the Jordanian constitution. The lesson also emphasizes that the Jordanian constitution does not differentiate between men and women in relation to their rights and duties (MoE 2005b p49).

However, in the section on the rights of the child in the same lesson, the textbook writes:

... and let us recall what Omar Ibn al-Khattab, God bless his soul, said "the right of a boy on his father is to choose his mother, give him a good name and to teach him the Qur'an".¹ Also to recall how Islam prohibited the burying alive of girls that was practised by some Arab tribes before Islam/² (MoE 2005b p 50).

While these two statements in this quotation may be referred to as a sign of the progressive nature of Islam within a Seventh Century context, they are not the best choice of statements for supporting the rights of women and children in the Twenty-First Century, mainly because of the way they portray the two sexes. While the first statement may be regarded in a positive light as an emphasis on the important role women play, though not alone, in bringing up 'boys', it could also be understood as presenting, maintaining and legitimizing the authority which the dominant view of social life tries to invest in its male members. This quotation could be viewed to present women as if they have no choice or will, but rather they are chosen by men, who are socially superior to them, in order to carry out a certain mission assigned to them by these men. Girls are also brought to the

picture in rather a dim context: prohibiting their burial alive when they're young.

In conclusion, this section argues that the mainly compound sentences that make up the lesson are part of its declarative non-dialogical syntax that is tailored toward emphasising the authority of religion, tradition and the state rather than helping students develop a capacity for critical thinking. By doing so, the lesson creates a non-dialogical divide in which students could be regarded as subordinates to the authority represented by the author of the text, who, in turn, claims to have access to knowledge and has a duty to transmit this knowledge.

The lessons in this textbook would benefit from striking a better balance between making assertions and asking questions that aim to engage learners in a dialogue. These questions could take a more general form, such as; 'does commitment to tolerance weaken one's own religious commitments?' and 'to what extent can one be tolerant (where to draw the line)?', as well as more culturally specific questions, including, but not limited to, the problem of honour killing, tensions that may arise as a result of normalizing relations with the state of Israel⁴⁰ and whether justifications for constitutional essentials that are based on *Shari'a* law could address the needs of pluralist democratic societies. Answers for these questions, and others, must not be presented as warranted assertions, but rather reached by students through helping them to develop a capacity for recognising, and making, good arguments based on the values of public reason.

A Rawlsian conception of public reason, Nagel (2003) writes, is not guaranteed to produce agreement and may not at the end develop into a consensus. What it guarantees is disagreement, arguments and counterarguments in which the different parties rely on the use of methods of evaluation and evidence that are recognised and mutually accepted by, at least, the reasonable amongst them. As Nagel writes, even if an argument that is presented by an opponent is not convincing to 'us', we accept his/her argument on the basis of its appeal to reason to convince us, which is something an argument that appeals to faith fails to do.

For this reason, students would benefit from seeing examples of complex sentences where arguments and counterarguments are presented objectively and different pieces of evidence are used to support different points of view in a debating manner. Given the variety of ways of life, a student should not feel

⁴⁰ Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty in 1994 that resulted in normalising the relations between the two countries.

threatened, or even ridiculed, if he/she upholds a different point of view from the dominant one.

3.4 Chapter's conclusion

Rapid social change emerges as one of the features that characterise modern societies. What is less obvious, though, according to Fairclough (1992a p3), is the important role that language plays within the changes that are taking place in society.

The three-level analysis of the JCE programme concludes that citizenship education discourse in Jordan, while it aims to help students develop liberal democratic citizenship values, contributes to the 'individual freedoms' problem in two main ways.

Firstly, the citizenship education discourse is narrated by one voice that mainly resorts to traditional sources of authority (tradition, religion and the state) in order to justify knowledge claims. It emphasises one form of social life that presents democratic citizenship values as a subset of traditional cultural and religious values without paying due attention to conflicts that may arise as a result of marrying these values. The analysis suggests that the grade ten National and Civic education textbook does not make enough effort to address non-Muslim students and even non-committed Muslim students, who may feel alienated by the textbook they study. While this approach to citizenship education may succeed in helping devout Muslim students to tolerate other ways of life, it undermines the demands of freedom and equality as characteristics of constitutional democracies.

The second limitation could be exemplified in the largely declarative non-dialogical form of language that the textbook uses, which does not encourage the learner to take an active role in his/her learning. The assertiveness of the language of the textbook, coupled with constant reference to traditional sources of authority in order to justify truth claims, has the effect of placing learners at the receiving end, where their main role becomes to internalize the information transmitted to them. This approach, contrary to the objectives of the programme, seems destined to be unsuccessful in promoting critical thinking and reasoning as one of the demands of democratic citizenship. By not presenting students with enough examples of reasoned arguments and counterarguments, the programme is not geared

towards helping students develop a capacity for taking part in public deliberations, which is another demand of democratic citizenship.

In general, the JCE programme is more tailored towards enforcing in the minds of youngsters a hierarchical order for the society that is underpinned by the authority of religion, tradition and the state. A lesson that is designed to contain more arguments, while it could be more successful in engaging learners in a dialogue that would help them develop a capacity for reasoning and critical thinking, would also place the textbook at the risk of opening itself up to counter-arguments. This may challenge the hierarchical structure of the society.

Given this summary, from a Rawlsian point of view, the image of the social world that the JCE programme presents, while it could be described as decent (in the sense that human rights are protected and external and internal conflicts are prevented), is illiberal (Rawls 1993b). In light of this, although these textbooks are devised, in part, to help students develop democratic citizenship values and attitudes; it may be argued that they are part of the problem rather than being part of its solution.

This chapter presented the JCE programme as example of a citizenship model that, while it still enforces traditional sources of authority as means for enhancing political stability and social cohesion, also aims to help individuals develop democratic citizenship values. The traditional outlook of the programme creates a certain image of the social world that, while it calls for tolerating diversity present within society and elsewhere, fails to take this diversity on-board. It presents a one-size-fits-all general way of life (the image of a tolerant open minded Muslim Jordanian) that fails, in many ways, to meet the demands of democratic citizenship education. Given the fact that modern democratic societies are pluralist societies, in which all citizens share equally with others in the exercise of political power (Rawls 1999), a democratic state (or one that aspires to consolidate democratic ideals) should not use its power (through education or other means) to undermine the political equality principle, which is one of the main pillars of any liberal understanding of democracy. Based on this, the following chapter introduces an understanding of citizenship education that is grounded in Rawls' PL, which it argues to be better suited to address the demands (from a liberal democratic theory point of view) of traditional orientations of Arab societies, the demands of tolerating diversity and the those of rational autonomy.

Chapter Four

Discussion and conclusions

4.1 The case for a broader understanding of citizenship education in traditional Arab states

The analysis of the Jordanian citizenship education (JCE) textbook concludes that a reconciliatory solution to citizenship education that presents liberal democratic citizenship values as a subset of traditional cultural and religious values, while it has some virtue in drawing a decent well-ordered society, in Rawlsian terms, it is not successful in helping students develop an appreciation for diversity and rational autonomy viewed as two necessary values for democratic citizenship education in democratic societies. The traditional outlook of the JCE programme highlights the need for a broader understanding of citizenship education.

Section 2.3 introduced two opposite understandings of citizenship education that draw from the liberal tradition, one valorising rational autonomy (Gutmann 1995, 2007, Levinson 1999) and the other toleration of traditional and cultural diversity (Galston 1995).

Considering these two positions in relation to the requirements of a citizenship education in Arab countries, it could be argued that a form of citizenship education that valorizes rational autonomy, as a way for general good life, faces moral as well as practical objections. Arkoun (1998) argues that there are no moral grounds for asking people to replace their culturally inherited way of life with another. Forcing a rational autonomy-dedicated way of life on all members of society, through formal schooling, could be argued to be similar to forcing an illiberal form of education; they both demand the application of coercive state power to be implemented, which a liberal democratic state should refrain from using.

Furthermore, a rational autonomy-dedicated approach to citizenship education could be argued to undermine traditional religious and cultural ways of life and provides reasons for younger generations to look down on their parents' ways of life. This could lead to confusion in the minds of children who are forced to live two lives, one at school and another at home, and could also lead to alienating these youngsters within their own societies. An autonomy dedicated approach to

citizenship education is also capable of widening the gap between those who champion tradition and those who are pro-autonomy. The problem becomes worse if these two groups focus on their differences rather than what they have in common. This would make it even harder for these two groups, particularly in young democracies where democratic ideals are not yet consolidated, to meet half way. In such an atmosphere, reaching a consensus on the objectives of citizenship education itself becomes problematic. The clash between traditional values and liberal democratic values could also lead to a confused hybrid generation in which youngsters and adult citizens are sometimes attracted to one system of values and in other times to another⁴¹.

Concerning the view that valorises traditional and cultural diversity, it could be argued that such an understanding of democratic citizenship education, in which students receive rhetorical knowledge about other ways of life without encouraging them to reflect critically on these ways, while it may help students to recognize the presence of other ways of life, does not necessarily help them develop a compassionate understanding of these ways. Mere tolerance, as discussed earlier in section 2.3, does not necessarily solve problems of discrimination within society. Furthermore, an uncritical approach to accepting diversity does not necessarily help students recognize reasonable from unreasonable ways of life⁴². Moreover, by putting a hold on students' critical thinking skills, this approach could be argued to disadvantage students' development as rational and critical thinkers.

The three paragraphs above suggest that neither of these two views can properly address challenges that face citizenship education in democratizing Arab countries. What is needed, this study argues, is a broader understanding of citizenship education that brings together the demands of tolerating diversity, traditional and liberal, individual and group, and the demands of rational autonomy.

Globalization theory suggests that global interdependence, even if it is based on a mere economic basis, urges educational policy makers, in Arab countries and elsewhere, to consider global diversity. There is growing recognition, as Osler

⁴¹ Such examples are already found in Jordanian society: a father allowing his son certain freedoms but denying the right of his daughter to the same freedoms, or a husband who 'allows' his wife to have a nine to five job, yet still considers the household in terms of cleanliness, cooking, tidiness and looking after children, to be wholly his wife's responsibility (Jordan Human Development Report 2004, p113).

⁴² 'Reasonability' here is taken as Rawls defines it, which is introduced in section 2.5.

(2005) writes, that national educational programmes which are designed to merely focus on nation building in its narrow sense, i.e. without paying due attention to the larger world in which nations exist and interact, lack necessary features that would provide students with necessary values, attitudes, skills and knowledge that could help them to develop a cosmopolitan understanding of citizenship. Theoreticians, such as David Held, have even gone on to suggest that cosmopolitan democratic models, in which international institutions and a universal code of human rights, should become part of states' constitutions (Held 2006).

In relation to traditionally oriented understandings of citizenship, accommodating traditional ways of life does not provide grounds for suppressing individual freedoms and alternative conceptions of the good. As far as Islam is concerned, it could be argued that given its different understandings, no one is given *“adequate ground for practicing authoritarianism through censorship or political restriction, since the legitimacy of adhering today to the views enunciated in the... [past]... has to be decided by those who live today”* (Sen 1999b p32). Democratic citizenship education in Arab countries needs to find means to bring youngsters to come to appreciate that unity can be found in diversity rather than trying to impose unrealistic conformity in order to enhance unity. Helping students to appreciate plurality that exists within their own societies would aid them to relinquish feelings of being trapped in small, young and culturally poor nation states that have little to offer to the rest of the world.

In line with the above paragraph, globalization has given stronger reason for radical Islamists to fill the vacuum created by the weakening role of the family and the school as traditional sources of authority. These groups, as Sen (2006) writes, rely on *“cultivating and exploiting a militant Islamic identity specifically aimed against Western people”* (p30). Campaigning under the banner of Islam, and in increasingly involving themselves in welfare and charity activities, some of these groups have managed to brainwash some of the younger individuals who are either economically in need and/or, in an age of uncertainty, seek comfort in identifying with a group that provides them with direct answers and reminds them of a perceived faultless past, while at the same time promises them of future rewards whether on earth or even in heaven (Abu Khalil 1993).

The progress of societies towards increasing plurality (section 2.4.1), choice and the development of a new form of individuality (section 2.4.2), poses a challenge

for the traditional view of education as a production process that the AHDR (2003) (section 1.6) describes national educational programmes in Arab countries to still hold. While such developments add to existing diversity that is present within every society, school, and even within every household, they also place increasing emphasis on the active role of the individual, who, from an early stage of life, is increasingly gaining more control over his/her own life, from types of food he/she chooses, to fashion, to satellite television channel, to subjects studied at school, sexuality preferences, political orientations, religious affiliations, etc. They also highlight the need for democratic understanding of citizenship education that helps students develop a capacity for making better informed and rational decisions that are based on evidence, reason and common sense knowledge.

However, in pluralist democratic systems, building relationships between society members that are based on mutual respect demands more than just rationality. Rationality involves assessing a particular situation from one's own perspective, which may or may not be a selfish one. Rawls argues for advancing the ideal of reasonability. When it comes to suggesting terms of cooperation between society members, Rawls' reasonability suggests putting oneself in the shoes of others and being able to suggest fair terms of cooperation that could be acceptable to others on the basis that all are free and equal.

In reference to the traditional stance that national educational programmes in Arab countries tend to emphasise, when education is offered in a form that mainly asks students to reproduce the facts that it provides them with or as a set of directives that students are asked to follow, learners become gradually convinced that the world should go along one route and deviations from this prescribed route are perceived as wrong. Learners are not provided with enough reasons to develop their ability to infer, question and explore. Equally important, this approach does not help students realize that there are other reasonable ways of life. The development of children as open-minded tolerant creative adults is harmed by a form of education that does not give them enough opportunities to use their own knowledge, skills and imagination to go beyond prescribed educational activities.

The above suggests that while democratic citizenship education in traditional Arab societies has an obligation to pay due attention to traditional religious and cultural ways of life, it also must pay due attention to the fact that democratic citizenship demands rationality, open-mindedness, accommodating change and accepting

reasonable diversity as a fact of life in modern democratic societies. What is needed is a broader understanding of citizenship education that makes such values accessible to all students. 'Accessible' here means to make them available as 'public goods' (a term used by Rawls). To be viewed as a public good in Rawlsian terms means that while the state should make provision for these values through state education for all students (hence satisfying the equality condition of a Rawlsian based democratic system), it is up to students whether to make use of these capacities or not (hence satisfying the freedom condition of a Rawlsian based democratic system).

The following section argues that an understanding of citizenship that is grounded in Rawls' political liberalism is better tailored to meet this understanding of citizenship education.

4.2 Why a liberal model? The case for Rawls' political liberalism

One could argue that despite differences between Rawls' political liberalism (PL) and other models that emerge from the liberal tradition, it is at the end a liberal representation of social life which clashes with some hierarchical representations found in Arab societies. Rawls (2001) himself identifies this incompatibility. In this regard he writes:

"Suppose that a particular religion, and the conception of the good belonging to it, can survive only if it controls the machinery of the state and is able to practice effective intolerance. This religion will cease to exist in the well ordered society of political liberalism" (p154).

While this may be true, it is also true that democratic systems of government are already in place in many Arab states and several steps were made in the direction of providing citizens with more basic liberties. Some Arab countries, including Jordan, present themselves as constitutional democracies (MoE 2005a). As for citizens of Arab states, several studies and public polls show that the majority of them, in different parts of the Arab world, are in favour of more transparent democratic systems of government. Tessler (2003), for instance, shows that among 2765 Egyptian interviewees, the majority favours democratic forms of governance over other forms. Equally important, Tessler's study shows that being more religious or less religious has no effect on attitudes of interviewees toward democratic governance.

In a background study conducted for the Arab Human Development Report (AHDR 2003), respondents from four Arab countries (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco) were compared as a unit to eight other country groupings⁴³.

Respondents from the four Arab countries grouping came at the top of the list favouring democracy as the best form of government and rejecting the notion of a *“strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections”* (AHDR 2003 p19). They also came third in rejecting the statement *“a university education is more important for a boy than for a girl”* (p52). However, they came at the end of the list concerning gender equality in employment (if jobs are scarce, men are to take priority over women).

Concerning the question of how much control Islamic *Shari’a* law should have in Arab societies, Khuri (2005) argues that there are different views within and between Arab societies. He bases his argument on a public opinion poll conducted in 2004 (by the aforementioned, the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland and Zogby International). In the survey, respondents, from six Arab countries, were asked to choose between two statements, statement A: *“Religion must be respected, but clergy should not dictate the political system”* or statement B: *“Clergy must play a greater role in our political system”*. Responses show a split within each country and differences between different countries. In three of the six countries (Jordan, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates) respondents favoured statement B over statement A (with 42%, 48% and 45 % respectively choosing statement B, as opposed to 36%, 33% and 25% favouring statement A). The remaining respondents in each of these countries were either unsure or were in favour of other systems.

Respondents in another two countries (Morocco and Lebanon) favoured statement A over B (51% and 50% respectively as opposed to 33% and 28%), while in Egypt responses were almost equally split (A: 50% and B: 47%) (Zogby 2004).

The results of the survey above indicate that there is no one view concerning the role *Shari’a* law should have in regulating societies. The high percentage of individuals, in the different Arab countries, who chose statement B, was counterbalanced by a high percentage of those who chose statement A.

⁴³ The eight country groupings are: East Asia; Eastern Europe; Latin America; (non Arab) Islamic countries; South Asia; Sub-Saharan Africa; USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand and Western Europe

The above paragraphs suggest that it is not unreasonable to make the assumption that there are citizens who want their governments to protect their rights and to provide them with basic negative liberties. In the case of Jordan, while the analysis of the citizenship education textbook shows that traditional sources of authority are important constituents of social life, there are also parallel demands by citizens for a liberal form of democracy that are recognised by the JCE programme. However, as the analysis of the JCE programme concludes, reconciliation attempts between liberal democratic citizenship values and traditional sources of authority give more weight to the latter. The hierarchical approach to citizenship education that the textbook utilizes, while it encourages students to tolerate different forms of social life, ties good citizenship with a belief in God. This condition undermines reasonable (in Rawlsian terms) ways of life that uphold different conceptions of the good. Furthermore, this approach to citizenship education places students within a certain cultural and religious category and does not allow them to think that they themselves could be different. While cultural and religious values could be welcoming to diversity, citizenship education that seeks the title 'democratic', in Rawlsian terms, should not advance one set of religious beliefs over other conceptions of the good, as this by its very nature is an act of discrimination against other reasonable ways of life.

According to Rawls (1993a), recognizing 'reasonable pluralism' is one of the characteristics of the political culture of democratic societies. Enforcing a shared comprehensive doctrine on all citizens can only be done through the use of oppressive state power. In constitutional democracies, public power, while it is always coercive, is power shared by all free and equal citizens. On Rawls' account, to use public power to enforce one form of social life over others, whether by imposing sanctions on those who are 'different' from the majority of citizens or by using public venues, including education, undermines both liberty and equality of citizens and violates the basis of justice within society.

Whether it is in Jordan or another Arab country, while it is not easy for the citizenship education discourse to escape prejudices enforced by dominant hierarchical representations of social life, historical wisdom suggests that it can be done. The Catholic Church in fifteenth and sixteenth century Europe was very domineering and in order to maintain the Catholic faith, strict measures were taken to suppress heresy. However, the Wars of Religion in Europe urged both Catholics and Protestants to reach a conclusion that, while no one system of

beliefs can speak for the other, shared religious faith alone cannot form basis for a stable society (Kymlicka 2002). Upon this, religious toleration, in Europe, took a specific form that built on individual freedom of conscience, which is something, Kymlicka writes, that was not tolerated before. The point that this analogy makes is that societies are not necessarily static, and radical solutions are possible.

Given this brief account, and in the absence of an adequately developed modern Arab or Islamic theory of education in which democratic citizenship education in democratizing Arab countries could be grounded, Rawls' PL, despite its loyalty being to liberal theory, could be argued to be an appropriate approach (i.e. involves lesser trades-off) for reconciling conflicting democratic citizenship values with dominant traditional representations of social life.

The following section moves on to address the question of how Rawls' PL could be realized at the larger societal level and how it could be translated into citizenship educational policy recommendations.

4.3 Translating Rawls' political liberalism into citizenship education policies

Educating youngsters about the benefits of shared political values and helping them develop an appreciation for the variety of doctrines (present locally and globally) is very much linked with where adults in a society stand with regard to this issue. Formal education, and in particular citizenship education, is one venue for reaching youngsters, but in order to translate Rawls' PL into citizenship educational policies, adults who are in charge of decision making, and who are legally responsible for youngsters, also need to come to realize these benefits.

By focusing on shared political values, a Rawlsian based citizenship education programme would help different peoples to come to realize that despite their differences, they have much in common. The aim of Rawls' PL is not to enforce unrealistic forms of conformity, but to build bridges of communication, trust and mutual respect.

Rawls' conception of justice as fairness builds on *"the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation over time, from one generation to the other"* (Rawls 1993a

p15). For this organizing idea to be realized, Rawls assumes the following two assumptions: first, citizens who are engaged in fair cooperation are both free and equal (in Rawlsian terms as introduced in section 2.5), and second, democratic societies are 'well ordered', meaning, they are regulated by a political conception of justice (in contrast to a comprehensive one), where political values take priority over all other private values that may come in conflict with them. This condition that regulates well-ordered liberal societies is different from the conditions that regulate well-ordered hierarchical societies introduced earlier in section 1.4.

As already introduced in section 2.5, the plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines that modern democratic societies are bound to accommodate makes it unreasonable for a constitutional democracy to refer to one single doctrine to address fundamental questions of justice, or as Rawls (1993a p135) writes, "*no comprehensive doctrine is appropriate as a political conception for a constitutional regime*". Establishing this fact is central to the success of a Rawlsian-based citizenship education programme. Its importance lies in its ability to help students develop an appreciation for the value of reaching a consensus on fundamental political values (a Rawlsian conception of justice) that regulate society on a basis that could be shared by people belonging to different reasonable comprehensive doctrines and along Rawls' organizing idea of democratic society as a system of fair cooperation between equal and free citizens.

Rawls distinguishes between three levels for accepting a political conception of justice: *modus vivendi*, constitutional consensus and overlapping consensus.

At the *modus vivendi*⁴⁴ level, two rival groups sign a treaty that aims to put an end to the sufferings of members of both groups. Signing a treaty of this kind does not mean in any way that the two groups will come to respect each other. They, for different reasons, respect the treaty itself, and, maybe, the values that underpin it, but not more than that. Should conditions change and one group, for any reason becomes more domineering within the society than the other, the treaty might be violated for the benefit of the domineering group. Under such conditions,

⁴⁴ To clarify what Rawls means by '*modus vivendi*', suppose two rival social, religious or political groups, or even nation states, where realizing the interests of one would inevitably come in conflict with the interests of the other and vice versa. The conflict is so powerful that events may develop in ways that could lead to social struggle and confrontation between these groups, which results in even worse conditions for members of both groups. The deteriorating situation forces the two groups, each for its own benefits, to sign a treaty that puts an end to the deteriorating situation and preserves at least some of the interests of both groups (Rawls 1993a).

accepting the treaty and the political conception of justice that underpins it is according to Rawls (1993a) a *modus vivendi*.

A '*modus vivendi*' treaty could develop into a constitutional consensus when political values that underpin the treaty become part of the state's constitution. Adopting these political values into the state's constitution enforces certain rights and liberties and creates a democratic culture that regulates relations between rival groups. Violating these values though becomes a punishable offence and to that effect these values are considered 'liberal'. As a result, these liberal political democratic values which were unwillingly accepted at first become part of the daily political interactions between citizens who over time come to recognise diversity, not necessarily with enthusiasm, but as a fact of daily living (Rawls 1993a, 2001).

Furthermore, successful political and social cooperation, when maintained, provides reason for citizens to trust each other more and to have more confidence in the process itself that led to this sort of trust. Citizens, Rawls (1993a) argues, who live in a society whose basic institutions are just would become more committed to the cause of justice, and over time, become more committed to applying and defending principles of justice that rule their social cooperation, which in turn leads to more cooperation and stability. When this happens, the political conception of justice that regulates citizens' social cooperation becomes more of a moral object rather than as a mere set of rules and regulations. Citizens, as a result, become more prepared to support an overlapping consensus that would serve as basis for public reason based on the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation (Rawls 1993a).

When different people reach an overlapping consensus, it means that they come to agree to be regulated by a political conception of justice (on the basis of the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation), which satisfies the Rawlsian condition of democratic societies being well-ordered. Such a consensus is likely to gain more and more acceptance among citizens and to last (and expand) over time, hence, satisfying the stability condition (over time and from one generation to another) in Rawls' organizing idea of society as a fair system of cooperation.

Such an overlapping consensus is hard to achieve if members of a society do not recognize reasonable diversity. An appreciation for a consensus on fundamental political values is therefore a core objective that a Rawlsian based citizenship

education programme should aim to achieve. Given the centrality of this objective, this study identifies three requisites that it argues to be necessary for helping students to come to achieve this objective.

Requisite One:

For youngsters, and indeed adult citizens, to come to appreciate Rawls' conception of justice, they must come to terms with the fact of diversity itself. Recognizing the value of diversity is identified by this study as the first requisite that a Rawlsian based citizenship education programme should aim to help students to develop if they are to come to appreciate a Rawlsian political conception of justice. The type of diversity that is referred to is defined in terms of citizens as individuals as well as collective groups. All adult citizens are free and equal. They all have equal civic and political rights, and they are all entitled to practise their role as citizens who are responsible for maintaining fair and lasting societal cooperation.

Requisite Two:

Democracy, as Rawls (1993a) writes, involves "*a political relationship between citizens*" (p217). To construct a shared political conception of justice, Rawls' PL consults different reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Given the fact that different doctrines may cherish values that may be conflicting, to advance a value into the political domain, this value has to be presented in a way that reasonable people who uphold different conceptions of the good would find enough reason to "*endorse as consistent with their freedom and equality*" (Rawls 1993a p218).

This suggests that a Rawlsian conception of justice could be viewed as a political settlement that is constructed with the 'Other' always in mind. While reasonable persons show readiness to suggest principles of justice, they are also willing to live with the burdens of their judgments. This characteristic of Rawls' PL highlights the need for helping students to develop a capacity for political bargaining. On this basis, a Rawlsian based citizenship education programme should be aiming to help students develop a capacity for collecting and weighing evidence, presenting oral and written arguments, inferring and at the same time, a capacity to listen to others, to be fair minded, and to accept common sense knowledge. These values, which will be referred to as the values of public reason, are identified as the second requisite for a Rawlsian based citizenship education programme.

Requisite Three:

Rawls' organizing idea of society as a fair system of cooperation assumes a sense of responsibility that reflects readiness among reasonable people

"to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation" (Rawls 1993b p49, Rawls 2001) and willingness "to recognize the burdens of judgment and to accept their consequences for the use of public reason in directing the exercise of political power in a constitutional regime" (Rawls 1993a p54, Rawls 2001).

Helping students to develop a sense of responsibility in line with this definition is the third and last requisite that this study presents as necessary for helping students to develop an appreciation for a Rawlsian conception of justice.

Diagram 4.1 below depicts these three requisites as the corners of a triangle, with a Rawlsian conception of justice placed at the centre of the triangle. While the development of any of the three requisites informs the development of the shared political conception of justice, it also provides grounds for the development of the other two requisites. In a similar way, the development of the political conception of justice informs the development of the three requisites. This reciprocal relationship is represented in the diagram by the two-way arrows that connect the four components of the triangle.




Diagram 4.1: A Rawlsian-based citizenship education programme model

In translating this model into practical educational activities, it should be made clear that these three requisites are entangled together in various ways, which makes it difficult to claim that one activity serves one requisite and not the other two. Educational activities that a Rawlsian-based citizenship education programme includes are meant to serve one or more points of the triangle.

Translating the above model into practical educational activities could be (and should be) done in a variety of ways that all, as the two-way arrows in diagram 4.1 suggests, contribute to helping students develop an appreciation for a Rawlsian conception of justice. The following are suggestions and guidelines for achieving this goal. These suggestions though are by no means intended to be an exhaustive list or a finished product. They are to be regarded as an attempt to develop general guidelines and pointers that could be used to devise a citizenship education programme suitable in the Jordanian context that builds on a Rawlsian conception of justice.

As a start, John Rawls' veil of ignorance⁴⁵ is a useful tool that could be translated into educational activities that help students to see the world through the eyes of others. In discussing certain issues, e.g. rights of women, children and minorities; honour crimes or school rules, students could be asked to act as amnesiac legislators. The aim is to help students develop sympathy for others which would lead to affirming a shared conception of justice.

In a similar way, a Rawlsian-based citizenship education programme could incorporate activities such as debating and exchanging roles (examples of exchanging roles could be boys/girls, employer/employees) in which students come to appreciate difference between people in an active, rather than rhetorical manner. Many 'us' and 'them' issues could be dealt with in this way; mothers and fathers, girls and boys, teacher and students, manager and employees, majority

⁴⁵ Briefly, Rawls' veil of ignorance is a hypothetical exercise in which legislators, who are preferably knowledgeable in the different fields of knowledge and human experiences, are in a state of amnesia concerning who they are. Any of these legislators does not remember, and there is no way for him/her to remember, whether he/she is a male or female, adult or under age, law abiding or criminal, straight or gay, believe in a certain religion or atheist and the list goes on and on. In brief, as long as his/her work is to legislate for laws, he/she is behind a veil of ignorance. Once the veil is removed, only then legislators remember whom they are. To legislate from behind the veil, legislators have to consider every possibility that what they legislate for or against must be fair and just and must not disadvantage any society member or group. For that, if they agree on a law that disadvantages a group or a minority, when the veil is removed, any of the legislators might discover that him/herself belongs to any of these disadvantaged groups (Rawls 1973, 1993a, 2001).

and minorities just to mention a few.

With regard to the above paragraph, Amartya Sen's view of people having multiple identities, in contrast to seeing identity as one rigid cast, is a useful concept for helping students to develop an appreciation of others. Sen (2006) argues that while the focus on one identity *"can enrich our bonds and make us do many things for each other and can help to take us beyond our self-centred lives"* (Sen 2006 p2), it could also exclude and even harm others. Citizenship education activities that provide students with reasons to see themselves in their normal lives as belonging to multiple groups would help them underplay the 'us' and 'them' distinction. A Rawlsian-based citizenship education would benefit from including activities that are designed to help students realize that they identify with more than one group at the same time. A student could be born to a Muslim family; he is also Jordanian who lives in a rural area; his parents are farmers; he may be diabetic, may be an environmentalist, an advocate of human rights, a fan of Manchester United, a piano player, enjoys rap music, a collector of Naguib Mahfouz novels, and many other things all at the same time. The point here is that each of the different aspects of a student's character could be seen to be located in different realms, and there is no one single identity that could encompass all the different aspects.

A programme that presents students with more open-ended activities where, while there are different possible answers, there is room within every answer for critical evaluation, is one way for helping them to develop such an appreciation for the fact that the body of knowledge is not static, but rather, it keeps evolving as more evidence becomes available and as circumstances change. Such an approach, while it provides reason for students to engage in their learning, helps them develop an appreciation for the fact that they themselves could participate in the making of knowledge.

Reasonable plurality highlights the need for a citizenship education that helps students appreciate the fact that knowledge is not absolute, but rather, it is individually and socially constructed, and of course understood. The social construction of knowledge places demands on citizenship education to help students understand that knowledge needs justification. Justification, however, can take different forms and each form has its strengths and limitations, and even the more reliable amongst them cannot establish the truth of a claim with absolute

certainty. This way, students develop their critical thinking and come to appreciate the limitations of knowledge and why it is constantly evolving.

When this is established students come to appreciate that even religious knowledge could be argued to be based on individuals' interpretations of available evidence which leads to diversity of opinions. In an Islamic context, this is evident in the presence of different schools of jurisdiction along which the Islamic world is divided.

One of the main aims of this approach to knowledge is to help students come to understand that they, as individuals and as groups, exist among others who could be different in many ways. These differences, however, are reasonably justified. Students come to appreciate that no one comprehensive doctrine can be used to rule political life and therefore the need for a shared political conception of justice that resorts to reasons and arguments to bring different peoples together and allow them to cooperate on a fair basis and as free and equal.

Having said so, it should be made clear that the aim of a Rawlsian-based citizenship education is not to eliminate differences between peoples, but rather to aid students in developing a sense of sympathy towards others and to build bridges of mutual respect and appreciation amongst individuals belonging to different doctrines. While people, as individuals and as groups, could be in many ways different from each other, they also have many things in common. As these values develop over time, students start moving away from judging others based on their own private values and instead they come to appreciate a political conception of justice in which others have rights and responsibilities in the same way that 'we' and 'I' have.

4.4 Is political liberalism an alien concept in an Arab context? Suggestions for further work

After presenting a general framework for a Rawlsian-based citizenship education programme, the question that this section addresses is whether Rawls' PL is an alien concept in Arab societies. The difficulties of adopting a Rawlsian based citizenship education programmes in Arab countries should not be underestimated, but it could be argued that Arab societies are already developed in ways that make the acceptance of a Rawlsian based citizenship education

possible. In addressing this question, while reference will be made to Arab societies in general, special attention will be given to the Jordanian context for two related reasons. Firstly, despite difference between Arab societies, Jordan was introduced, in Chapter One, as an example of a democratizing Arab country, and therefore what applies to Jordan could be argued to be relevant to other democratizing Arab countries. Based on this assumption, the JCE programme was selected as material for study (Chapter Three), which is the second reason for the special attention that this section places on the Jordanian context.

The question posed by the title of this section has no straightforward 'yes/no' answer. While radical religious groups, and some individuals who refuse to compromise their comprehensive doctrines, may reject the endorsement of any shared political conception of justice that does not comply with their holistic views, others, as Rawls (1993a p163) writes, would have no problem in accepting reasonable principles of justice, and if need be, to act upon them.

In support of this claim, figures taken from a survey-based study conducted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 2001 (Nachtwey and Tessler 2002) reveal that inhabitants who support a reconciliatory solution with the state of Israel are three times more numerous than those who do not. The findings also show that those who support a reconciliatory solution are not likely to be less religiously oriented than those who oppose such a solution. Political attitudes, as Nachtwey and Tessler conclude, are very much influenced by political and economic (rather than religious) considerations that directly influence people's own lifestyles and welfare.

As for the question of how much control *Shari'a* law should have in Arab societies, as argued in section 4.2, there are different and often conflicting views within each Arab country and across the Arab world (Khuri 2005). To assume that there is one unified view ignores the diversity of opinion present within Arab societies, and, at the same time, runs the danger of dealing with complicated issues in a rather simplistic manner.

The above affirms Rawls' (1993a) argument that most individuals come to appreciate the benefits that a shared conception of justice could bring to them, to others whom they care for and to the society at large. Given these benefits, when one's personal views come in conflict with constitutional principles of justice, a person might adjust, or even revise, his/her views, rather than deny these

principles. When fair cooperation between citizens is sustained, individuals come to accept constitutional principles of justice and political practices without necessarily making any connections between these principles and their comprehensive doctrines.

However, to make better informed assumptions in relation to attitudes of citizens of Arab countries toward liberal understandings of democracy, more research is needed. While conducting more public polls and survey-based studies could provide a general idea about overall attitudes and inclinations of citizens, adults and youngsters, these studies need to be supplemented by more in-depth ethnographic studies that could be used to shed more light on aspects of Arab societies that public polls and surveys cannot reveal.

Living in societies where dominant representations of social life are hierarchical in structure may hinder the realization of 'other' representations of social life. This may render those in charge of devising, implementing and running a citizenship education programme that has the recognition of reasonable diversity as one of its main objectives not ready for this job. If this analysis is accurate, then this problem would face the enforcement of any educational programme that is dedicated to presenting the 'Other' as equal. The hierarchical image of social life that the JCE programme presents highlights the need for researching where adult and young citizens of Arab countries stand in relation to liberal democratic issues such as equality among the two genders and with others who uphold different conceptions of the good, individual liberties, freedom of conscience and how traditional sources of authority figure in the way adults and youngsters think and behave. Having a more informed understanding about where adults and youngsters stand from these issues would form the basis for citizenship education reform, including objectives, activities, assessment as well as teacher training.

While the results of the Nachtwey and Tessler study above could be used to support the assumption that Arab citizens would respond to reason and argument that are based on shared public principles, Rawls argues that we should not expect to find answers for many of our questions concerning political justice. Instead, *"we must be prepared to accept the fact that only a few questions we are moved to ask can be satisfactorily resolved"* (Rawls 1993a p156). Some democratic citizenship values could be more controversial than others. This highlights the need for identifying values that could be readily accepted as part of

a shared political conception of justice, from these values that may prove to be more difficult to reach a societal consensus on. Once these widely accepted political values are identified, they could form the basis for citizenship education reform. The development of a political conception of justice that is based on shared political values has more chances to succeed if it is developed in a gradual manner. The aim should be helping students develop an appreciation for a consensus concerning fundamental justice questions. Once students start to develop awareness for such consensus, citizenship education could move on to addressing other (more difficult) questions of justice. This suggests that the implementation of a Rawlsian-based citizenship education programme is to be implemented over gradual stages, and in each stage, the circle of core political values expands to include more values as the society becomes more ready. A Rawlsian based citizenship education programme is work in progress.

In section 1.6, it was argued that the word 'education' in Arabic has two distinct dimensions, *ta'leem* that concerns the acquisition of knowledge, skills and competencies, and *tarbiya*, that concerns character building and the development of the social, moral and spiritual dimensions of the individual. This distinction highlights the question of whether an educational programme could be successful in helping students to develop a capacity for reasoning and critical thinking in certain aspects of the programme and, at the same time, demand obedience and uncritical acceptance of knowledge in other aspects. This could be another area for educational research in Arab countries to address.

As mentioned earlier, in section 1.2, only Saudi Arabia among all Arab countries still takes *Shari'a* law as its constitution, while other Arab countries have either adopted other more modern civic judicial systems that are built on *Shari'a* law or incorporate dual judicial systems: one civil and another religious. In the case of Jordan, where a dual system is in place, *Shari'a* law applies only to marriage, divorce and inheritance. Anything outside these three domains is subject to coded civil laws and in this regard there is a secular side to the state. *Shari'a* law, while it is highly respected, is not applied except on certain aspects of social life. In other words, while Islam, like many other religious and philosophical doctrines, seeks to be comprehensive, citizens' conceptions of justice are not necessarily fully comprehensive in the same way. The application of modern coded criminal laws suggests that a divide is already in place between religion and the state.

Having been used to responding to a dual judicial system could be regarded as a step on the long route to accepting the distinction that Rawls makes between a shared political conception of justice (represented by coded criminal laws) and citizens' private comprehensive doctrines. However, there are many obstacles that need to be overcome. Christianity, for instance, is the only other religion that enjoys freedom of public worship in Jordan. For Christians living in Jordan, though, while their own religious marriage and divorce laws apply, Islamic inheritance law applies to all citizens.

The aim of the section is to show that a Rawlsian conception of justice is not a totally alien concept, neither in Jordan nor in other democratizing Arab countries. As already introduced in section 1.4, Jordan, similar to other democratizing Arab countries, has a constitution (and a national charter) that guarantees and protects basic liberties and rights, and the signing of the UN Universal Human Rights declaration affirms these rights. Furthermore, parliamentary life in Jordan is active, which is evident by constant debate and delegations that take place inside the parliament and in the press. And more importantly, at the grass roots level, Jordanians of different backgrounds and origins are not only used to coexisting alongside each other, but also their peaceful coexistence and cooperation for hundreds of years suggests that their relationships are to a large extent based on respect for each other and an appreciation for the peculiarities of other ways of life that exist in the society.

The above, however, is not to present a rosy view of democratic life in Jordan or to claim that democratic life in Jordan is developed enough to accept Rawls' PL⁴⁶ without resistance, but what this section is trying to argue for is that the bases are there. These bases, however, need to be enforced and expanded gradually.

4.5 Assumptions and limitations

A main reason for suggesting Rawls' PL as grounds for citizenship education in a democratizing Arab country such as Jordan -where education is trying to strike a balance between traditional orientations and modern democratic citizenship demands that are informed by a more liberal view- lies in its dedication, at least at

⁴⁶ Chapter Three presents major obstacles that democratic life in Jordan faces.

the philosophical level, to laying the grounds for fair societal cooperation in which all citizens, despite of their private beliefs, are equal and free.

A Rawlsian-based citizenship education, while providing students with knowledge about their basic constitutional rights, would aim to help them develop a consensus on shared political values (a Rawlsian conception of justice) that would lead to better social unity and long term stability.

This study assumes that using a public venue, such as formal education, to enforce one dominant representation of social life or one comprehensive doctrine is to use coercive state power to exclude those who do not view the world through the same pair of eyes, which is something a democratic state should not do.

The following three paragraphs introduce three main factors that put limits on the applicability and scope of the suggested Rawlsian based citizenship education model. These limitations move from the general to the particular, and will be introduced starting from the most general one.

1. The first limitation concerns the applicability of the model. Suggestions and recommendations that this research makes are applicable in a Jordanian context. This study makes the assumption that Jordan is one Arab country that is dedicated to keep going along the long route to democratic reform, as otherwise, PL, and indeed other attempts to achieve democratic reform, would be no more than an empty rhetoric. This assumption is made based on claims to democratic status made in Jordanian citizenship education textbooks⁴⁷ and in the Jordanian constitution and the National Charter. Applicability of this model to other democratizing Arabic-language speaking countries, however, is a matter of degree depending on their particular political, social and economic circumstances.
2. The second limitation affects the scope of this research. This research makes suggestions and recommendations for a citizenship education as if it is detached from the larger educational system. In response to this limitation, it could be argued that democratic reform is always work in progress and is never a finished product. In Jordan, and other democratizing Arab countries, where traditional representations of social life are dominant and are infused in different aspects of national educational

⁴⁷ For more detail check Chapter Three.

systems, citizenship education could be regarded as a reasonable starting point for helping students develop an appreciation for a political conception of justice in which all people, despite their different affiliations, are viewed as free and equal.

3. The third limitation also affects the scope of this research. The area that this research is mainly concerned with is helping students to develop an appreciation for a Rawlsian political conception of justice, and any suggestions made in this research are limited to this effect.

4.6 Evaluation

Chapter One argued that despite differences between Arabic language-speaking countries, they share, to a varying degree, a classical culture that is encoded in the use of formal Arabic. Among the characteristics that they share is a tendency to emphasise the authority of tradition, religion and the state. This claim could be better supported with more empirical data. However, in the absence of such data, the argument presented in support of this claim is assumed to be sufficient and the generalizability of the results of this research (to other democratizing Arabic language-speaking countries) is limited to this assumption.

Chapter One also argued that hierarchical representations of social life that are dominant in Arab states inform citizenship education discourse in these countries, and the analysis of the JCE programme supports this assumption. This claim would be better informed if it were based on comparative studies that look at citizenship education programmes of different Arab countries. In a similar way to the first point above, in the absence of such studies, the results of this research are limited to this assumption.

The choice of critical discourse analysis (CDA) for analyzing the JCE programme reflects some of the biases that the Author (researcher) has. The aim is to highlight how traditional hierarchical representations of social life may come in conflict with liberal democratic citizenship values, and for this reason, CDA, that has its roots in cultural Marxism, proves to be a useful tool. Analysis focused on certain aspects of the textbook that are in line with the Author's biases. Others may pinpoint other strengths and/or weaknesses of the text that this analysis did not pay attention to. Analysis could have benefited from taking into consideration

how the consumers of the textbook, teachers and students, would see it.

The choice of certain lessons from the grade ten textbook is also biased towards highlighting the individual freedoms problem. Analyzing more lessons from more than one textbook could be more representative of the citizenship education programme of Jordan.

4.7 Concluding remarks

The dynamics within Arab societies are changing at a rate faster than ever before. Globalization and the knowledge economy are aiding in spreading values among youngsters that could interfere with local values and traditions. Societies are progressing in directions that lead to more individualisation, and young men and women are assuming a more active role in the running of their lives. Societies are becoming more diverse and plurality, particularly in democratic societies, is emerging as a fact of life. Such developments have led to weakening the role of traditional sources of authority as a means for social stability and political control.

While the effects of such developments are more obvious in liberal democratic societies, Arab societies are not immune from their influences. The JCE programme comes as an attempt to reconcile liberal democratic citizenship values with traditional representations of social life dominant in Jordan (and in other Arab countries). The analysis of the JCE programme, however, suggests that the conflict between traditional representations of social life and liberal democratic citizenship values is real and genuine and it is not expected to be reconciled in any perfect way that fully satisfies the demands of both orientations. While the Jordanian citizenship approach is one way for addressing this conflict, there are other ways and each of these ways has its own trade-offs. The issue is rather what solution(s) will work best in addressing the demands of democratic citizenship, including those of diversity and autonomy, without undermining traditional cultural and religious ways of life dominant in Arab societies. Rawls' PL, this study argued, provides a view of liberalism that, uniquely perhaps, can accommodate traditional viewpoints, and this, according to this study, creates opportunities for citizenship education in democratizing Arab countries.

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Appendices

Appendix One

'Jordan First' document

Appendix One quotes the full text of 'Jordan First' document, which is available from King Abdullah II webpage. Referencing details of the document could be found in the References list under King Abdullah II 2002.

Date: October 29, 2002

Title: Jordan First

In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful

*His Excellency, Brother Ali Abul Ragheb,
Our Prime Minister*

I send you a genuine Jordanian Hashemite greeting.

Conditions in our region, coupled with challenges dictated by the situation in the world around us, which both affects, and is affected by us, have made it incumbent upon us to focus most of our official and popular efforts on issues pertaining to our people and the priorities and interests of our homeland.

Launching the Jordan First slogan, was initially our plan of action, which would fuse Jordanians in a consolidated social fabric, that stimulates their sense of belonging to their homeland, pride in their Arab Nation and Islamic religion, in an atmosphere of freedom, democracy, pluralism, tolerance and social justice.

Hence, it was essentially inevitable to share the conviction, as well as the unity of purpose, that "Jordan First" is more than a slogan. It is, indeed, a national canon we want to consecrate as a methodological course of action and a daily practice for all Jordanian men and women. This slogan targets every Jordanian man and women, who believes in this homeland as a refuge, a warm haven and a promising future, and strive in his/her pursuit to realise his or her self through his/her homeland, not through external allegiances, whatever their aims or objectives.

Jordan is proud of its Islamic identity and Arab allegiance. It will, as expected from it, indefatigably strive to protect the rights and interests of the Nation, raise the slogan of Arab unity, construction and solidarity, and adhere to the tolerant tenets of the Islamic religion. Nobody should take the "Jordan First" call as a bid for introversion, but rather as a deep conviction that Jordan's economic and political strength, as well as its social security, are prerequisites that need to be safeguarded in order to strengthen our Arab surroundings and support our Arab brethren.

In order to be successfully implemented, the Jordan First slogan will have to depict a clear state of mind and an act of voluntarism, rather than an ephemeral "reaction" that pacifies the conscience of those who simply utter and echo the slogan. The fundamental objective is to stimulate the Jordanian citizen's deliberate positive energies and to review his/her priorities, with a view to creating the certitude that

his/her pursuit, effort, cause, ambitions, objectives and aspirations start all with "Jordan First."

The "Jordan First" slogan must be a common denominator for all Jordanian men and women, whatever their origin and irrespective of any diversities in their attitudes, views, creeds, beliefs and races. This concept needs to be dedicated, starting with the family, school, university, and youth centres, as well as governmental and civil society organisations, to become a reality, a tangible matter of fact and a conscious act.

On the basis of this act of volition, and in the midst of shuffled priorities that sway the clarity of our thinking and the efficiency of our performance, we are in need of a "focal idea" and a "pure and fundamental national attitude." This will spark our thinking and practices and measure our performance and civism. A successful healthy society is an aggregation of cells or individuals, who together constitute the society's unity and social fabric.

To achieve this, it is inevitable that we adopt the "Jordan First" slogan as a plan of action and a catalyst that brings together the fabric of our unified society. This slogan is meant for Jordanian men and women, in villages and desert encampments, in cities and refugee camps. It is also meant for students in their schools and universities; for soldiers who guard the Homeland; for intellectuals, politicians, trade unionists and partisans, be they Islamists, nationalists or centrists. It should be distant from all political, religious and racial alignments. We have to pursue a social contract that, through daily practices, establishes our priorities, starting with this "first priority."

The need for such a matter is decisive and cannot stand any delay or improvisation. We have got to give "Jordan First" an integrative immunity in the face of negative ideas, incriminating interpretations that may attempt, ignorantly or maliciously, to deprive the "Jordan First" slogan of its pure and sublime essence into a narrow racist corner. This is what we would not entertain against our selves and our people and will never accept.

In essence, human nature strives to protect itself and advance its standard of living. Hence, we have to launch the "Jordan First" slogan initially on a solid economic and social ground, without falling into the trap of contradictory political clichés. If we establish "Jordan First" on a ground of economic and social realities and achieve stability and prosperity, and, consequently, self-reconciliation for our people, we will finally arrive at the desired political limpidity, spontaneously and without fabrication.

As we see it, our people give credence to these convictions, but they cannot be transformed into central realities without a review of some of the arguments put forward by representatives of the various groups of our people and by our political parties and trade unions. This review should be conducted in such a manner as to make the interests of Jordan, as far as all Jordanians are concerned, come before any other interests or issues. The opposition should be in opposition of the Government's policies, not the approach and fixed premises of the State. The opposition's role is to serve the causes and interests of our Jordanian people and to strive to build Jordanian capacities, before defending other interests and objectives. The Jordanian press should devote its largest spaces to addressing internal Jordanian affairs, as well as the citizens' concerns and issues, before getting involved in external issues.

Even though this conviction may sound axiomatic, it still requires from all of us diligent action and clear vision to carry our message across to all the educational, academic and social segments of our people, in both the private and public sectors. The difficult dues, currently being faced and conquered by the Homeland, are only

apparently easy, but, when it comes to details, they are gruelling. Therefore, adopting "Jordan First" requires us to face all the negative probabilities and to mobilise all the positive capabilities of our civil society. This will levitate the civil society above all contrarities by being nationalistic, avoid all discord by being unified, and transform differences into a civilised and humanitarian wealth.

For all the above arguments, and for the sake of "Jordan First," we see a need to establish, back, support, and mandate a national body to look for ways and mechanisms for delivering the "Jordan First" message and confirm this idea in the daily practice of our educational, economic, social and developmental affairs. The body shall consist of the following personalities:

1. His Eminence Sheikh Izzidine Al-Khatib Al-Tamimi
2. Mr. Marwan Dudin
3. Dr. Abdullah Ensour
4. Dr. Rajai Al-Dajani
5. Mr. Sa'id Bino
6. Mr. Sameer Habashneh
7. Mr. Abdul Karim Al-Dughmi
8. Mr. Ayman Al-Majali
9. Mr. Saleh Qallab
10. Mr. Abdul Rahim Ukour
11. Dr. Basseem Awadallah
12. Dr. Ruwaida Al-Ma'ayta
13. Mr. Sa'ad Hayel Al-Srou
14. Mr. Mamdouh Al-Abbadi
15. Mr. Assem Ghosheh
16. Mrs. Subhiyyah Al-Ma'ani
17. Dr. Sima Bahous
18. Dr. Muhammad Al-Masalha
19. Mr. Amjad Al-Adhaileh
20. Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh
21. Mr. Sabih Al-Masri
22. Mr. Mahmoud Al-Kharabsheh
23. Dr. Sa'ad Hijazi
24. Mr. Basseem Al-Salem
25. Mr. Uraib Rantawi
26. Mrs. Suhair Al-Ali
27. Mrs. Rana Sabbagh
28. Mr. Ghazi Abu Jneib Al-Fayez
29. Dr. Hussein Touqa,
30. Dr. Wajeih Uweiss
31. Mr. Ahmad Salameh.

This body shall initially complete its mandate during a first stage. Other bodies and committees shall be formed at later stages to follow up on this matter in such a manner as to befit our vision for Jordan in the future.

May peace and God's mercy and blessings be upon you.

Abdullah II Ibn Al Hussein

*Amman, 22 Sha'ban 1423 Hijri
29th of October 2002*

(King Abdullah II 2002)

Appendix Two

'Amman Message' document

Appendix Two quotes Amman Message, which is available from the 'Amman Message' webpage. Referencing details of the document could be found in the References list under Amman Message 2004.

Amman Message

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. Peace and blessings upon His chosen Prophet, and upon his household, his noble blessed companions, and upon all the messengers and prophets:

God Almighty has said: O humankind! We created you from a male and female, and made you into peoples and tribes that you may know each other. Truly the most honored of you before God is the most pious of you. (49:13)

This is a declaration to our brethren in the lands of Islam and throughout the world that Amman, the capital of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, is proud to issue during the blessed month of Ramadan in which the Quran descended as guidance to humankind and as clarifications for guidance and discernment. (2:185)

In this declaration we speak frankly to the [Islamic] nation, at this difficult juncture in its history, regarding the perils that beset it. We are aware of the challenges confronting the nation, threatening its identity, assailing its tenets (kalima), and working to distort its religion and harm what is sacred to it. Today the magnanimous message of Islam faces a vicious attack from those who through distortion and fabrication try to portray Islam as an their enemy. It is also under attack from some who claim affiliation with Islam and commit irresponsible acts in its name.

This magnanimous message that the Originator—great is His power—revealed to the unlettered Prophet Muhammad—God's blessings and peace upon him, and that was carried by his successors and the members of his household after him, is an address of brotherhood, humanity, and a religion that encompasses all human activity. It states the truth directly, commands what is right, forbids what is wrong, honors the human being, and accepts others.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has embraced the path of promoting the true luminous image of Islam, halting the accusations against it, and repelling the attacks upon it. This is in accordance with the inherited spiritual and historical responsibility carried by the Hashemite monarchy, honored as direct descendants of the Prophet, the Messenger of God—peace and blessings upon him—who carried the message. For five decades, his late Majesty King Hussein Bin Talal—God rest his soul—demonstrated this way with the vigorous effort that he exerted. Since the day he took the flag, His Majesty King Abdullah II has continued this effort, with resolution and determination, as a service to Islam, fortifying the solidarity of 1.2 billion Muslims who comprise one fifth of humanity, preventing their marginalization or extrication from the movement of human society, and affirming their role in building human civilization and participating in its progress during our present age.

Islam is founded upon basic principles, the fundamentals are attesting to the unity of God (tawhid Allah); belief in the message of His Prophet; continuous connection with the Creator through ritual prayer (salat); training and rectifying the soul through the

fast of Ramadan; safeguarding one another by paying the alms tax (zakat); the unity of the people through the annual pilgrimage (hajj) to God's Sanctified House, [performed] by those who are able; and [observing] His rulings that regulate human behavior in all its dimensions. Over history these [basic principles] have formed a strong and cohesive nation and a great civilization. They bear witness to noble principles and values that verify the good of humanity, whose foundation is the oneness of the human species, and that people are equal in rights and obligations, peace and justice, realizing comprehensive security, mutual social responsibility, being good to one's neighbor, protecting belongings and property, honoring pledges, and more.

Together, these are principles that provide common ground for the followers of religions and [different] groups of people. That is because the origin of divine religions is one, and Muslims believe in all Messengers of God and do not differentiate between any of them. Denying the message of any one of them is a deviation from Islam. This establishes a wide platform for the believers of [different] religions to meet the other upon common ground for the service of human society, without encroaching upon creedal distinctions or upon intellectual freedom. For all of this we base ourselves upon His saying:

The messenger believes in what has been revealed unto him from his Lord as do the believers. Each one believes in God and His angels and His scriptures and His messengers. We make no distinction between any of His messengers - and they say: "We hear, and we obey. [Grant us] Your forgiveness, our Lord. Unto You is the journeying." (2:285)

Islam honors every human being, regardless of his color, race or religion: We have honored the sons of Adam, provided them transport on land and sea, sustained them with good things, and conferred on them special favors above a great part of our creation. (17:70)

Islam also affirms that the way of calling [others] to God is founded upon kindness and gentleness: Call to the path of your Lord with wisdom and a beautiful exhortation, and debate with them in that which is most beautiful (ahsan). (16:125) Furthermore, it shuns cruelty and violence in how one faces and addresses [others]:

It is by some Mercy of God that you were gentle to them. Were you severe—cruel hearted—they would have broken away from you. So pardon them and ask forgiveness for them and consult with them in the conduct of affairs. And when you are resolved, put your trust in God; truly God loves those who trust [in Him]. (3:159)

Islam has made clear that the goal of its message is realizing mercy and good for all people. The Transcendent has said, We did not send you [Muhammad] but out of mercy for all creatures. (21:107) And the Prophet Muhammad—blessings and peace upon Him—said, "The Merciful has mercy upon those who are merciful, be merciful to those on earth, He who is in heaven will be merciful unto you."

Islam calls for treating others as one desires to be treated. It urges the tolerance and forgiveness that express the nobility of the human being: The recompense for an evil is an evil equal thereto, but who forgives and reconciles, his recompense is from God. (42:40) Good and evil are not equal. Repel with what is most virtuous. Then he between whom and you there is enmity will be as if he were an intimate friend. (41:34)

Islam confirms the principle of justice in interacting with others, safeguarding their rights, and confirms that one must not deny people their possessions: And let not the hatred of others make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just: that is closer to piety; (5:8) God commands you to return trusts to their owners, and if you judge between people, you shall judge with justice; (4:58) So give [full] measure and [full] weight and do not deny the people their goods, and work no corruption in the land after it has been set right. (7:85)

Islam requires respect for pledges and covenants, and adhering to what has been specified; and it forbids treachery and treason: Fulfill the covenant of God when you have entered into it, and break not oaths after they have been confirmed and you have made God your surety; truly God knows what you do. (16:91)

Islam recognizes the noble station of [human] life, so there is to be no fighting against non-combatants, and no assault upon civilians and their properties, children at their mothers' bosom, students in their schools, nor upon elderly men and women. Assault upon the life of a human being, be it murder, injury or threat, is an assault upon the right to life among all human beings. It is among the gravest of sins; for human life is the basis for the prosperity of humanity: Whoever kills a soul for other than slaying a soul or corruption upon the earth it is as if he has killed the whole of humanity, and whoever saves a life, it is as if has revived the whole of humanity. (5:32)

The primordial religion of Islam is founded upon equanimity, balance, moderation, and facilitation: Thus have we made of you a middle nation that you might be witnesses over the people, and the Messenger a witness over yourselves. (2:143) The Prophet Muhammad—peace and blessings upon him—said: "Facilitate and do not make difficult, bear good tidings and do not deter." Islam has provided the foundation for the knowledge, reflection and contemplation that has enabled the creation of this deep-rooted civilization that was a crucial link by which the West arrived at the gates of modern knowledge, and in whose accomplishments non-Muslims participated, as a consequence of its being a comprehensive human civilization.

No day has passed but that this religion has been at war against extremism, radicalism and fanaticism, for they veil the intellect from foreseeing negative consequences [of one's actions]. Such blind impetuosity falls outside the human regulations pertaining to religion, reason and character. They are not from the true character of the tolerant, accepting Muslim.

Islam rejects extremism, radicalism and fanaticism—just as all noble, heavenly religions reject them—considering them as recalcitrant ways and forms of injustice. Furthermore, it is not a trait that characterizes a particular nation; it is an aberration that has been experienced by all nations, races and religions. They are not particular to one people; truly they are a phenomenon that every people, every race and every religion has known.

We denounce and condemn extremism, radicalism and fanaticism today, just as our forefathers tirelessly denounced and opposed them throughout Islamic history. They are the ones who affirmed, as do we, the firm and unshakeable understanding that Islam is a religion of [noble] character traits in both its ends and means; a religion that strives for the good of the people, their happiness in this life and the next; and a religion that can only be defended in ways that are ethical; and the ends do not justify the means in this religion.

The source of relations between Muslims and others is peace; for there is no fighting [permitted] when there is no aggression. Even then, [it must be done with] benevolence, justice and virtue: God does not prevent you, as regards those who do not fight you in religion's [cause], nor drive you from your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them: truly God loves the just; (60:8) Then if they cease, let there be no aggression, save against the oppressors. (2:193)

On religious and moral grounds, we denounce the contemporary concept of terrorism that is associated with wrongful practices, whatever their source and form may be. Such acts are represented by aggression against human life in an oppressive form that transgresses the rulings of God, frightening those who are secure, violating peaceful civilians, finishing off the wounded, and killing prisoners; and they employ

unethical means, such as destroying buildings and ransacking cities: Do not kill the soul that God has made sacrosanct, save for justice. (6:151)

We condemn these practices and believe that resisting oppression and confirming justice should be a legitimate undertaking through legitimate means. We call on the people to take the necessary steps to achieve the strength and steadfastness for building identity and preserving rights.

We realize that over history extremism has been instrumental in destroying noble achievements in great civilizations, and that the tree of civilization withers when malice takes hold and hearts are shut. In all its shapes, extremism is a stranger to Islam, which is founded upon equanimity and tolerance. No human whose heart has been illumined by God could be a radical extremist.

At the same time, we decry the campaign of brazen distortion that portrays Islam as a religion that encourages violence and institutionalizes terrorism. We call upon the international community to work earnestly to implement international laws and honor the international mandates and resolutions issued by the United Nations, ensuring that all parties accept them and that they be enacted without double standards, to guarantee the return of rights to their [rightful] holders and the end of oppression. Achieving this will be a significant contribution to uprooting the causes of violence, fanaticism and extremism.

The way of this great religion that we are honored to belong to calls us to affiliate with and participate in modern society, and to contribute to its elevation and progress, helping one another with every faculty [to achieve] good and to comprehend, desiring justice for all peoples, while faithfully proclaiming the truth [of our religion], and sincerely expressing the soundness of our faith and beliefs—all of which are founded upon God's call for coexistence and piety. [We are called] to work toward renewing our civilization, based upon the guidance of religion, and following upon established practical intellectual policies.

The primary components of these policies comprise developing methods for preparing preachers, with the goal of ensuring that they realize the spirit of Islam and its methodology for structuring human life, as well as providing them with knowledge of contemporary culture, so that they are able to interact with their communities on the basis of awareness and insight: Say, "This is my way. I, and those who follow me, call for God with insight;" (12:108) taking advantage of the communication revolution to refute the doubts that the enemies of Islam are arousing, in a sound, intellectual manner, without weakness or agitation, and with a style that attracts the reader, the listener and the viewer; consolidating the educational structure for individual Muslims, who are confident in their knowledge and abilities, working to form the integral identity that protects against corrupting forces; interest in scientific research and working with the modern sciences upon the basis of the Islamic perspective that distinguishes between creation, life and the human being; benefiting from modern achievements in the fields of science and technology; adopting an Islamic approach for realizing the comprehensive development that is founded upon [maintaining] the delicate balance between the spiritual, economic and social dimensions [of life]; providing for human rights and basic liberties, ensuring life, dignity and security, and guaranteeing basic needs; administering the affairs of society in accordance with the principles of justice and consultation; and benefiting from the goods and mechanisms for adopting democracy that human society has presented.

Hope lies with the scholars of our Nation, that through the reality of Islam and its values they will enlighten the intellects of our youth—the ornament of our present age and the promise of our future. The scholars shield our youth from the danger of sliding down the paths of ignorance, corruption, close-mindedness and subordination. It is our scholars who illuminate for them the paths of tolerance, moderation, and goodness, and prevent them from [falling] into the abysses of extremism and

fanaticism that destroy the spirit and body.

We look to our scholars to lead us in partaking of our role and verifying our priorities, that they may be exemplars in religion, character, conduct, and discerning enlightened speech, presenting to the nation their noble religion that brings ease [in all matters] and its practical laws in which lie the awakening and joy of the nation. Among the individuals of the nation and throughout the regions of the world, they disseminate good, peace and benevolence, through subtle knowledge, insightful wisdom and political guidance in all matters, uniting and not dividing, appeasing hearts and not deterring them, looking to the horizons of fulfillment to meet the requirements and challenges of the 21st century.

We ask God to prepare for our Islamic Nation the paths of renaissance, prosperity and advancement; to shield it from the evils of extremism and close-mindedness; to preserve its rights, sustain its glory, and uphold its dignity. What an excellent Lord is he, and what an excellent Supporter.

God Almighty says: This is My straight path, so follow it. And follow not the [other] ways, lest you be parted from His way. This has He ordained for you, that you may be God-fearing. (6:152-153)

The last of our supplications is that praise be to God, Lord of the worlds.

*Amman
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Ramadan 1425 Hijri
November 2004 AD*

(Amman Message 2004)

Appendix Three

List of contents of the Jordanian grade ten 'Civic and National Education' textbook

The grade ten 'Civic and National Education' textbook (MoE 2005b) comprises 27 lessons that are divided over 8 teaching unit units. Students are introduced to these lessons over the academic year that is divided into two semesters. The following is a translation for the 'list of contents, as it appears on pages three and four of the textbook.

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<i>The first semester</i>		
<i>Unit one</i>	<i>Educational and media institutions</i>	<i>7</i>
<i>Lesson one</i>	<i>Education in Jordan</i>	<i>8</i>
<i>Lesson Two</i>	<i>Vocational education in Jordan</i>	<i>13</i>
<i>Lesson Three</i>	<i>Culture and media</i>	<i>18</i>
<i>Unit Two</i>	<i>The State of Jordan and its institutions (citizenship)</i>	<i>23</i>
<i>Lesson one</i>	<i>The concept of citizenship and its components</i>	<i>24</i>
<i>Lesson Two</i>	<i>Citizenship: objectives, duties and rights</i>	<i>28</i>
<i>Lesson Three</i>	<i>Citizenship values and it demands</i>	<i>31</i>
<i>Unit Three</i>	<i>The State of Jordan and its institutions (democracy)</i>	<i>35</i>
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<i>Lesson Two</i>	<i>Democracy: domain and applications</i>	<i>40</i>
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the second semester

<i>Unit Five</i>	<i>Reason, logic and dialogue</i>	<i>63</i>
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<i>Lesson one</i>	<i>The Arab Army- the Jordanian Armed Forces</i>	<i>94</i>
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<i>Lesson one</i>	<i>Al-Mafrq Province</i>	<i>110</i>
<i>Lesson Two</i>	<i>Ma'daba Province</i>	<i>115</i>
<i>Lesson Three</i>	<i>Theaban</i>	<i>120</i>
 <i>References</i>		 <i>124</i>

Appendix Four

Distribution of religious quotations per lesson

Appendix Four shows the distribution of direct religious quotations per lesson. Religious quotations are taken to include any direct quotation taken from the Holly Qur'an, sayings of Prophet Mohammed and/or one of the First Four Caliphs in the early days of Islam. The total number of religious quotations in the textbook is 47 distributed over 14 lessons.

Unit No.		No. of religious quotations
Lesson No.		
The first semester		
Unit one	Educational and media institutions	-
Lesson one	Education in Jordan	3
Lesson Two	Vocational education in Jordan	1
Lesson Three	Culture and media	0
Unit Two	The State of Jordan and its institutions (citizenship)	-
Lesson one	The concept of citizenship and its components	3
Lesson Two	Citizenship: objectives, duties and rights	1
Lesson Three	Citizenship values and it demands	1
Unit Three	The State of Jordan and its institutions (democracy)	-
Lesson one	Democracy: principles and objectives	0
Lesson Two	Democracy: domain and applications	1
Lesson Three	Democracy and human rights in Islam	17
Lesson Four	The basic rights of woman and child	5
Lesson Five	The democratic experience of Jordan	0
Unit Four	The State of Jordan and its institutions (political parties)	-
Lesson one	Political parties	0
Lesson Two	Political orientations and comprehensive system	0

The second semester		
Unit Five	Reason, logic and dialogue	-
Lesson one	Public opinion	0
Lesson Two	Fanaticism and discrimination	2
Lesson Three	Coexistence and tolerance	8
Unit Six	The managerial process and its features	-
Lesson one	Management and leadership	0
Lesson Two	Communication	1
Lesson Three	Human incentive	0
Lesson Four	Effective Jordanian institutions	1
Unit Seven	National security and international peace	-
Lesson one	The Arab Army- the Jordanian Armed Forces	0
Lesson Two	National security and development	2
Lesson Three	Ministry of Interior	0
Lesson Four	Security apparatus	1
Unit Eight	Biography of Jordan's civilization	-
Lesson one	Al-Mafrq Province	0
Lesson Two	Ma'daba Province	0
Lesson Three	Theeban	0
	TOTAL	47

Appendix Five

Translation of a sample Lesson

Appendix Five is an Author's translation of the Third Lesson (Coexistence and Tolerance) of the Fifth Unit (Reason, Logic and Dialogue). The linguistic analysis undertaken in section 3.3.3 mainly draws on this lesson in which four linguistic features were looked at (whole-text language organization, clause combinations, clauses and words).

The translation aims to convey to the reader an accurate account of the lesson using grammatical and lexical items from the English language. It also aims to maintain the same paragraph and sentence structures as they appear in the original text (as long as the translation is accurate). The reason for keeping the same paragraph and sentence structures as they are in the original text is to ensure that the linguistic analysis of the lesson is as accurate as possible.

Words that could give different meanings when translated to English are followed by the Arabic word written phonetically in italics inside two brackets.

Titles of Qur'anic *Surahs* (chapters) were not translated to English, but written phonetically (as translating them to English would not aid or obstruct the linguistic analysis of the lesson). The Qur'an comprises 114 *Surahs* and each *Surah* comprises different number of verses. Translations of Qur'anic verses were taken from Pickthal (1996) for which referencing details are found in the References List.

The Third Lesson

Coexistence and Tolerance

The Lord said: *"Thus We have appointed you a middle nation, that you may be witnesses over mankind. And that the Messenger may be a witness over you"*
(Surah Al Baqarah: verse 143)

Firstly: the tolerance concept

The tolerance concept is associated (*yrtabet*) with human rights, and the value of tolerance concerns a bundle of rights that characterises any democratic system including the freedom to express opinion and organization, equality under the rule of law, mercifulness to prisoners of war and respect or acceptance of the opinion of minorities.

Tolerance is a practice that may be undertaken by individuals, groups and states. From tolerance stems the readiness for allowing for expressing ideas and interests that contradict our own. Tolerance could be defined as: respect, acceptance and appreciation for cultural diversity, ways of expression and the different human attributes (*syfat*).

This definition of tolerance means, before anything else, taking a positive stance that acknowledges the rights of others in enjoying their rights and their basic freedoms that are universally acknowledged.

The practicing of tolerance does not come into conflict with human rights and it does not mean accepting social injustices or abandoning one's rights and beliefs or failing to take them seriously.

Secondly: the effect of tolerance in human relations

The human community (*Mujtama insani*) incorporates a great deal of variance and unity at the same time. Variance is manifested in the big number of races, ethnicities, religions and nationalities that hold values and beliefs that lead to different civilizations (*thaqafat*), and unity is manifested in the sharing of all members of these groups their seeking to live in dignity, peace and to achieve their ambitions and interests and based on this, what brings people together is more than what divides them, but, why the violence, struggle, ill-will and hatred that the world witnesses today?

In the current age, the association between societies and the intertwining of interests between these societies, which resulted from the communication, information and transportation revolution, makes tolerance, coexistence, communication and open dialogue necessities that are crucial for achieving the interests of all societies.

Think!

1. Racial or religious extremism come into conflict with the tolerance principle, explain.
2. What do you think of the role of school in developing the values of tolerance?

Thirdly: Amman Message

Many verses appeared in the Holy Qur'an that emphasised the tolerance principle through the meanings of "forgiveness, pardoning, charity, replacing bad deeds with good deeds and shunning the ignorant" and other meanings that call humans to be endowed by the value of tolerance. And the issuing of 'Amman Message' in November 2004A.D. came to show the real tolerant image of Islam, to protect it from external attacks and to stop false accusations against it. In this regard, Amman's Message emphasised a bundle of Islamic principles, the most prominent among them are:

To honour human being, without distinction of colour, race or religion (refer to Surah al-Isra'a: verse 70)	Amman Message	Tolerance and forgiveness (refer to Surah al-Shura: verse 40, Surah Fussilat: verse 34)
Gentleness, mercy and shunning violence (refer to Surah al-Nahl: verse 125 and Surah al-Imran: verse 159)		Respect for conventions and pledge and condemnation of treachery (refer to Surah al-Nahl: verse 91)
Balance, moderation and equanimity (refer to Surah al-Baqara: verse 143)		To ensure mercy and welfare to all people (refer to Surah al-Anbiya'a: verse 107)
Treating others justly and safeguarding their rights (refer to Surah al-Ma'ida: verse 8, Surah al-Ni'sa'a: verse 58, Surah al-A'araf: verse 85)		To uphold human right for non-fighters (refer to Surah al-Maida: verse 32, Surah al-Mumtahina: verse 8, Surah al-Anaam: verse 51)

Figure (5-6): Principles of 'Amman Message'.

Think!

There are those who consider tolerance a form of surrender and submission to the other. What do you think about that?

Activity

Write a report about the values of tolerance that are encompassed in Amman Message.

Fourthly: The importance of tolerance.

Tolerance is a key for solving disagreements, and a necessary condition for peace and social progress, and through tolerance we can overpower bigotry, discrimination and hatred. And the following represent the most prominent positive effects that could be achieved through tolerance:

1. Mutual respect between religions, sects and denominations.
2. Stability and peacefulness of the society.
3. Establishing the values of coexistence and free and rational dialogue.
4. Overcoming attitudes of bigotry and discrimination.
5. Providing social harmony in multicultural societies.
6. Openness between different cultures and the achievement of common gains.
7. Respect for human freedoms and rights.

To achieve the values of tolerance, it is necessary to unite efforts of formal and civil institutions of the state as this reflects positively on all members of society and its institutions. And the United Nations General Assembly approved the announcement of tolerance related principles on 16 November 1995A.D, and it declared that day as the International Day for Tolerance.

Think!

What is the role of the media and political parties in engendering tolerance and coexistence in society?

Fifthly: Forms of tolerance and its means

Tolerance has different forms that concern social relations between individuals and groups and relations between countries, and the most prominent of these forms are:

1- Religious tolerance

The Lord said: *"Lo! those who believe, and those who are Jews, and Sabaeans, and Christians- Whosoever believes in Allah and the Last Day and does right- there shall be no fear come upon them neither shall they grieve"*.

Surah al-Ma'idah: Verse (69)

2- Tolerance in dealings

The Lord said: *"Repel evil with that which is better. We are best aware of that which they allege"*.

Surah al-Mu'minun: Verse (96)

3- Racial tolerance

The Noble Prophet said in the farewell deed speech: *"Your father is one, you all belong to Adam and Adam is made of earth. The most honourable amongst you in the eyes of God in the most devout, and the Arab has no advantage over the Persian except in devotion"*.

4- Cultural tolerance

Every society has its own culture and has the right to be proud of it and to promote it.

Think!

- 1- Mention other forms of tolerance.
- 2- Mention other instances from the Qur'an or the traditions of Prophet Mohammed, *al-Sunna*, that address the different forms of toleration.

Tolerance has its tools and means through which it could be achieved. The figure below illustrates the most prominent of these:




Figure (5-7): Means of tolerance.

Think!

How can education (*tathqeef*) be used as a means for tolerance?

Questions:

- 1- Mention four positive effects for tolerance.
- 2- What is the relationship between tolerance and bigotry?
- 3- Derive the meaning of tolerance in the following Holy verses.

The Lord said:

a. *"We make no distinction between any of His messengers – and they say: We hear, and we obey. (Grant us) Your forgiveness, our Lord. Unto You is the journeying"*
(Surah al-Baqarh: verse 285)

b. *"There is no compulsion in religion. The right direction is henceforth distinct from error".*
(Surah al-Baqara: verse 256)

c. *"And argue not with the People of the Scripture unless it be in (a way) that is better"*
(Surah al-Ankaboot, verse: 46)

d. *"The food for those who have received the Scripture is lawful for you, and your food is lawful for them".*
(Surah al-Maida, Verse 5)

- 4- How can dialogue be a means for tolerance?
- 5- Mention three means for achieving the principle of tolerance.
- 6- What is the role of the family in the development of the value of tolerance?

Appendix Six

Globalization from a Middle Eastern perspective⁴⁸

Views about globalization in Arabic literature range from viewing it as a relatively new phenomenon that was made possible by developments in science and technology (el-Azm 1999), to viewing it as a continuation of an old imperialist Western project (Amin 1998). For some, 'the economy' is the instigator and the motive behind globalization, and for others it is much more than that; it represents a direct offensive that is determined to spread political and cultural 'American' hegemony over national and traditional ways of life, in which economic interference and open market strategies are just influential means for achieving this purpose (al-Jassour 2000).

The relation between globalization and the role of the nation state is viewed in different ways depending on how globalization itself is viewed. While globalization is seen by some to undermine the authority of the nation state (Amin 1998), others argue that globalization cannot progress without the backing-up offered by a strong nation state (al-Azm 1999).

Globalization is associated with the rise of multinational corporations. Such corporations, backed up by huge budgets, international trade treaties and advanced technology, are becoming increasingly influential in national policy planning (Abdullah 1997, al-Jabri 1998). Governments that wish to attract such corporations must provide an environment that allows them to operate and invest. Those who regard globalization as a threat to the authority of the nation state argue that governments that are bound by international treaties cannot have a free hand in making their own decisions, but often have to give priority to the international over the local, and the compromise, as Brecher and Smith (1999) argue, becomes even more alarming as governments compete to attract such capital.

On the other hand, those who see a strong relation between globalization and the role of the nation state argue that capitalism had always depended on the presence of a strong nation state, which promoted it and facilitated its spreading (Brown & Lauder 1997, al-Azm 1999). Globalization, Mayo (2005) argues, is often associated with neo-liberal policies which became increasingly influential at the international level during the eighties of the past century. Starting from the 1970s, the economic boom that followed the Second World War started to slow down. Neo-liberals argued that this slowing down was a natural result of the expanding role of the state as a welfare provider and its control over market operations. State resources, they pointed out, were used to support inefficient public enterprises and state bureaucracies rather than being used productively.

The spread of neo-liberal policies was aided by the bigger role played by international agencies such as the World Bank, the IMF and the World Trade Organization. During the 1980s, different governments turned to the IMF and the World Bank for financial aid. Borrowing governments needed first of all to put their own houses in order through the adoption of pragmatic policy strategies that

⁴⁸ This brief account of globalization is mainly taken from an EdD assignment prepared previously by the Author as part of the requirements of the programme.

allowed them to reduce rates of inflation and minimize public expenditure. To be able to do so, borrowing countries had to roll back the role of the state as a welfare provider and instead turn to the private sector to provide some of the services that used to be offered by the state. Countries had to increase market mechanisms and charge in return for offering public services like education and health. At the international level, these governments had to open up their economies for foreign investments and liberalize their international trade policies by opening up their markets and reducing tariff barriers (Mayo 2005).

Globalization and technological developments particularly in the field of communications, whether regarded as independent agents or tied together, did open the door wide for new opportunities. At the same time, they also created new risks that nation states, societies and individuals had to deal with. Development "is being reinvented by new markets (e.g., foreign exchange and capital markets), new tools (e.g., the Internet and cellular phones), new actors (e.g., non-governmental organizations, the European Union and the World Trade Organization) and new rules (e.g., multilateral agreements on trade, services and intellectual property)" (AHDR 2002 p1). As a result of these developments, change in the different fields of life is occurring at a pace that states, societies and individuals are sometimes finding hard to catch up with.

Whether globalization is seen to undermine the role of the nation state or whether globalization does demand a strong nation state that backs it up, it is clear that the role of the nation state must be redefined in order to meet the new challenges and demands of the new era. The constant change in market demands brought about by globalization brings with it a sense of instability on the side of employees and, at the same time, presents a new challenge for nation states that regard employability as one of their main objectives. For employees to survive the dynamics of a changing global market, they need to be willing and capable to adapt. The best employee, in this set-up, is one who is able to extract and assimilate new information and is willing to obtain training whenever needed (Witte 2000). In light of this, life long learning becomes an important quality that educational policy and planning in Arab states need to enforce. Life long learning helps employees to improve their adaptability enabling them to deal with a variety of situations that may be unforeseeable in an economically and politically changing world, and hence improves their own productivity and employability.

As a result of knowledge becoming increasingly shared in the globalization age, values, attitudes and behaviours are crossing borders much more easily than before making the distinction between local and foreign values harder to maintain. However, globalization is accused of not providing fair opportunities for mutual cultural encounters (al-Askari 2001) and concerns are raised about the imbalanced flow of cultural messages that are "heavily weighted in one direction, from rich countries to poor" (UNDP report 2000 p345). Questions are raised about the relation between globalization and the margin of freedom left for traditional societies to protect and preserve their cultural and religious identities. Questions are also raised about the extent to which the more influential countries in the globalization debate are willing to learn about and respect societies that are more traditional in their outlook (UNDP report 2000).

Concerning the materialization of a standardized global culture, some Arab and non-Arab writers present a different perception that concludes the possibility of the emergence of more distinctive national and regional identities which pose another threat to the role of the nation state. They argue that although peoples could be

increasingly receiving the same information, buying the same products, etc., yet, this would occur in their differing settings of rich and poor countries, and differing cultures (Abu Halaweh 2001). Holders of this view argue that our surrounding history, culture and values have a much greater impact on us than we are sometimes aware, and that humans are constantly in search of a sense of belonging. The splitting up of nations according to ethnic, tribal, and sectarian lines is becoming a trend in the age of globalization (al-Askari 2001, Smith 2000) so that instead of an amalgamation of world cultures, globalization is providing chances for cultural encounters that may lead to disagreement and conflict. Robins (2000) provides illustrations of this phenomenon in the tension between the Western and Islamic worlds, the defensiveness of Europeans against American media and products, and the traditional European identities such as Basque, Briton, and Scottish that have been reasserting themselves as a counter reaction to cultural globalization.

Globalization could also be regarded as an important factor in hastening the political and social liberalization in the Arab world. The free flow of information has challenged the control and censorship imposed by state and traditional sources of authority in the region. Individuals are becoming better informed about democratic experiences in other parts of the world, which allows them to compare and contrast their experiences with others and helps them make better informed decisions. Globalization is also argued to bring international guarantees for human rights in general and for minorities in particular.

Despite the importance that conservatives place on the need for maintaining social, cultural and religious values, practically speaking, the unavoidable infiltration of foreign values and behaviours through the different means of communication forces the concept of protection to take on a new meaning. Askari (2001), among other Arab social commentators, argues that the difficult political, and in many cases economic, conditions in the different Arab states, coupled with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism which attempts to impose conformity among people, have the effect of encouraging individuals to escape their harsh realities into the more attractive world of the media and cyberspace that is dominated by the technologically developed countries, which increases the challenge for traditional sources of authority. In other words, protection through censorship is not an option any more and the innocence of young children cannot be assumed to be true any longer. Individuals, as Stables writes "have become less and less the unquestioning recipients of a role allotted to them by society, and more and more the conscious agents of their own career and lifestyle choices" (2003 p4). Students cannot be regarded "as 'empty vessels' to be stuffed full of unquestioned facts and narrowly enculturated" (Stables 2003 p4) as the traditional Fordist view of education used to regard them. Despite the fact that these changes are, to varying extents, affecting all societies, this same Fordist view is still influential in educational thinking and practices in traditional societies, like Arab societies, where collectivist traditional cultural and religious norms still hold a strong grip on the different aspects of life.

It is becoming more and more important in order to cope with the huge flow of information, that youngsters need to be equipped with the skills of accessing, analyzing, and utilizing appropriate knowledge available through the different means of communication. Equally important is the equipment of youngsters with the qualities of thinking independently, making judgments and decisions, and evaluating information that provide them with the means to adapt in a fast changing world (Cogburn 2001).